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Conflicts in the Niger Delta have reached a political brink that has attracted significant 
concerns and responsiveness at both local and international levels. Several theses have been 
centred around the recurring issues in the region, pointing to the argumentation of resource 
governance, marginalization, and neglect. While all these structural factors are valid and serve 
as the basis for understanding the grievances, a unique question still remains unanswered: why 
have the Ogoni and the Ijaw, which have in the region shared common, lived experiences, 
reacted differently to these problems?  As this gap in the literature suggests, scholarship on the 
Niger Delta has tended to conflate these two distinct conflicts into one single movement of 
opposition and resistance.  
 
The current thesis argues that in order to better understand the undercurrents of the Niger Delta 
conflict, it is imperative to analyse the dynamics of choice in terms of the distinct courses of 
action taken by the two groups. Given the similar structural constraints, it is essential to 
consider why the Ogoni adopted nonviolent resistance, and the Ijaw violent resistance. This 
question builds on a rich scholarly literature, which situates the causal factors of the conflict 
within three broadly contextual, structural, explanations: the political, socio-economic and 
environmental ones. However, these common structural factors cannot explain the divergent 
political strategies the Ogoni and the Ijaw have adopted to respond to the crisis. The dissertation 
argues for the inclusion of other key factors, namely narratives, leadership and organisation. 
These three factors are important for explaining the ‘how’ and ‘why’ within the political 
trajectories of the Ogoni and Ijaw in terms of nonviolence and violence. This more nuanced 
perspective provides a new context to the knowledge that each group employs distinct 
strategies in constructing its conflict, hence, each group works towards some context specificity 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
 Introduction 
Conflicts in multi-ethnic countries remain a primary challenge to peace globally. From the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to the Basque region of Spain and Northern Ireland, from 
Ruwanda to Sudan, from Fiji to Indonesia, several conflicts have been fought along ethnic 
(Horowitz, 2000) or religious lines through nonviolent and violent means. Ake (2000: 94) 
proposed that political divides would gradually emerge along ethnic or religious courses, 
deepening discontent and conflicts in Africa. These rifts of ethnic or clan conflicts remain 
dominant across much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and have arisen from episodes of democratic 
transitions (Mozaffar, 1995: 34) which have created threatening uncertainties for groups (Gurr, 
2000: 85). Such is the situation Nigeria finds itself as, from independence to date, it has 
witnessed nonviolent and several violent conflicts.  
 
African countries are continuously faced with one form of conflict or another. In Somalia,  
Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, the conflicts are ongoing, with various implications for peace, security 
and development (The World Bank, 2011). The African conflict landscape is composed of 
violence and nonviolence, which also includes terrorist attacks by movements that claim 
ideological reasons (ibid). Although conflicts are endemic in every society and make up one of 
the central features of human existence (Desai and Potter, 2008: 450), they impact negatively 
by destroying  material resources and social networks which made daily life possible dating 
back to the colonial era (Ezirim, 2011: 61). The institutionalisation of colonial rule in Africa, 
especially through the last years of the nineteenth and the very early decades of the twentieth 
centuries, ushered in a considerable variety of responses from African societies (Kastfelt, 1976: 
1); some expressed through violence and others through nonviolence. These reactions, 
according to Kastfelt, should be regarded as expressions of African politics demonstrated 
differently, indicating diverse local political differences (ibid). Some embraced the colonial 
rule in terms of its anticipated economic and political benefits, while others responded by active 
protest and resistance against the establishment of colonial rule (Ajayi and Crowder, 1976). 
Along with colonial rule came loss of traditional independence, and the institutionalisation of 
novel forms of economic and political orders, which were in direct opposition to the existing 
cultural forms of organisation (Ibid). This was apparent, for instance, in the local ethnic and 
religious customs of African communities, particularly the introduction of new taxes (ibid). 
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The period from 1905 to 1921 witnessed various types of African resistance against the British 
and their African supporters in the administrative system (Kastfelt, 1976: 3). Resistance is 
opposition that is refused legal recognition (Scruton, 2007: 595) based on an identity based 
political action (Howe, 1998). As a conscious rejection of values that maintain prevailing 
power relations (Faith, 1994; Hollander and Einwohner, 2004: 534), it has also been referred 
to as a deliberate questioning of the existing structure of national roles, as well as a rethinking 
of how such roles may be structured (Brown, 1994:167). Resistance takes place in various 
situations, including political systems and revolutions (Skocpol, 1979; Goldstone, 1991; Scott, 
1987). The Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-1907 in Tanzania demonstrates a violent resistance by 
African indigenous communities in German East Africa against the colonial rule, and it has 
arisen from a policy designed to compel African people to grow cotton for export (Garibaldi, 
2011). Other examples include, The Mau Mau uprising in Kenya 1952-1960 (Anderson, 2006) 
and the Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba resistance in Senegal in the 1880s which was subtle and 
aimed towards local matters of political and economic autonomy against the French (Talton, 
u.d) . Although the South African apartheid resistance was devoid of military engagement, it 
was however marked by mass uprisings and random guerrilla attacks. There were boycotts too 
in the South African case as seen in the Soweto Uprising of 1976 in which African students 
boycotted schools and protested against having Afrikaans language taught in their schools 
(ibid). 
 
Characteristically, resistance in African conflicts indicates forms in which outcomes of a 
changed global order, identity and greed are interconnected within contexts of injustice, 
predation and repression (Sawyer, 2004). The question of categorizing these features and 
recognizing their salience in each theatre of conflict becomes important. Gurr (2000b) notes 
that in conflict situations as seen in Africa, where identity issues are foremost as seen in the 
Niger Delta, strongly attracts world-wide acknowledgment in terms of the importance of 
minority rights which mostly result in negotiated settlements. However, in several theatres of 
African conflicts, identity may not continuously be the most outstanding concern at the source, 
suggesting that conflicts undergo transformations (Sawyer, 2004). As rightly pointed out by 
Haynes (1995: 89) ‘Africa’s second liberation or second independence in the early 1990s 
involved a series of widespread political upheavals’. He refers to the rise of demands centered 
on democratisation, economic reforms and human rights, signifying the emergence of political 
opinions within certain society groups, which were subsequently transformed into fundamental 
aspects of political agendas, by professional politicians. These requests for democratisation and 
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economic change in Africa, Haynes explains, demonstrate ‘a reawakening of political voice by 
dormant interest groups, inspired by international developments, whose worries were 
understandably aggravated by decades of popular frustration and disappointment (Ibid). As the 
subsequent chapters will show in the Nigerian case, the emergence of new leaders, such as Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, brought to the attention of the international community such socioeconomic 
problems and resourcefulness linked to human rights issues, that, had previously been 
overlooked by the state.  
 
Conflict discourses within the African context (Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, South Africa) revolve 
around the participation of youths’ in making claims and demands against the state employing 
both violent and nonviolent actions (Özerdem and Podder, 2015: 1). Özerdem and Podder note 
that youth as a conceptual grouping, are ‘othered’ in the debate on conflict, and presented as 
hypothetically dangerous ‘subjects’ and policy outlines them as ‘a problem (ibid: 4). Their 
engagement in conflict and resistance has emboldened them with power and potential, but one 
which is categorized by the state as marginal and therefore, subjected (Ibid: 6). This is why 
understanding the different forms of conflict which is a ubiquitous feature of all political 
societies becomes particularly crucial. 
 
Nigeria is a microcosm of Africa with a population of over 170 million, it is made up of 36 
states (see Figure 1), and 774 local governments. Politically, the country is split into 6 
geopolitical zones, 1): North Central - comprising Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, 
Plateau states and Federal capital Territory Abuja; 2) North East - comprising Adamawa, 
Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states; 3) North West - comprising Jigawa, Kaduna, 
Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara states; 4) South East– comprising Abia, Anambra, 
Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states; 5) South South – comprising Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo and Rivers states; 6) and the South West – comprising Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, 
Osun and Oyo states (see Figure 2). The three major ethnic groups are the Hausa in the north, 
Igbo in the east and Yoruba in the west. It is almost evenly split between Muslims and 
Christians, and endowed with vast resources (Walker, 2011). It is encompassed in a complex 
mosaic of ethnic, regional, and religious identities, all of which have over the years served as 
one form of threats to the country’s stability at one point or another. In similarity to some of its 
sub-Saharan African neighbors, the state struggles to contain political, socio-economic, ethnic 
and religious differences among its people (Elaigwu, 2003).  
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Nigeria is a large country in the West African region, covering 356,668b square miles bordered 
to the south by the Bights of Benin and Biafra, which are on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean, to the west, by Benin, to the north by Niger, and Cameroon to the east. It is separated 
from Chad in its extreme north eastern corner by the Lake Chad (Falola and Heaton, 2008).  
With over $47.6 billion in external reserve, Nigeria has been described as the largest economy 
in the sub-region in terms of resources and other economic potentials, as well as being among 
the largest oil producers in the world (Obada, 2013). The 1914 success story of the 
amalgamation of diverse groups in Nigeria has radically depicted an arena of conflict and 
violence rather than a platform for peaceful coexistence. The conflict has arisen from the 
inherited colonial culture of state violence as well as the socioeconomic and political structures 
which exist today in post-independence Nigeria, in the form of the police and military. These 
mechanisms were exerted almost precisely in the colonial era (Elaigwu, 2003). Similarly to the 
former colonial overlords whose attitude to internal security barely acknowledged the genuine 
concerns of the subject people, the Nigerian state’s conception of the indigenous leadership of 
organised protests is more of threats, against the obvious deficiencies of the neo-colonial order, 
which attracted decisive reaction in the form of massive mobilisation and the use of repressive 
state apparatus on agitators (ibid).  
Figure 1.1 
  




Map of Nigeria showing the six geopolitical zones in the country. Source: 
nigeriamasterweb.com 
 
The Nigerian polity and social environment could be disaggregated into three distinct epochs: 
the era of modern politics 1946-1966, the military era 1966-1999, and the civilian democracy 
1999-date (Turaki, 1982). Alternatively, as Ojo (2006:466) adds, Nigeria has gone through 
fluid and unusual phases, starting with the era of colonial autocracy and absolutism that is, 
explained by Ojo as the period under colonial rule until attaining independence on October 1, 
1960. Ojo identifies the next phase as the advent of constitutional democracy between 1960 
and 1966, followed by the arrival of military dictatorship from 1966 to 1979 and the 
reestablishment of constitutional democracy between 1979 and 1983. He places the second 
coming of military autocracy at around 1983 and 1989 (Ibid:235), and argues that since 1989, 
the polity has added three more phases to her democratisation bid. Currently the country is in 
its Fourth Republic, and it is experiencing its longest uninterrupted period of civilian 
administration ever. From the attainment of independence in 1960, however, the Nigerian 
polity has for most of the period been afflicted with insecurity (Elaigwu, 2012:176) and 
escalating episodes of violent militancy to which the state has consistently reacted with military 
force. State policies in third World countries such as Nigeria are shaped by factors which 
include but not limited to ‘the nature of domestic political structures and distributions of wealth 
and income’ (Haynes, 1999:224). Burnell and Randall (2008: 466), establish that the 1990’s 
were arguably the most challenging periods in Nigeria’s political and economic development 
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in addition to events that unfolded in the 2000s. During the 2000s a country, Nigeria faced 
several forms of nonviolent and uprisings in terms of ethno-religious, political and economic 
issues.  
 
Nevertheless, Nigeria, the ‘giant of Africa’ has over the years been caught up in recurrent 
cycles of civil conflicts of various magnitudes and outlook within a political disposition that 
has seen a rise in violence. Civil unrests of diverse dimensions and nature have manifested 
intermittently in Nigeria’s historical development preceding and since its independence in 
1960. Despite the fact that since 1999, Nigeria has been in a democratic form of government, 
the conflicts have been on the rise and have become more militarized than they were even in 
the military era. Militarization according to Ross (1987), refers to the predisposition towards 
violent lines of action to the detriment of nonviolent modes of persuasion. These modes of 
disputes revolve around sequences of related episodes in which the pressure and engagement 
of force by groups is clearly targeted at the state (Mitchell et al., 1986). These conflicts have 
been delivered in different political, socio-economic, and religious forms, as seen in the Tiv 
uprisings 1960-1964; Maitatsine riots 1980-1985; Tiv – Jukun and Jukun - Kuteb unrests in the 
1990s; Niger Delta from the 1980s, Kaduna and Jos from the 1980s (Elaigwu, 2003) and Boko 
Haram insurgency from 2002. Irrespective of their specific character, each of these conflicts 
could be considered as a distinctive study in violence, which have created reasonable doubts 
about the sustainability of the Nigerian nationhood (ibid).  
 
These cycles of conflict and violent militancy have resulted in prolonged periods of 
unpredictability and uncertainty. Social development, for instance, has particularly remained 
very low, as money seldom makes its way into productive usage, a factor that has dampened 
Nigeria’s pursuit for stability, national security and accelerated economic development. 
Several of its worst conflicts pit the original inhabitants of a particular place against supposedly 
later settlers, exemplified in the Jos indigene-settler conflicts, which seem to  be growing 
deadlier and more numerous with time (Sayne, 2012). In some parts of the country, particularly 
in the Middle-Belt area, there have been decades of substantial migrations, and these 
movements pitched indigenes against the settlers in the pursuit of control over polity and 
economy (Elaigwu, 2014: 23).  
 
Factors which are often considered primordial such as the political and social arguments, have 
played major roles in the character of these conflicts, due to the country’s politicized turbulent 
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history, illustrated by the fear of domination of the Christians from the south by the slightly 
more populous northern Muslims at the federal level (Falola and Heaton, 2008). At the national 
level, the fear expressed by ethnic minorities of domination by larger ethnic groups might be 
illustrated by that of the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo 
in the southeast, (ibid; Yakubu et al., 2011:38). The Nigerian Civil War (1967 to 1970) is an 
example of these ethnic and religious tensions, in addition to numerous episodes of both 
organised attacks and spontaneous riots targeted at ethnic and religious minorities. In reality, 
the existence of such challenging social forces and interests within and between societies makes 
violence an inescapable phenomenon in human relationships, where the dimensions and 
occurrences of such violence are often representations of the depth of social disagreements 
(Elaigwu, 2003). Also, in most of the conflicts experienced, soldiers had been drafted to repress 
the crises and restore temporary ‘peace’, overlooking the importance of restoring permanent 
peace between and among the concerned groups (Albert, 2003).  
 
Politics, ethnicity and religion have generally been related with violence and insurgency in 
Nigeria (Alemika, 2012). The country has recorded several incidents of inter-group violence 
in the past decade all of which have resulted in numerous casualties across the country (Alubo, 
2006). The frequency and recurring nature of such conflicts often makes it quite challenging to 
distinguish between ethnic and religious violence due to the conflation of the two identities. 
Large scale conflicts have resulted in huge losses of lives and the destruction of property across 
the country, with the highest frequency recorded in the north (Alemika, 2012). In fact, the 
contested nature of these conflicts has mainly been associated with the political elite’s strategic 
employment of ethnic and religious sentiments to further their personal interests. Political 
entrepreneurs galvanize and sometimes separate ethnic and religious differences among the 
groups as a process of attaining political and economic power (Tilly, 2003). Another element 
is the implication of the socioeconomic environment in relation to the quality of life, level of 
inequality and impact of political repression especially of specific ethnic groups by the state 
(Lutz and Lutz, 2011). For the benefit of this study, the Niger Delta conflicts serve as the major 
focus, especially in attempting to understand why different people, the Ogoni and the Ijaw in 
the same region perceive and react to the conflict in different ways, some through nonviolence 
and others with violence. 
 
Within the Nigerian context, poverty, corruption and inequalities in relation to equal access to 
oil resources, education, health and other social infrastructures have all been presented as 
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causal factors (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Naanen, 1995; Osaghae, 1995; Watts, 1999,  
2003). The perception of alienation and involvement in the management and control of oil 
(Ukiwo, 2007; Okonta, 2008; Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010), the lack of political power 
combined with the oppression and repression by the state (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a; Afinotan and 
Ojakorotu, 2009) and digested as inequalities (Obi, 2006,  2007,  2009;  Ikein, 2009;  Ojakorotu, 
2010; Frynas, 2001) have led to several conflicts in the oil producing communities in the Niger 
Delta. Such grievances here are expressed by nonviolent civil strategies and also represented 
by several militancy activities against the state and multinational oil companies. These 
perceptions of marginalisation, neglect and domination are easily transferred within 
communities along ethnic networks cutting across all aspects of the society, resulting in the 
advent of a society thrown up and divided along ethnic and religious lines (Horowitz, 2000). 
This also suggests that when individuals in the oil producing areas assimilate, they combine 
new experiences into the existing framework, capturing culturally and historically dependent 
discourses that rest on social interaction (Piaget, 1985) which transform into discontentment, 
frustrations and conflicts. 
 
1.1 The Niger Delta 
 
Situated in the south south geopolitical zone of southern Nigeria, the Niger Delta region is that 
part of Nigeria which is defined by the delta of the Niger River (Anele and Nkpah, 2013: 53).  
It is a massive marshland spreading over a large expanse of territories crisscrossed by rivers, 
rivulets, springs and other natural topographical endowment (Horsfall, 1999:1). The area, rich 
in oil and natural gas deposits as well as flora and fauna, comprises of four main ecological 
zones: the coastal barrier sandy ridge; mangrove swamp; fresh water swamp; and lowland 
forest (UNDP, 2006: 19). It has been described as the third largest delta area in the world, 
approximately 26,000km (Oboreh, 2010: 17), second only to the Mississippi and Pantanal in 
South West Brazil (Anele and Nkpah, 2013: 13). It is home to over 606 oil fields, both onshore 
and offshore, with each field comprising several oil rigs and flow stations (Umukoro, 2010: 
86). It is that part of the country that is solely responsible for the provision of over 90 percent 
of the country’s foreign exchange income, through crude oil extraction and exportation, thereby 
making it the most strategic region (Ikein, 2009) upon which the national economy relies 
(ibid:8). It consists of the coastal margin and swamps which run along the coast from the East 
to the West that comprises the lagoon coast made up of the fresh water from the rivers and sea 
(Ojeifo, 2014: 17; Ekong et al., 2013: 42-43). The Niger Delta region is made up of the states 
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of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Rivers, and Ondo (see Figure 
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This Niger Delta is home to more than 40 ethnicities, 250 dialects and 3,000 communities (ICG, 
2006: 26)  it houses ethnic nationalities that include the Andoni, Efik, Ogoja, Annang, Ibibio, 
Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ikwere, Kalabari, Ogoni and Okrika, with some sections of the Yourba and Igbo 
(see figure 4). The Ijaw is the largest ethnic group and arguably the fourth largest in the 
Nigerian state (ibid). The Delta people are traditionally hunters, farmers, fishermen, and 
producers of palm oil.  
 





However, a disconnection occurs between the economic advantage of the region and the 
quantum of resources expended for its development, which has created structural imbalances 
in the area. The majority of the communities are situated extremely close to the oilfields and 
pipelines that crisscross their landscapes, which brings about several associated environmental, 
health and socioeconomic problems. Arising from this, the region has been characterised by 
increasing spates of insecurity and threats in addition to series of uprisings (Umukoro, 2010: 
50) such as attacks of oil pipelines and kidnapping of oil workers for ransom by aggrieved Ijaw 
youths. The people in the region believe that they have been neglected by the state, owing to 
the perception that, they have barely benefitted from the rich resources they produce and the 
negative impact that oil exploration and production  activities have on their traditional means 
of livelihood, which has been destroyed (Umukoro, 2010: 18). 
 
Accordingly, the dawn of militancy in the Niger Delta has been ascribed to several factors both 
historical and contemporary. Afinotan & Ojakorotu, argue that these imbalances have made 
the region famed for constant violence, terrorism and insurgency, embedded within a complex 
network of creeks and braided streams, serving as operational bases of numerous insurgent 
groups (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009). The continuous period of military rule from December 
1993 to May 1999 saw the increase in demands for resource control and resistance in the Niger 
Delta.  Prior to 1999, the military had control of the state under the leaderships of Major 
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General Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985), Generals’ Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and 
Sani Abacha (1993-1998), and most Nigerians were apprehensive of the military, particularly 
with human rights trampled upon (Agbu, 2004: 36). The perception that very little could be 
done about grievances in the existing structure of the state saw the institutionalisation of 
agitations and demands for self-determination and resource control, which were misinterpreted 
as threats to the legitimacy of the then military administration in power (Idemudia and Ite, 
2006). They were regarded as predispositions unacceptable to the government (Omeje, 2004; 
Okoh, 1996).  
 
Consequently, in explaining the Niger Delta conflicts, understanding the various debates, such 
as those hinged on the occurrence of oil and the presence of multinational oil companies 
(Oboreh, 2010: 19), exploitation, marginalization and neglect (Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010: 
5; Ojakorotu, 2010), paradoxes and contradictions of environmental degradation (Watts, 2008: 
35; Ikein, 2009); Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 88) becomes very vital. The prevailing 
deprivation exacerbated by continuous ecological damage wrought on the Niger Delta has 
collectively caused it to be ‘mangled, raped and denuded’ (Kuku, 2012). This situation heralded  
various styles of responses from Niger Delta groups in the form of civil unrests, militancy as 
well as opportunistic criminality (Umukoro, 2011: 50; Anele and Nkpah, 2013; Ebeku, 2008; 
Okonta, 2008). The belief that there was little in terms of solutions that could be sought for 
their grievances in the existing structure of the state saw the clamour for self-determination and 
resource control become the order of the day, which were unfortunately misconstrued as threats 
to nationalism and to the legitimacy of the state by the central state (Omeje, 2004; Idemudia 
and Ite, 2006: 395; Okoh, 1996). These postulations indicate the existence of an array of distinct 
minority ethnic groups that have shared lived experiences especially regarding the oil 
exploration. However, the structural factors so often indicated as causes of the conflict are not 
in themselves sufficient to explain the course of resistance adopted by different groups.  
 
Structural explanations are necessary factors but not sufficient for the course of the resistance 
(agency), so the thesis fits within the standard problem of structure and agency in International 
Relations, bearing in mind the shared relation between agency and structure. Structure refers 
to social relationships and shared meanings (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012:284) while agency has to 
do with the actors (ibid: 287). Viotti and Kauppi contend that structure can inspire agents to 
reconsider their interests and identities within an ongoing socialisation process, indicating that 
agents have a bearing on structures in terms of how they are transformed and shaped. Therefore, 
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agents and structures equally constitute one another (ibid). In the course of resisting against oil 
exploration and production induced environmental issues, unequal income distribution, neglect 
and marginalisation, oil producing communities in the Niger Delta demanded for a fair share 
of the revenues as well as right to self-determination and resource control. However, the Ogoni 
group, whose resistance peaked in the early to mid-1990’s, operated under military 
administrations, and were thus confronted with the might of the armed forces security 
apparatus.   
 
Nevertheless, the openness of democratic space in 1999 and the allowance of human rights, 
especially that of freedom of speech and agitation for better treatment, became more intense 
(Elaigwu, 2003: 16). This suggests that the transition to civilian rule provided an opportunity 
for grievances and resentments against the state and oil companies to be freely expressed 
(Alabi, 2014). In the quest for their demands for justice, some of the oil producing communities 
adopted a nonviolent civil form of engagement as will be analysed in the Ogoni movement, 
while some groups adopted a violent militant confrontation against the state and the 
multinational oil producing companies as in the Ijaw case (these will be analysed fully in 
Chapters Three, Four and Five). Some of the people in the region even regarded the militant 
youth as their protectors from oil producing activities, giving this youth some form of 
encouragement and legitimacy from their kinsmen (Alabi, 2014).  
 
1.2 Towards Strategic Choice of Nonviolence or Violence: The Background of the 
Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
 
The Niger Delta has been presented as one of Nigeria’s hot points of ethnic violence, terrorism 
and insurgency. But within the unchecked violence and revolving criminality, in addition to 
the general ensuing apprehension to extinguish the conflict and appease the militants, the real 
issues of marginalization, environmental degradation and development, seem to have been 
ignored (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009: 192). The unarmed and armed struggle, internecine 
conflict and insurgency in the Niger Delta have been incorporated under the general term of 
the Niger Delta crisis. The suggested core elements leading to the conflicts in the region are 
inclusive of injustice in socio-economic and political associations among multiple components 
of an ethnically plural nation, Nigeria. These concerns have been aptly expressed in what is 
now being termed the ‘Niger Delta Manifesto’ (Darah, 2003). The Niger Delta Manifesto stems 
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from the perceived inactions by succeeding governments to the issues affecting the region in 
terms of marginalisation and neglect which have pushed the communities to agitate and 
ultimately revolt against the state. It represents an argument which states that the resources of 
the region have been intentionally and systematically appropriated not only by the 
multinational oil conglomerates but also by the state through the mechanisms of exploitive 
laws that centralised the control of the oil wealth at the federal level. The manifesto will be 
analysed within the context of the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights as well as the 1998 Ijaw Kaiama 
Declaration in Chapter Five, the organizational chapter, to highlight the distinction between 
the dynamics of choice adopted by the two groups. 
The core characteristics of the Niger Delta problems date back to the colonial era during which 
issues of equal identity representation and resource control emerged (Edozie, 2011: 45). At this 
time the Niger Delta and the Cameroons River yielded about half of Africa’s palm oil and came 
to be known as the Oil Rivers (ICG, 2006b: 3). The palm oil trade was controlled by the Royal 
Niger Company1, chartered by the British government in 1886, which subsequently became 
the most prominent trading company operating in the region. This monopoly of palm oil trade 
triggered a high degree of frustration among other British merchants as well as the local people 
who had previously depended on the palm oil trade. The company took over its African 
competitors in 1893 and instituted tariffs and licences in the area in an action which infuriated 
the local traders who perceived the takeover as hampering them from their traditional trading 
activities and thus instigated major resentment towards the British company (ibid). 
Consequently, these hostilities culminated in an attack on the company’s headquarters in 
Akaasa by Nembe and Brass local warriors in 1895, who later made formal complaints against 
the Company. In 1900, the company involuntarily sold its lands to the British government 
(Anele and Nkpah, 2013: 14).   
 
Furthermore, as a response by locals against the massive exploitation of the colonial system, 
the area was consumed by a surge in resentments against the colonial authority in 1929. All 
sorts of resistance actions were used. For instance, a rumour about new income taxes led the 
women of Aba2 from the Opobo, Andoni, Igbo, Ibibio and Bonny ethnic groups in the Niger 
Delta region to directly confront the police, which resulted in the death of over 50 women (ICG, 
                                                          
1 A mercantile company that existed in Nigeria in the 19 century, chartered by the British government. 
2 Aba women’s riots in 1929 when women came to the forefront to protest injustice issues during in the colonial 
period. 
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2006: 4; Elaigwu, 2003: 3). The absence of political power as well as the frustration over the 
extension of direct taxation, which in 1928 had been forced on the men pushed the women of 
Aba to employ collective action by way of demonstrations to convey their discontent, against 
the listing of men, women and livestock by the then acting district officer Captain J. Cook 
(Ibid). However, during these protests which consisted mainly of sitting down, the security 
forces were brought in by the British district officers to disperse the sit-downs. The women of 
Aba were demonstrating peacefully not violently yet they were suppressed by the might of the 
colonial forces. In other words, even at that time, the incompatible and antagonistic disposition 
of the relationship between the British and the peoples of the region was characterised by 
resistance made up of different types of action, including violence. At that time, both 
nonviolence and violence were used as absolute tools to accomplish colonial interests (Ibid). 
The period witnessed other violent episodes as well, such as the 1945 Labour Strike and the 
Enugu colliery incident that are examples of the resistance of the colonised to the huge 
exploitation of the colonial system (Elaigwu, 2003: 3). These indicate that all sorts of resistance 
actions existed even during the colonial era, suggesting also that the interests of the British 
were concentrated on the economic exploitation, as well as on the political and cultural control 
of the people in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.  
 
Coming back to the present day Niger Delta, the perception among the people of the state is no 
different from the colonial period, they view it not as an unbiased arbiter with reference to 
competing interests (Okonta, 2005: 205) in a region so rich and yet characterized by a crisis of 
underdevelopment (Ikein, 2009; Umukoro, 2011: 18). The concern over domination (i) resulted 
from a lack of representation within the Nigerian political structure of governance (ii) was 
combined with issues of tangible development (iii) exacerbated the perception of 
marginalisation in the region. These three interrelated factors suggest that the above mentioned 
nonviolent and violent agitations were exacerbated by the oil exploration and production 
activities that often resulted in unequal distribution of accrued revenues, and were made worse 
by the environmental degradation which pushed the communities to react, leading to periodic 
out-breaks of conflict. Meanwhile, when government fails to guarantee the equitable and 
impartial allocation of those resources, the people are compelled to react, especially in the form 
of youth restiveness and militancy. For example, perceptions of ‘poor environmental 
conditions, deficiency in development and the reluctance of the state to attend to the demands 
made by the Ogoni served as catalysts for reactions in the area (Haynes, 1999: 236). Analysts 
suggest that such disagreements arise in the Niger Delta as a result of a clash of values and 
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claims over scarce resources and power (Yusuf, 2007: 237), and could manifest in either a 
nonviolent or violent form, or even a combination of both.  
 
The Yunguru resistance in Adamawa, located in the present day northeastern part of Nigeria, 
for instance, is an example of a combination of both nonviolent and violent forms of resistance. 
The contention here arose out of the frustration with the imposition of a Hausa district head on 
the Yunguru people who they rejected through attacks on both the Hausas and the British 
(Kastfelt, 1976). Although Kastfelt argues that some of the Adamawa peoples accepted the 
colonial political transformations without armed resistance, others preferred to fight the new 
system (Ibid). 1914 thus demonstrated a resistance against a recently created administrative 
unit in which, political, religious and ethnic factors heralded a hostility between the British and 
the locals, which resulted in the  loss of several lives including that of the Hausa District Head 
(Ibid).  In the southern Nigeria, the suppression of the locals by force of the slave trade in the 
area was the core factor  (Ikimẹ, 1972: 271). The Yoruba anti-British resistance was fractured, 
not of a united people, as various groups within the area had differing purposes and intentions. 
It was the outcome of established political and other rivalries (Ibid: 270). The resistance was 
due to the breaking of the monopoly of trade that the coastal middlemen had benefited from 
for over the best part of the nineteenth century. It is clear therefore that the resistance to colonial 
conquest was situated within the politics of the slave trade, the Yoruba rival wars and the trade 
in palm produce (Ibid). 
 
Arising from this, the conflicts in the Niger Delta could be regarded from two perspectives: the 
Ogoni example of a successful nonviolent movement against the environmental destruction of 
their land by multinational oil companies in alliance with the Nigerian state led by the late Ken 
Saro-Wiwa (Zunes et al., 1999). Secondly, the Ijaw national struggle for self-determination, 
which assumed a more fluid and radical dimension through its violent forms of expression. The 
struggle started under the late Ijaw patriot, Issac Adaka Boro (Ojo, 2009: 8), and revolved 
around the core issues of resource control, environmental protection and political 
marginalization (Naanen, 2004; Ojo, 2009; Orji, 2012).  
 
The plethora of studies on the recurring crises of the Niger Delta (Humphreys, 2005; Obi, 1997, 
Obi, 1999, Obi, 2001; Ibeanu, 2000; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Asuni, 2009; De Barros, 2004; 
Douglas et al., 2004; Omeje, 2008; Basedau and Lay, 2009) point to resource governance as 
the backdrop of conflicts in the region. Decades of the poor management of resources and the 
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neglect of the people in the region have been accountable for this misfortune (Ezirim, 2011: 
67). The conflicts in the region have been categorized into 5 major areas, intra-community; 
inter-community, inter-ethnic, community-oil company, and state-federal government 
(Onyeukwu, 2007). While this study draws on rich scholarly research on the Niger Delta 
conflicts, which puts the roots of the crisis within three contextual explanations: the political, 
socio-economic, and environmental as causal factors, it aims to further this argument by 
advocating for the inclusion of narratives, leadership and organisation in deep rooted conflict 
analysis. Narratives are important especially when the group is addressed by a leader, the leader 
usually has to stir up the group to make it participate and react by uniting around certain goals. 
This is achieved through group mobilisation on the basis of emotions and passions, which is 
what narratives do. These are reflective in the language that leaders use, which is why 
leadership and narratives go together. Leaders are normally defined as charismatic, they have 
to exercise charisma and communicative skills within which they organise their groups towards 
achieving targeted goals. These three latter factors are important for explaining the political 
trajectories of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements in terms of nonviolence and violence 
respectively. 
Firstly, the environment marks the context within which the complexity of the Niger Delta has 
been established. The reason is that the discovery and exploration of oil (Ojeifo, 2014), which 
has been heavily marked by severe environmental problems such as the physical alienation of 
land for agricultural services (ibid: 67; Soremekun and Obadare, 1998). Kadafa (2012), 
provided historic instances of oil spillages and gas flaring in the region as seen through the 
following examples: Araromi, where the first oil spill happened in 1908; Forcados tank 
terminal in July 1979; Funiwa No 5 well between January 17-30th 1980 destroying about 836 
acres of forest; Oyakama oil spillage of May 1980; Oshika village in September 1979 and 
Ogada-Brass pipeline oil spillage in February 1995 and August 1983 (Kadafa, 2012: 14). Due 
to the people’s unacceptance of the existing situations, the impact of these on the environment 
made it practical for violence to be widely accepted in the region, with the exception of the 
Ogoni, thereby making intervention by the communities very important. They provided the 
enabling environment for collective violence to thrive in the delta (Idemudia and Ite, 2006: 
400). Secondly, state failure is regarded within the context of socioeconomic factors, especially 
in explaining why development is not commensurate to what is expected in spite of the 
abundance of resources in the region. The economic factors stimulating the conflict could be 
considered along two nexuses: political-economic and the economic-environment. In 
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particular, the political-economic nexus to the conflict lies on the resource allocation formula 
which intensified the sense of relative deprivation in the region (Ibid: 396) .  
 
The frustration and dissatisfaction brought on by palpable neglect in the region forms part of 
the justification for the Ogoni and the Ijaw challenging the state and the multinational oil 
companies (Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010: 24). A key question that comes up here is whether 
or not the Ogoni and the Ijaw are fighting for the same cause in view of the similar situations 
they found themselves in. Thirdly, the role of political factors are interlinked with state policies 
responsible for the polarization of groups, which accounts for the snowballing of ethnic and 
communal conflicts (Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010) from nonviolence as seen in the Ogoni 
movement to violence of the Ijaw movement. These are evident in the interplay between 
ethnicity and state formation, and the contradiction inherent in oil generated revenues. The 
display and use of youth for violence in the region (Omoweh, 2003) has also been widely 
accepted as a strategy channelled at attracting the state’s attention to expected changes to its 
unfriendly policies and actions on minority oil producing communities (Idemudia and Ite, 
2006). The state’s reaction to both nonviolence and violence resistance, attributed to the 
military culture, is illustrated, for instance, by the state’s strategies for repressing agitations of 
any kind, particularly when the state security apparatus utilise the heavy-handed military 
tactics, obvious in the engagement styles of the security forces (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 102; 
Bagaji et al., 2011: 40). The militarization of the Niger Delta conflicts (Ukiwo, 2007; Watts, 
2003, 2008), as will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, has been credited as one of the 
major factors in the escalation of violence in the region from the 2000s. 
 
Several military task forces, such as Rivers State Special Task Force on Internal Security; 
Operation Andoni; Operation Hakuri; Operation Fire for Fire and Operation Restore Hope have 
over the years been used to suppress demonstrations in the region (Omeje, 2004b: 431). These 
methods used in phases of deep restiveness are associated with the illegal procurement, 
acquisition and proliferation of sophisticated arms in the Delta. The arms build-up intensified 
the struggle between the restive youths versus the state security agencies (Ekong et al., 2013). 
Hence, the combination of the environmental, socio-economic and political factors discussed 
above, heightened the people’s grievances and frustrations in the Niger Delta, and the different 
groups became unwilling to wait idly and instead decided to take on the state and by extension 
the multinational oil companies. Some with arms and some in a nonviolent manner. Worthy of 
note here is that not all the agitations and demonstrations that happened in the Niger Delta were 
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violent such as the Ijaw militant actions. For instance, the Ogoni struggle for self-determination 
was nonviolent: the Ogoni protested in the form of demonstrations, media campaigns, letter 
writings, international advocacy and boycotts, while the Ijaw which initially mirrored the 
Ogoni style, later employed tactics such as kidnappings, bombings of pipelines and direct 
engagement with state security forces. These will be discussed in detail in the subsequent 
chapters.  
 
However, while all these arguments are valid and serve as the framework for understanding 
the Niger Delta conflicts, they establish a research puzzle on why two ethnic groups, the Ogoni 
and the Ijaw who live in exactly the same conditions, facing the same structural issues and yet 
made very different trajectories and choices in expressing their grievances. A unique question 
that stands out is, why the Ogoni and the Ijaw reacted differently to the actions and inactions 
of the state, why did they fail to fight together the cause of the region. The literature on the 
region is yet to fully address this, as all the uprisings are conflated as one. I argue, however, 
that in order to better understand the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict, it is imperative to 
analyse the dynamics of choice in terms of the distinct courses of action taken by the two 
groups: why the Ogoni decided on a nonviolent course of action while the Ijaw opted for a 
violent course of action, as a means of expressing their grievances against the Nigerian state. 
This is because as shown, most scholars discuss the commonalities of the Niger Delta in terms 
of issues and causal factors (Ukiwo, 2007; HRW, 1999; Watts, 2003, 1999; Ikelegbe, 2005; 
Adebanwi and Obadare, 2013), and I argue that the conflict in the Niger Delta comprises 
different strategies, which are not one and the same. 
 
1.3 Why the Niger Delta and Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
 There is a common trend among people in Nigeria, that when the oil producing communities 
in the Niger Delta agitate and protest over resource control and self-determination, the majority 
regard their actions more as unfounded noise making. Yet when you read about the problems 
affecting the region, they tend to be presented as the same and, focus more on how these actions 
affect the economy of the country, and the media reports tend to be biased. A strong sense of 
misunderstanding and ignorance exists within the ordinary people that in most cases their 
grievances are not perceived as genuine and legitimate because the majority of Nigerians do 
not have the knowledge and understanding of what is actually happening in the Niger Delta. 
As an outsider, I decided to embark upon an investigative journey into the Niger Delta to find 
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out for myself first-hand what the Niger Delta problems are all about, and most importantly, 
why the people are reacting the way they are. And what followed was an academic adventure 
into an unknown territory, often described as dangerous and unfriendly especially to the Hausa, 
Yoruba and Igbo. The journey revealed to me that, not only was I lucky to have a clean 
environment free of gas flaring and oil pollution, but having clean drinking water and the ability 
to move about freely without pipelines crisscrossing my backyard among other things, made 
me realise the enormity of the challenges faced in the Niger Delta. In other words, to be able 
to tell a more informed and objective story. It is not enough to judge and assess or even 
condemn the situation from a distance, rather the beauty of analysing it lies in the in-depth 
exploration and understanding of the Niger Delta issues.  
 
Therefore, this thesis will be of relevance to many academic, political, economic and social 
disciplines. As the subsequent chapters will show, it will have some impact on federal level 
policy makers in Nigeria especially in helping to unravel the dynamics of the Niger Delta, and 
at the same time serve as a guide to what to look out for when assessing nonviolent and violent 
conflicts. It will also contribute to the understanding of the complex nature of the conflict 
related actions and in actions of the Nigerian state regarding civilian conflicts, as these seem 
often to be overlooked in the theatres of conflict, especially in terms of the role they play in 
reproducing and transforming disputes into armed struggles. 
  
This study concerns the dynamics of choice used by the Ogoni and Ijaw in the Niger Delta to 
chart their distinct courses of engagement with the state. As discussed earlier, the Nigerian state 
is challenged with several forms of conflict occurring in the north as seen in the Boko Haram 
insurgencies, ethno-religious and political/elections related conflicts across the country, and it 
is also not about assessing all the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region. The Ogoni and the 
Ijaw ethnic groups are the subject of emphasis, based on the simple fact that, having coexisted 
and shared common living experiences, they each decided to embark upon different strategic 
choices of engagement with the state. The research encompasses the conflicts in the Niger 
Delta pre independence, pre 1960 up to the present day, starting with the nationalistic and 
developmental activities carried out by the late Ogoni patriot, Paul Birabi from the late 1940s 
to 1953, to the emergence of Ken Saro-Wiwa in the late 1980s up to the present day Ogoniland. 
A dominant context of the Ogoni struggle, as we shall see, is the preaching and 




The Ijaw style of conflict was rather fluid and fragmented as later chapters will show. This 
conflict, began with the confrontational actions of the late Ijaw patriot, Isaac Adaka Boro who 
attempted the 12 Day Revolution in Ijawland, to the emergence of a mirrored version of the 
Ogoni nonviolent struggle, which was later hijacked by more radical and confrontational youth 
leaders such as Asari Dokubo. During this period, a temporary peace was brokered by the state 
for about four years, after which the region has again erupted into violence. 
 
Therefore, to understand more fully what is happening in the region, the conflicts should not 
be generalised as one, but it should be insisted that, the choice of the Ogoni and Ijaw 
movements is based on their unique and historical occurrences and that at some points exposed 
the weaknesses of the Nigerian state that was meant to safeguard the lives and securities of all 
its citizens. Worthy of note here is the intention of the thesis to avoid the conflation of the two 
conflicts as one but rather to bring to the fore the similarities and differences between them. 
This is in view of the several resources such as marginalisation, neglect and oil exploitation, 
used to explain the causes of the conflicts, which unfortunately are limited in terms of 
narrowing down on the ways in which each scenario is different and context specific. A deeper 
insight into the different perspectives offered in the narratives, leadership style and 
organisational structure of the movements would provide a more informed understanding of 
the area compared to that of the existing literature.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 This thesis is carried out over six chapters. Chapter One provides an introduction to African 
conflicts and a background towards the strategic choice of violence and nonviolence in the 
Niger Delta conflicts in addition to justifying the reason why a different focus on the conflicts 
is important. It introduces the unique Nigerian factors related to the Niger Delta such as 
environmental, socio-economic and political that are contributing to the explanation of why 
one group goes in one direction and the other in another. Chapter Two provides a review of 
related literature and theoretical framework. It sets out the conceptual understandings on the 
dynamics of nonviolence and violence in conflicts that includes social movements, contention, 
structure and agency and the construction of collective narratives as well as the methodological 
aspect of the study. It also introduces the key research questions. Chapter Three being the 
first empirical chapter draws themes together on how the narratives of the Ogoni lead to 
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nonviolence and those of the Ijaw to violence. This chapter presents narratives on the dynamics 
of choice between nonviolence and violence as methods of expressing their grievances. 
Chapter Four draws on how the Ogoni leaders preached nonviolence and the Ijaw preached 
violence. In this chapter, the strategies adopted by the different leaders are analysed in relation 
to nonviolence and violence. Chapter Five concerns how the Ogoni developed an organisation 
for advocacy, negotiations, and peaceful links with international bodies, while the Ijaw 
developed an organisation for armed struggle. The chapter also analyses the development and 
presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights in comparison to the Kaiama Declaration. As outlined, 
the three empirical chapters will be addressed according to Figure 5 below. Finally, Chapter 
Six draws from all the previous chapters and leads to a conclusion of the thesis. It presents an 
overview of the findings, contributions and recommendations for future studies. 



































This introductory chapter has briefly introduced the prelude to conflicts and resistance in Africa 
dating back to the colonial era where different African communities protested against various 
forms of rules imposed upon them by colonial rulers. The modes of resistance employed were 
violent as demonstrated by the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion and also the Maji Maji resistance 
in Tanzania, the Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba resistance in Senegal as well as and the nonviolent 
resistance seen in the Aba Women’s riot in Nigeria, and the South African examples. The 
chapter has furthermore provided a brief overview of the types of conflicts in Nigeria and 
introduced the Niger Delta and the nature of the conflicts in the region. It focused on why this 
research project should even take place in spite of the plethora of literature on the Niger Delta 
conflicts, as well as the scope and limitations of the study. The major objective of this study is 
to find out the reasons explaining why the Ogoni and the Ijaw, having shared similar lived 
experiences, decide to adopt different strategies of engagement with the state that saw the use 
of nonviolence and violence in the Niger Delta. The chapter argued that it is not enough to 
generalise when discussing the conflicts in the Niger Delta, rather, in order to better understand 
the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict, it is imperative to analyse the dynamics of choice in 
terms of the distinct courses of action taken by the two groups. 
 
The challenges faced by the Nigerian state in terms of various forms of conflict that manifest 
in the form of ethno-religious,  socioeconomic and political agitations were briefly analysed 
and narrowed down to the specific nature of the Niger Delta. The agitations in the region were 
historically traced from pre independence Nigeria when people in the area revolted against the 
perceived domination and injustices associated with the palm oil trade by the Royal Niger 
Company. The trade in palm oil was the major source of income to the region before the 
discovery and exploration of oil resources in the area, and when a foreign company came in 
and attempted to subvert their benefits, the Niger Delta people reacted through the use of arms, 
which suggests the existence of violence even at that time. The chapter then moved on to show 
the linkage between how the agitations were demonstrated pre and post-independence Niger 
Delta in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, in order to effectively answer the main research question, the chapter has 
suggested a six stage outline to the questions, separated into six chapters, with this being the 
introductory one. The second chapter will review existing related literature and how it relates 
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to the nonviolence and violence demonstrated in the Niger Delta conflicts. Being the empirical 
chapters, three, four and five will demonstrate the linkage between the qualities of the data 
gathered from the field work in relation to the arguments presented and how the existing 

































The literature review is structured to show the importance of understanding the dynamics of 
choice between violence and nonviolence when attempting to analyse the Niger Delta conflicts. 
This is because research into this topic requires the survey of such diverse literature that makes 
it necessary to examine theoretical concepts such as contention, construction of collective 
narratives and identities, social movements, structure and agency. This assertion is founded on 
developments along with gaps within existing literature which addresses the dynamics of 
choice between violence and nonviolence. This chapter is going to set out a theoretical and 
analytical framework that will use the theories to elucidate the concepts, it will look at these 
aspects to determine whether they had a bearing on explaining the research puzzle. It will also 
present the methodological aspect of the research and the main research questions.  
 
The Niger Delta communities which include the Ogoni and the Ijaw, have been characterised 
by a commonality of lived experiences including marginalisation, inequality, poverty, 
environmental, socio-economic, and political arguments (Watts, 1999, 2003, 2008a; 
Ojakorotu, 2010; Naanen, 1995; Okonta, 2008; Oboreh, 2010; Frynas, 2001; Ikein, 2009; 
Osaghae, 2008, 1995; Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010; Osha, 2006,  2007; Ukiwo, 2007; Saro-
Wiwa, 1995; Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009; Obi, 2006,  2007). Anger and frustration aroused 
by the combination of all these factors heralded the deep rooted contentions (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2000) resulting in grievances in the region that arise out of these disagreements, 
which have manifested in several ways. This is dating back to pre-independence Nigeria under 
the guidance of Paul Birabi in the 1940s from the Ogoni group, to the 1960s under the 
stewardship of Adaka Boro in the Six Day Revolution (when he attempted to declare a Niger 
Delta Republic). Then from the early 1980s-1990s exemplified in the Ogoni struggle led by 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and to the late 1990s as documented by the Ijaw youth Kaiama Declaration, 
and to the 2000s to date as seen in the armed Ijaw militancy. The introduction suggested that, 
as argued by scholars, the structural context is relevant to some extent, but the argument here 
is that these structural conditions are not enough to address the puzzle surrounding the 
dynamics of the Niger Delta conflicts.  
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The research puzzle concerns why, we have two ethnic groups, the Ogoni and the Ijaw who 
live in exactly the same conditions, facing the same structural issues and yet made very 
different trajectories and choices in expressing their grievances. The dilemma here is that these 
two groups in those structural conditions behaved very differently, and most scholars have 
explained insufficiently why one group chooses violence and the other nonviolence. Therefore, 
the critical query here is, why the Ogoni group adopted the nonviolent course of action, and 
why the Ijaw went the violent way. This implies the importance of considering other larger 
elements in terms of the major delineations on the choice of strategies based on three key 
elements, narratives on nonviolence versus violence, leadership and the organizational 
structure of the two movements. Scholarship on the Niger Delta has conflated the two distinct 
conflicts, which undermines the Ogoni and the Ijaw, and the earlier presented structural causes 
are insufficient in providing a more informed distinction and understanding of the dynamics of 
choice within the Niger Delta conflicts. 
 
2.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Conflict 
 
Scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution have different perspectives on what conflicts 
entails. Conflicts are presumed to be bases for solving internal variances in addition to being 
avenues of converting hidden disagreements into open tensions, (Ross, 1993). This thesis is 
concerned with the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region, who identify 
themselves as distinct ethnic groups fighting to retrieve their oil and gas resources as well as 
their environment which they claim rightfully belongs to them. For this purpose, the adopted 
definition of conflict is the one advanced by Johan Galtung and Chris Mitchell, in which it is 
described as a triangle (see Figure 2.1). Its vertices are constituted by goal incompatibility, 
attitudes and behaviour (Mitchell, 1981: 7; Galtung, 1996), and it is situated within a conflict 
setting where the parties tend to have opposing interests and objectives, and identifying with 
their own side, which will be demonstrated within the Ogoni and Ijaw cases. As the next three 
empirical chapters will show, how the Ogoni and the Ijaw engage within their peculiar conflict 
triangle, fight a context specific battle, one through nonviolence and the other through violence.  
 
Figure 2.1 Galtung’s Conflict Triangle. 
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Source: Galtung (1958) 
Galtung’s conflict triangle suggests that peoples’ behaviour in a conflict corresponds directly 
to their attitudes, in the sense that attitudes in conflict situations affects the behaviours of a 
single individual as well as that of others which directly influences the setting within which the 
conflict is pursued. It provides a straightforward framework for studying the triggers and 
effects of conflict. According to Mitchell, conflict is any situation in which two or more parties 
perceive they possess mutually incompatible goals (Mitchell, 1981:7). This triangle model 
expanded by Mitchell and Galtung underscores conflict as an active course in which 
incompatibilities, attitudes and behaviour are continuously shifting and affecting one another 
(ibid), as exemplified by the fluid and fractured nature of the conflicts in the Niger Delta as 
will be demonstrated in Chapters Three, Four and Five.  
 
Coser (1956) illustrated conflict as a struggle over ideals and rights to limited resources, status, 
and power where the main objectives of the challengers are aimed at counterbalancing, hurting 
or destroying their opponents. Humphreys (2005: 63) goes further to delineate six rival 
mechanisms that clarify the correlation between natural resources and conflicts: (a) the greedy 
rebels’ mechanism; (b) the greedy outsiders’ mechanism; (c) the grievance mechanism; (d) the 
feasibility mechanism; (e) the weak states mechanism; and (f) the sparse networks mechanism. 
In line with Humphreys’s theory, the greed and grievance thesis on the Niger Delta conflicts 
suggests the significance of an economic explanation as opposed to grievance based on 
inequality, neglect, and political marginalisation as causes of the Niger Delta conflicts (Collier, 
2007; Collier et al., 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2000; Urdal, 2004). In 
contrast, however, Ukiwo (2007), contests the inclusion of greed as a causal factor, rather, he 
advances marginalisation and political exclusion, while, grievance-based approaches relate 
horizontal inequalities to socio-economic, cultural and political elements (Stewart, 2008; 
Stewart et al., 2008).  
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The grievance school stress the existence of such major inequalities as unequal wealth and 
power distribution, identity-based deficiencies, increasing social indignities brought about by 
unequal power allocation and subsequently incessant poverty that could push communities to 
agitate and protest against regimes (Gurr, 1970, 2007; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015; 
Cederman et al., 2011). The perception by the Ogoni group that the senses of marginalisation 
and neglect and within other groups in the Niger Delta, exacerbated by the region’s poverty 
could be used as an example of such grievance-based approaches.  
 
An alternative argument to the grievance based thesis is that focusing on only grievance would 
not adequately account for the eruptions of conflict (Collier et al., 2009; Goldstone, 1991; 
McAdam, 1999), meaning that the strong emphasis on socio-economic and political 
deprivations is insufficient in arousing ethnic groups to protest against the state (Chenoweth 
and Ulfelder, 2015; Lichbach, 1994). While these historical reasons are important, Chenoweth 
and Ulfelder (2015) argue that they fall short of considering ‘how people rebel’. Rather the 
emphasis is on the ‘why’, they stress that, to pursue change, groups choose either nonviolence 
or violence. The combination of the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ explain how groups navigate through 
the different conflict options available to them in order to achieve their goal, thus, the fact that 
the Ogoni maintain their nonviolence to the present day while the Ijaw have been a cocktail of 
violence and nonviolence serve as good examples of the importance of using different 
theoretical concepts to better explain why the Niger Delta conflicts evolved the way they did. 
Conflicts emerge when there is a quest of opposite concerns, purposes and desires be it by 
groups or individuals within identified social and physical environments (Otite and Albert, 
1999; Forsyth, 1990). Draman (2003), posits that conflict is an interaction between 
interdependent people who recognise incompatible ends and who presume meddling from the 
other party, should they make an attempt to accomplish their aspiration (Folger et al, 1995). In 
the Nigerian context, the state’s attitude to conflicts whether violent or not is that of 
management not resolution. Due to the recurring and fluid cycle of violent and nonviolent 
conflicts, it remains a question yet to be adequately addressed, if approaches to solving these 
conflicts are actually the interest of the state in most of Africa.  
 
The root causes of the Niger Delta crises have been presented (Okonta, 2008; Obi, 2006, 2007, 
2009; Naanen, 1995) as lying in the power dynamics that developed after the Nigerian civil 
war and as a result of the commercial political economy promoted on unearned oil proceeds. 
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Consequently, proceeds from the oil resources originating from the minority region profited 
the non-oil producing dominant ethnic groups who had the monopoly of power within the state. 
Consensus exists among scholars of conflict and peace studies that, conflicts cannot be resolved 
unless their root causes have been addressed. Root causes are distinctive fundamental causes 
that can rationally be identified (Rooney and Vanden Heuvel, 2004), and they are the primary 
causes of discontentment issues, grievances and conflicts, meaning proximate causes that are 
likely to turn violent in the near future.   
 
Emphasis on the fact that conflicts should be acknowledged and identified for what they stand 
for and addressed was made by Oberg (1996). As the effective means of ensuring the non-
reappearance of cycles of violence in their latent or manifest form, like it is happening in 
Nigeria. Oberg (1996) relates recognising conflicts to the identification and attending to the 
root causes of a contention. He explains that solving conflict efficiently opens the road to 
development while locking and suppressing conflict is a recipe for the eventual outbreak of 
violence. The significance of conflict identification and solution serves to avert another violent 
conflict (Lund, 2002; Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Cordell and Wolff, 2009).  In a research article, 
Rodt (2012) argues in favour of the timing within which a conflict is addressed, in which either 
a conflict is violent or at a suggestive risk of turning violent in the short term. Similarly, 
Oyeshola (2005), simply refers to conflict as a clash, confrontation, battle or struggle. 
Accordingly, Oyeshola brings in four elements within which conflict could be viewed, which 
means that, on a general note, conflicts can be violent or non-violent in nature, indicating that 
they manifest in different forms. The bottom line is the existence of some kind of strong 
contentions of views over a specific phenomenon.  
 
According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007: xi) contentions emanate in clusters, and relate to ‘third 
waves of contention’ such as civil wars, revolutions, and social movements, which are similar 
to mechanisms and processes. They identify mechanisms as events that produce the same 
immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances, and processes as combinations and 
sequences of mechanisms that produce some specified outcomes (ibid: 203, 214). Therefore, 
when a conflict changes from a nonviolent process into an open contest resulting in at least 25 
battle related deaths, then it is designated as armed conflict, and these forms of conflict exist 
inter-state or intra-state, between governments and armed groups within states (Draman, 2003), 




 Contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the 
use of force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. 
Of the two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state (Harbom and 
Wallensteen, 2005).  
 
 
As specified above, Tilly, Harborn and Wallensteen indicate the non-static occurrences of 
conflicts, and open up the dynamic demeanours of conflict which change its construction that 
have over time become necessary aspects of acceptable scrutiny (Mitchell, 1981: 33). This 
indicates the existence of boundaries between nonviolence and violence in conflicts (Demmers, 
2012: 4). Conflicts are sometimes termed as deep-rooted, Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) 
recognise identity and distribution of resources as the core characteristics of deep-rooted 
conflicts, where perceived inequity in allocation coincides with identity differences. Where one 
ethnic group is marginalised and starved of benefitting from resources extracted from their 
environment, for instance, this becomes a potential for deep-rooted conflict. These types of 
conflicts have additional features such as their persistence, scope, and the tendency to recur are 
manifested through choices of either nonviolence or violence. Therefore, Chapters Three and 
Four will show the deep rooted nature of the Ogoni and Ijaw grievances specifically depicted 
in the narratives of the leaders and styles of leadership in the two movements and how they 




Nonviolence, a method of engaging in conflict, takes place beyond the framework of normal 
political, economic or social phenomenon. It is founded on the perception that economic, 
social, political, and military power originates from the consensus and submission of 
individuals to the accepted rules and norms within a society (Merriman, 2009). Merriman 
(2009) highlighted six sources of power that leaders and nonviolent movements contend for 
and struggle to influence and claimed that these are factors that shape individuals obedience, 
allegiance and obedience patterns in society. These factors range from legitimacy, human 
resources, skills and knowledge, material resources, culture, religious and ideological factors 
as well as sanctions (Ibid: 19). Drawing on the understanding of the movements of collective 
action (Sharp, 1973: 82), studies of civil disobedience and religious thinking, Mohandas 
Gandhi emphasised the idea that nonviolence discipline is based on the strategic connection 
between mass political action and the principle of nonviolence (Schock, 2013). The Gandhian 
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notion of Satyagraha became a key method engaged in challenging perceived injustices (ibid). 
Schock explains that post-World War II, new nonviolent social movements appeared that were 
concerned with environmental and peace campaigns. Schock further uses the global South as 
an example of where several nonviolent indigenous people’s movements adopted the principle 
of nonviolent resistance (Schock, 2009). Martin Luther King Jr. acknowledged the existence 
of evil and injustice and the necessity to oppose these through nonviolent resistance and non-
cooperation (Crocker et al., 1996), which is a specific strategy advocated for by the Ogoni in 
the Niger Delta. 
 
Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013: 271) define nonviolent resistance as the application of 
unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts and 
demonstrations without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent (Stephan and 
Chenoweth, 2008; Govier, 2008). Nonviolent resistance is again explained as a civilian- based 
method without the threat or use of violence to wage conflict through psychological, socio-
economic, and political means (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 9). These methods of 
nonviolent action (Sharp, 1973; Bond, 1988) were employed as instruments used to strive 
against injustice and oppression as witnessed in the civil rights movement in the United States 
of America’s pro-democracy movements from the 1980s into the 21st century. In 1994 
apartheid South Africa, Philippines in 1986, Poland in 1989, Chile in 1988, Serbia in 2000, 
Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 (Schock, 2013: 278), Madagascar in 2002, Ukraine 2002-5, Nepal 
in 2006, Georgia in 2003, Lebanon in 2005 (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 8) and the 1990s 
Ogoni struggle in Nigeria. The fundamental awareness here is that you do not need violence to 
depose powerful and repressive regimes (ibid: 279).  
 
Over the years, a crucial inquiry into major nonviolent civil resistance has developed 
(Cunningham, 2013; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013;  Svensson 
and Lindgren, 2011; Zunes, 1994;  Nepstad, 2011; Schock, 2003, 2005, 2013). Scholars such 
as Gene Sharp provided a narrower and broader context of nonviolent resistance to include a 
wide-ranging category of such non-routine political activities that were devoid of violence or 
the threat of violence (1973). Paige (1993) argues that if nonviolent campaigns are to be most 
effective, they have to come from the bottom up; meaning that they have to be ‘lived and 
practiced at the grassroots level’. He considers this as ignoring the legacy of Gandhi’s 
Satyagraha campaign, as seen in more recent campaigns (p. 63) of the late 1980s. Gandhi, 
however, constructs a division between conflict and violence; he clarifies that conflict is often 
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essential and beneficial as a method of resisting domination and attacks on an individual’s 
autonomy or that of others (Terchek, 2001: 221). Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Petra Kelly, 
to mention but a few, endorsed nonviolent conflicts that were organized to rectify injustices in 




Violence as defined by World Health Organisation, refers to ‘the intentional use of physical 
force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or 
community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation’ (Krug et al., 2002;  Nicholson, 1992). 
Ho-Won (2000: 19) has described the act of doing physical harm to other people as the most 
evident form of violence and he focuses on two types of violence that are evident in diverse 
social relations: direct and structural. While direct violence refers to physical injuries and the 
infliction of pain by a specific individual, structural violence relates to conditions such as 
inequalities, poverty, social alienation, repression (ibid), oppression (Freire, 2000) and 
genocide (Nicholson, 1992).  
 
In the Niger Delta conflicts, both structural and direct violence have been exercised by both 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw. Bearing in mind the commonality of their living environment however, 
the difference between them in this sense lies in the type of violence they used in response to 
their conditions of severe environmental degradation, exclusion, marginalisation and poverty. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five will analyse the ways in which these conditions render the 
situation of the two groups distinct from one another. This distinction could be regarded within 
three contexts, firstly, in terms of structural violence it could be considered along the perception 
of marginalisation, oppression, social alienation, poverty, inequalities (Ho-Won, 2000); 
secondly, in terms of resources related grievances (Watts, 2008a, 1999) and thirdly, in the form 
of the lived experiences of both the Ogoni and Ijaw as exerted by the Nigerian state (see 
Chapter Three). This is going back to my research puzzle, relating to the question of why the 
Ogoni and Ijaw, despite having common lived experiences and facing similar structural issues, 
responded with two distinctly different trajectories and choices to the supposed structural and 
direct violence exerted by the state. While subjected to structural violence by the state, the 
Ogoni chose to respond using nonviolent civil protests, letter writings and international 
campaigns for support (see Chapter Five). They presented, furthermore, an Ogoni Bill of Rights 
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which was an articulated set of demands that they constructed. Another of their responses was 
the creation of MOSOP, which was done with the hope of emancipating the Ogoni ethnic group 
from the perceived state-led structural violence but which was suppressed by the direct force 
of the State security apparatus (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1995a). Chapters Four and Five will 
demonstrate that the Ijaw case, although initially mirrored the Ogoni case by releasing the 
Kaiama Declaration (Ijaw Youth Council, 1999a) and then by being met, similarly to the  
Ogoni, with violence by the state, exemplified in direct violence seen in the use of armed forces 
to repress the movement (Ikelegbe, 2006; Osaghae et al., 2007; Ukiwo, 2003).  
 
The second context, that of direct violence  (Ho-Won, 2000), for the Ogoni would be based on 
the repression of the Ogoni movement: on the arrest, detention and subsequent execution of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni leaders (see Chapter Five) and the suppression and crack 
down on the Ogoni leaders in 1993 (Chapter Four) some whom went underground and others 
fled the country to Europe, United States of America and other neighbouring African countries 
(Bob and Nepstad, 2007; Campbell, 2002; Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015). Although direct 
violence is used on the Ogoni, still they chose to respond with nonviolent civil actions under 
the leadership and guidance of Ken Saro-Wiwa, which will be explained in detail firstly in 
Chapter Three that focuses on leadership, and secondly in Chapter Four that analyses 
organisation. The markedly different nature of the Ogoni and Ijaw responses to the relevant 
states’ reaction presented a very intriguing angle in the discourse on the Niger Delta conflicts, 
which was sought to be explored in this thesis. The third context is based on the repression of 
the Ijaw movement and it relates to the use of direct violence on the group. Direct violence 
against the Ijaw is exemplified in particular by the Odi massacre which saw the displacement 
of the 60,000 inhabitants, deaths, human rights violations and destruction (See Chapter Four). 
Even though the estimated death in Odi is disputed, Environmental Rights Action (ERA) puts 
it at 2500 (Bassey, 2006) while OMCT and CLEEN (2002) places it at 1000.  
 
The reaction of the Ogoni to such direct violence by the state differs from that of the Ijaw. 
While the Ogoni actions were devoid of violence, the Ijaw youth under the MEND umbrella 
employed direct violence against the state, exemplified, for instance, by the killings of nine 
staff members of the ENI SPA company in 2006; twenty Nigerian soldiers guarding Shell 
facilities 2006; ten staff of Chevron’s Oloibiri floating production storage 2007; the attack on 
Shell operated pipelines in Nigeria forcing the stoppage of the production of 170,000 barrels 
of oil per day 2008 (David, 2016). The Ijaw, furthermore, also engaged in various acts of 
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sabotage against the state and multinational oil companies which included kidnapping of oil 
workers, and requests for ransom. The kidnap of Shell workers in 2003; nine crew members 
and four escorts of oil barges in 2003; nineteen oil workers of Nobel Drilling; hostage taking 
of 10 Shell workers in 2002 are some of the examples to this (Agbu, 2004).  Ijaw youth have 
also engaged in sabotage activities in respect of oil based resource benefits, illustrated by the 
invasion and seizure of three vessels in Qua Iboe Terminal belonging to Exxon Mobil in 2000; 
the occupation of Shell oil rigs at Tunu and Opukulli and holding sixty five staff hostage in 
2000; the stoppage of work on a Shell gas project and shutting down five flow stations in 2001; 
the seizure of Shell housing estate in 2001; sealing off the Chevron/Texaco off shore oil rig 
and taking eighty eight workers as hostage in 2002 (Agbu, 2000; Williams, 2000). Ijaw youths 
engaged furthermore, in bombing oil pipelines: the attack on the Agip Brass crude oil pipelines 
in Bayelsa state, the Escravos-Warri crude oil pipeline and the Clough Creek Tebidaba Agip 
pipeline manifold in Bayelsa in 2016. They also blew up Well D25 in Abiteye belonging to 
Chevron in 2016 (David, 2016).    
 
Chapters Three, Four and Five will detail the desperation, frustration and anger in terms of the 
perceived grievances of both the Ogoni and the Ijaw against the state and multinational oil 
companies, and also discuss choices of different actions. From an axiological perspective, 
Freire (2000) argues that the issue of humanisation has been central to humankind’s problems 
since the interest for humanisation points to the acknowledgement of dehumanisation, not only 
as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality (Freire, 2000: 43). Although  violence 
has been characterised as the most austere and concerning form of conflict which warrants a 
significant level of attentiveness, some associate psychological or cognitive processes as 
features justifying violence (Cunningham, 2013; Elbert et al., 2010). The different choices 
made by the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders might suggest, however, that violence as a concept, might 
be observed from diverse perspectives according to which it may suggest actions causing injury 
or it may figuratively accentuate intensity of feelings and of words (Bulhan, 1985: 132). In a 
similar context, Galtung (1996) argues that violence is developed into ‘unequal, unjust and 
unrepresentative social structures’ historically, and should be explained as a ‘situation in which 
actual realisations of humans are below their potential realisations’. He defined violence as, 
 
Avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally, life, lowering the real 
levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible (Galtung, 1996: 197).  
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Basic human needs represent whatever may be fundamentally necessary for survival and the 
avoidance of harm, and include whatever may be held to be absolutely necessary for physical 
survival, or for human dignity (Dean, 2010). According to Bulhan (1985: 135), additionally, 
any process or condition by which an individual or a group violates the physical, social and 
psychological integrity of another person or group amounts to violence. However, Galtung 
(1969), underscores the point that violence extends beyond the physical, the individual and the 
international, suggesting that anything short of these needs amount to conflict and violence. 
Therefore, in the absence of negotiation or in case of the failure to provide these basic needs, 
violence may be viewed as a mechanism of the de-legitimation of another, and could manifest 
in the physical or psychological destruction of the other (Paine, 2001). Ackerman and DuVall 
(2000), focus on physical violence deployed in revolutions, wars and terrorism that use tools 
of violence such as guns, tanks, bombs, and other instruments of physical force. Physical 
violence in the form of political violence could be expressed in three modalities: the first relates 
to violence by oppressed people in support of the state as in South Africa; the second is 
bidirectional and suggests violence in support of the oppressed people exemplified by the ANC 
in South Africa; and finally lateral or horizontal violence described as that between and among 
oppressed groups (Foster et al., 2005: 61).  
 
Violence could also be considered as a social phenomenon within the context of its meaning 
and application which, as Paine (2001: 169) argues, is subject to divergent interpretations 
‘depending, for example, on whether one is delivering or receiving’ (Wolff, 1969; Holmes, 
1971). In support of this argument, Bermanzohn (2000) gave the example of the American civil 
rights era (1950s-1960s) when violence central to the United States politics became rife. 
Another example was the reign of terror unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan and white supremacists 
also around 1956-1966. Violence has been referred to as politics, specifically when contention 
takes a violent turn (Tilly, 2003). Contentious politics is referred to as,  
 
Interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s interest, 
leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which 
governments are, as targets, the objects of claims, or third parties (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007: 202). 
 
Such violent organized conflict as seen in the Ijaw movement in Nigerian Niger Delta (see 
Chapters Four and Five) diminishes economic growth, exacerbates social service provision and 
points to weaker human indicators when compared to non-conflict countries (Collier et al., 
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2003; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001). Stewart (2009) advances the idea that incidences of such 
violent conflicts are prevalent among the poorest countries of the world. She highlights the 
plethora of evidence indicating that violent conflict in multi-ethnic societies (Basque region of 
Spain, Sudan Ruwanda, former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Fiji and Indonesia) is not an 
unavoidable ramification of ethnic difference, an outcome of age-old hatreds, nor of an 
unavoidable ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993). According to Fearon and Laitin 
(1996), violent conflicts within multi-ethnic countries are not inevitable because several multi-
ethnic societies are peaceful.  
 
Contrastingly, it has been argued that there is no intrinsic connection between violence and 
conflict (Most and Starr, 1989; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Boulding, 1963). According to 
Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), dis-contentment and conflicts sometimes result in nonviolent 
actions, implying that nonviolence and violence could be potential alternatives (Dudouet, 2013; 
Sandler et al., 1983; Shellman et al., 2013) as seen in the activities of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  
 
 In his book, Charles Tilly presents three violent vignettes: the ‘cowboys shoot cowboys’ 
(Courtwright, 1996) is a gunfight where the actors turn against each other; the ‘villagers attack 
combines and landlords’ (Scott, 2000) where the violence was targeted at the combines 
(harvesting machines) which the villagers felt were encroaching and taking away their wages 
and hence decided to tamper with the machines by removing the batteries, carburettors and fill 
the tanks with sand and mud. The third variety is the ‘Rwandans slaughter each other’ context, 
depicting the mass genocide between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Here, Tilly brings to the fore the 
notion that although these three episodes are distinct from one another, they share the common 
strategy of collective violence (Tilly, 2003: 3).  He explains that for violence to occur in the 
three varieties, it must ‘involve a minimum of two architects, immediately inflict physical 
damage on persons and objects, and result at least in part, from coordination among persons 
who perform the damaging act’ (ibid). This implies collective violence based group rather than 
on individual activity, which as he suggests, is similar to the unpredictable nature of the 
weather, ‘complicated and changing in some regards’ (ibid: 4). Accordingly, the Ijaw and 
Ogoni movements could be regarded similarly to the three vignettes presented by Tilly, in the 
sense that although the two movements are distinct, they share also share a common strategy 
of collective action, albeit the Ijaw which is unpredictable employ violence while the Ogoni go 
for nonviolent actions.  
 49 
 
While the distinctions between violent and nonviolent conflicts provide a good understanding 
of conflicts, but because the dynamics of the Ogoni and Ijaw contentions are framed within 
several issues, the Niger Delta conflict is yet to be adequately explained. It becomes crucial to 
make an attempt at deconstructing the reasons why one group takes up arms against the state 
and the other insists on nonviolence. Therefore, in navigating this transition from nonviolence 
to violence, perhaps what is interesting however, is the actions of the state related to how groups 
react within the story of the Niger Delta conflicts. 
 
2.2. The State and ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu’ 
 
Sociologically, in Weber's (1965) words, ‘the modern state can be defined only in terms of the 
use of physical force’ highlighting the intimate relation between the state and violence. He cites 
Leon Trotsky, who argued that, ‘every state is founded on force’. Weber points to the fact that, 
although force is not the only means of the state, it is a means specific to the state, therefore, 
politics translates as striving to share power or influence the distribution of power, either among 
states or among groups within a state. Power is the essence of all governments and violence is 
by nature instrumental, like all means it always stands in need of guidance and justification 
(Arendt, 1970). Arendt sees violence mainly as a blatant manifestation of power (ibid: 35). The 
political environment within which groups in Nigeria operate and express their support or 
apprehension is controlled by the state, making the issue of national security paramount, as 
seen in all nation states. Historically, security is considered as the responsibility of states, but 
since the evolution of new threats, especially the September 11 attacks on the USA, the 
interpretation has drastically been altered (Fouinat, 2004). According to Fouinat, lives of 
millions are threatened more by violent conflicts than by the danger of a nuclear apocalypse. It 
has been firmly established as an important development issue that the increase in everyday 
violence and the globalisation of violence advances the recognition that violence undermines 
sustainable development (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Keen, 2008). 
 
The contemporary understanding of security has transformed from physical security to include 
human security which encompasses economics, the environment, food and health (Özerdem 
and Podder, 2012: 543). The defence and security of any country would unavoidably be placed 
on national interests and values with special emphasis on its integrity (Vogt, 1996). The 
concept of national security is automatically biased towards the military (Wolfers, 1952;  Bull, 
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2000), and by association, this school supports that once the physical territory of a state is 
secure, then other matters will spontaneously fall into place (Saliu, 1997: 12).  
 
The conventional view of violence, including group or collective violence, is that it is irrational, 
deviant and a threat to the fundamental norms of a state (ibid) which are meant to be rationality, 
stability, and consensus on social and political change. The view here is that any group 
employing violence should automatically be met by suppressive actions of the state security 
apparatus. Moreover, when groups in Nigeria such as the Ogoni and the Ijaw who incidentally 
employ different methods of engagement with the state, come out to protest against perceived 
injustices, they are dealt with in the same manner, suppressed through the state security 
apparatus. The point of interest in the nature of state response is that there is no distinction 
regarding whether one group approaches the state through nonviolent civil protests and another 
that takes up arms, the state strategy, as will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, is one 
and the same, through force (Wood, 2015). Therefore, when the use of violent coercion used 
to repress unarmed protests fails, an outcome referred to as ‘political jiu-jitsu’ (Sutton et al., 
2014) occurs. This suggests that sometimes these actions backfire on the state and could 
transform such protests into armed militancy (Wood, 2015), as exemplified during the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (ibid). Political jiu-jitsu is also evident in 
the Niger Delta movement in Nigeria as the leaders’ narratives in Chapter Three will 
demonstrate as a justification for, why the Ijaw militants took up arms against the state based 
on the state’s reaction and repression of the Ogoni movement. 
 
Structural conditions and processes such as regime type, demography, economy and terrain 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier et al., 2004; Vanhanen, 1990; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015) 
correlate with political conflict, but because they evolve gradually within the traditional 
African context, specifically in the Nigerian setting, these conditions stop short of detailing the 
conflict processes. Structure based approaches emphasise the correlation between the 
organisation of states and violent conflict, which derives from violence inherent to political, 
economic, cultural and geo-political structures (Demmers, 2012: 55). Gregg (1935), 
acknowledged that, in some situations, the use of violence creates some inefficient and 
unplanned outcomes for the attacker. Political jiu-jitsu simply refers to the ‘paradox of 
repression’ (ibid; Johnstad, 2010), a phenomenon when the use of violent coercion to repress 
protests eventually backfires on the state (Sutton et al., 2014; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; 
Schock, 2005; Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994; Sharp, 1973; Martin and Varney, 2003), causing 
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severe, unanticipated, consequences (Martin, 2007; Nepstad, 2011; Martin et al., 2001). 
Accordingly,  Imobighe (2013), points out that threat assessments are ineffectively dealt with 
by Nigeria and some other African countries in that, threats are regarded narrowly within the 
lenses of regime perpetuation and with an outlook on how to silence the opposition. Many 
contend that because these countries base their strategic response on such a narrow perception 
of threats, they have no clear idea as to the root causes of the increasing threats they are facing 
(Mbachu and Bature, 2013). In fact, McNamara rightly warned of the danger inherent in this 
simplistic, narrow and militaristic approach to security: ‘there is among us an almost 
ineradicable tendency to think of our security problem as being exclusively a military problem, 
and to think of the military problem as being exclusively a weapons or manpower problem...We 
still tend to assume that it is primarily this purely military ingredient that creates security’ 
(McNamara, 1968: 142).  
 
Though not unmindful of the priority of the physical safety of a nation, Oberg (1996: 29), 
rightly asserts that security should also focus on  immaterial items such as freedom, identity, 
culture, lifestyle, and the protection of nature, which are at the centre of the  Niger Delta 
conflicts. Individuals yet to satisfy their basic human rights and needs can hardly be called 
secure, no matter how much weaponry the individuals may have at their disposal. The point of 
view of Oberg and other scholars who share the integrated approach to the question of national 
security is that underdevelopment and poverty are potentially as destructive as guns in the 
physical elimination of a larger percentage of mankind (WECD, 1987), therefore, non-
availability of bread and butter are no less potent threats (Ebo, 1994).  
 
Repressions by states could be regarded as warning signals or messages by the state to the 
protestors who are viewed as threats and deviants, specifically in relation to what Earl 
(2003:48) referred to as ‘observable repression by state agents’. Earl explains the idea as 
oppression that is targeted to the opposition and also to the general public with a clear intention 
(ibid) to scare or deter the opposition. But this is not always the case, the failure of violent 
coercion by the state exacerbated the cycles of conflicts in the Niger Delta and two groups 
decided to mobilise against the state. Therefore, political Jiu-Jitsu could be applied to the Ijaw 
case in the Niger Delta where, in response to the actions of the state, the radical militant leaders 
decided to engage the state also with arms. The Ogoni movement, however, maintained 
nonviolent civil resistance, as will be seen in the subsequent chapters.   
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 2.3 Movements and Collective Identity 
 
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) highlight that social movements are sustained campaigns of claim 
making by employing recurring acts that publicise demands based on ‘organisations, networks, 
traditions and solidarities that sustain these activities’. They clarified that, not all types of 
contentious politics constitute social movements, and these amalgamate ‘sustained campaigns 
of claim making, display of public performances; recurring public display of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment’. Social movements, therefore, are inclusive associations containing 
diverse interest groups (Tilly and Wood, 2009). In their study of social movements from 1768 
to 2008, Tilly and Wood, (2009) described social movements as a form of contentious politics 
that necessitate historical understanding that will then provide potential answers to the question 
of ‘why these movements integrated some decisive features that differentiate social movements 
from other types of politics’ (ibid: 3). Democratic regimes are generally considered to be 
favourable political structures for social movements because of their relative openness, 
tolerance of opposition, and freedom of association and information within certain limits (Della 
Porta, 2013). Although Volkan (2001: 82), identifies the importance of the leader-follower 
dynamics as part of large group processes when he suggests that leadership is a defining 
characteristic of groups because members idealise the leaders (Volkan, 2001: 82) and thereby 
unite and recognise one another. He argues for the protection of the group identity as being 
imperative. 
 
Contention in movements, according to Tilly, includes making claims that bear on another’s 
interests (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 4) in which ethnic groups in conflict are often represented 
as sharing a unitary identity and as fighting over a unified entity (Demmers, 2012). Ethnicity 
within the Niger Delta is perceived as a communal bond prearranged by nature. Ethnicity itself 
is socially constructed, and it has penetrated every socio- economic and political structure of 
the country due, especially, to perceptions of marginalisation and exclusion within and between 
groups.  
 
Nevertheless, scholars of new social movements shifted from class-based political mobilisation 
to acknowledging new identities and lifestyles (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). These theorists’ 
have empirically merged political goals with more culturally oriented efforts (Melucci, 1985; 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Touraine, 1981,1985; Castells, 1997; Offe, 1985). These further 
suggest the inclusion of more fluid constructs and they relate to ‘life politics’, the direct 
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involvement of new social movements (Davis, 2002: 3), which is another type of politics that 
focuses on situations of self-actualisation within the context of post traditional frameworks 
(Giddens, 1991: 214). In this context, apprehensions are amplified over economic structures in 
representative democracies, and over how they affect the quality of life and life styles 
(Pichardo, 1997: 415). On the other hand, scholars contest this claim by new social movement 
theorists’ arguing that efforts to deconstruct identity are more critical in recent movements than 
they have ever been, Jasper (1997), for example, suggests the insertion of the ‘legal’ aspect as 
a significant difference in comparison to the civil rights and early labour movements which 
were concerned with full inclusion as citizens (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Constructionism, as 
Davis (2002: 7) identifies it, places greater emphasis on the overlooked phenomenon of liaison 
in social movement participation especially between mobilising beliefs, ideas and 
identification in resource mobilisation.  
 
Identity has been used to categorise the self and the other, and in social movements it is used 
in a plethora of ways to describe, label and categorise, but also as ‘doing things’, and driving 
individual and group behaviour (Demmers, 2012). It is the answer to the question’ who or what 
are you’ which includes social identities in relation to the individuals and the environment 
(ibid; Volkan, 2001), that correlates with their shared understandings and representations 
(Tilly, 1995: 2). Because, identity is not static and, it becomes fluid as a result of social 
exchanges between persons, contentions exist in relation to what identity actually signifies 
(Appadurai, 1998; Kaufman, 2001). Scholars, such as Kaldor (1999), combine identity and 
globalisation due to the emergence of a new politics of identity as a result of the erosion of the 
modern state. She cites the examples of the decline of welfare states in more advanced 
industrial countries, the loss of legitimacy of post-colonial states in South Asia and Africa, and 
the collapse of communist states after 1989 as fertile grounds that advanced new types of 
identity politics (Ibid: 78). In this context, the concept of identity becomes very important as 
both the Ogoni and Ijaw groups regard themselves as having distinct group identities within 
the Niger Delta.  
 
Ross (2007: 23) argues that although identities might be formed, shifting them within the short 
term is not uncomplicated. Identity issues comprise several characteristics that are fundamental 
to a people’s sense of being such as culture, heritage, race, religion, and language. Hence, the 
capacity of deep-rooted conflicts can be worrying to states because conflict spreads easily 
among people who share the same identity. The issues in the contest are not only identity based, 
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but groups also become emotional over what ‘gives them a sense of themselves, defining an 
individual’s attachment with the community and defining the level of satisfaction of their need 
for identity’ (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998), which indicates that individuals are socialised into 
ethnic identities (Verkuyten, 2005: 86). In the global process of mobilisation support for armed 
conflict, identity boundary mapping has been recognised as a defining feature (Demmers, 2012: 
12). However, Volkan (2001: 79), notes that a ‘chosen trauma’, a term he uses to identify 
historical events, is a key element of large group identity (Volkan, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998; 
Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1993, 1994), and it also links group members together. Movement 
leaders maximise chosen trauma especially in conflict situations when groups tend to heighten 
their identity (ibid: 88), associate fears through conscious and unconscious linkages made 
between the psychological description of a past trauma and a current threat. This process of 
chosen trauma amplifies the image of contemporary conflicts, so that it exacerbates the threat 
perception by members (Ibid: 89). This phenomenon becomes relevant in the analysis of 
leadership narratives in this study, in relation, specifically, to the analysis of how in the Ogoni 
Bill of Rights, Ken Saro-Wiwa creates more awareness by historically tracing the issues 
affecting the group before independence to include internal colonialism, minority issues within 
a minority and environmental related issues (Chapter Three). As the chapters on leadership and 
organisation will show (Chapter Four and Five), he was able to maximise the chosen trauma 
through mass sensitisation and awareness campaigns, where he deliberately linked the 
problems of the past to the situation the group found themselves in at that time. While on the 
Ijaw side, the fragmented nature of the leadership will show the mirroring of the Ogoni strategy 
but in the form of a youth conference and the presentation of the Kaiama Declaration. As well 
as a completely different method of expressing the chosen trauma by the radical militant leaders 
in terms of the use of violence against the state as the only way to solving the Ijaw problem 
(Chapter Four and Chapter Five). 
 
Collective identity is therefore defined as an individuals’ emotional, cognitive, and moral 
association with a wider community (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). It is based on the 
awareness of a shared connection which, as Polletta and Jasper argue, could be imagined rather 
than directly experienced, and is communicated in various forms such as narratives and cultural 
materials (Ibid). In the process of constructing collective identities, the notion of collective 
memory is introduced, which has been described as an effective cultural resource exercised to 
build movement groups. For this reason, social movements are key to the formation of 
collective memories (Kubal and Becerra, 2014). These memories form a continuity with the 
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past, and are relied upon as resources of legitimacy and identity (Gongaware, 2010; Kubal, 
2008). Social movements and revolutionary groups have been known to utilise memories for 
their cause (Isaac, 2008), as in the Zapatistas and the Sandanistas use of the memory of past 
leaders to mobilise present recruits (Jansen, 2007), and in the Niger Delta Ijaw movement’s 
constant reference to Adaka Boro, then Birabi and Ken Saro-Wiwa for the Ogon. Using 
collective memories to connect the past and the present (Chapter Three) has served as a 
motivational factor for groups, especially ones that define themselves as economically 
threatened, to take either violent or nonviolent actions to protect their own legacies (Kubal, 
2008). Both the processes of collective identity and collective memory are established within 
a process known as framing, which according to Snow and Benford (1992) amounts to the 
‘transformation of old meanings’. They are real and not plain collections of individual 
memories (Kratochwil, 2006: 19). The Ogoni under the guidance of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
constructed themselves through a collective identity as a distinct ethnic group within the Niger 
Delta. The use of primordial narratives will highlight how the group distinguishes itself as a 
minority within a minority (Chapter Three). In the case of the Ijaw group, the continuous 
linkage of their struggle to the earlier mentioned Adaka Boro’s ‘Twelve Day Revolution’ which 
they claim justified the turn to violence will further show how memories of the past still 
influence issues within the wider Niger Delta based on how they are framed by the group 
leaders.  
  
2.3.1 Framing and Collective Action 
 
Frames symbolise representations of explanation, that allow persons to trace, comprehend, and 
label episodes within their life space and the world (Goffman, 1974: 21) with the sole purpose 
of organising experience and directing action (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614). In social 
movements, frames identify and underscore the exigency and gravity of social problems, hence, 
articulating claim making among a range of various functions (Walton, 2015; Benford and 
Hunt, 1993; Benford and Snow, 2000). Though as Walton (2014) notes, social movements do 
not originate frames, but in some cases they are essential to the achievement of intended goals 
(Benford and Snow, 2000: 623). Genocide, for instance is a very powerful frame (Epstein, 
1997: 416), so also are human rights and internal colonialism (Naanen, 1995; Saro-Wiwa, 
1995). Saro-Wiwa at a certain point situated the Ogoni marginalisation and neglect within the 
frame of genocide, within the context of how the billions of dollars cost of oil and gas was 
being carried away from their land by the state and Shell Petroleum Development Company, 
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leaving the people without any benefit but environmental damages, poverty and neglect 
(Chapter Three).  
 
Saro-Wiwa related these frustrations to the poverty, sickness, frustration exacerbated by state 
action and inactions which he claimed was an agenda of hatred against the Ogoni (Saro-Wiwa, 
1992). This was exemplified in the mobilisation of the Ogoni people to collective action in the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights, which attracted the support and attention of the international community, 
and also in the albeit in a nonviolent boycott of the June 12 1993 elections (Chapter Five). 
Accordingly, interaction, interpretation and discourse are accentuated by movements in the 
process of framing grievances and mobilising support and in the building of collective identities 
(Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992; Fine, 1995; Snow et al., 1986; Gamson, 1992; Johnston and 
Snow, 1998). Consequently, in line with these ideas, Snow et al., (1986) note the emergence 
of collective action frames through an interactive and negotiated process where groups, 
drawing on and modifying existing cultural beliefs and issues, deliberately mould their 
grievances, strategies and reasons for collective action.  
 
Frames are techniques of understanding how movements’ employ, motivate and legitimate 
action, within the dual perspectives of the need for such action and the attractiveness of 
undertaking it (Ibid). Motivational framing, for instance, provides a call to arms or a basis for 
engaging in corrective collective action, especially the construction of suitable vocabularies of 
motive (Benford and Snow, 2000: 617), as seen in violent collective actions.  These socially 
constructed vocabularies provide the motivational primes for engaging in collective action. 
Furthermore, recollecting the past amounts to situating it in a frame that gives meaning to the 
events, and by associating the past with the present, with individuals’ personal and political 
projects. In this way, ‘we prove our identity as agents and as societies, and recognise ourselves 
as the same, notwithstanding all the changes’ (Kratochwil, 2006: 15). 
 
The general understanding of collective action is that people have reasons for every action they 
take, but there are various explanations as to what factors motivate individuals. Gamson (1992: 
111) clarified that collective action is mainly the outcome of negotiating shared meaning, 
which relates to Tilly and Tarrow's (2007) indication of it as organising efforts on behalf of 
shared interests, which, when successful, develops a connection between the identities of the 
individual and the group (Hunt et al., 1994). This position is supported by Davis (2002), who 
interpreted social movements as proffering novel ways of understanding contemporary 
 57 
movements especially, as they comprise collectively constructed and shared meanings, 
interpretations, and identities. He suggested, furthermore, that they represent much more than 
collectively organised action. Tajfel (1978: 63), however, supports the social identity approach 
as the key to collective action, based on the distinction between individual and group based 
motives. This approach focuses on the relationship between the individual and the social 
environment. The degree to which people identify with their group clarifies the consequence 
of sociostructural factors on collective action (Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978).  
 
The magnitude of a group’s capacity for collective action depends on the visibility of group 
identity and communal motivations, but most importantly, capacity is enhanced if the group 
has genuine leaders who can bridge internal divisions (Gurr, 2007: 144). Most collective 
actions, including sustained campaigns of protest and rebellion, are shaped by strategic 
assessments and tactical decisions of the leaders of politically mobilised groups. Gurr stressed 
that although leadership, could strengthen existing group ties and provide a greater awareness 
of shared interests, leaders cannot actually create them (Ibid: 143). 
 
On the other hand,  Olson (1968), framed collective action as a social dilemma which relates 
to individuals participating in movements because of perceived collective benefits in the form 
of ‘free riding’. Smith et al., (1998) advise that framing at the transnational level would be 
challenging because it must incorporate wider political, cultural, and social distances, which 
would warrant frame stretching movements (Bob, 2014) to attract the attention of international 
audiences. Frames, however, are important when analysing movements because they allow us 
to understand the why and the how, highlighting the point that, when contentious politics and 
collective action combine, claims turn collective and rely on coordination among the people 
making the claims (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 9). While this is true, if we accept that framing in 
movements serves as the link to understanding the past in relation to the present, then how do 
movements construct these frames so much so that they bring people together to act in 
movements either through violence or nonviolence in conflicts. The insight highlighted by this 
literature is that the generalised studies done earlier on the Niger Delta conflicts were 
incomplete without taking into consideration of how the framing of conflicts within narratives, 
leadership and organisation provided a more nuanced understanding of the distinct nature of 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw movements. Thus, on the one hand is the framing of the Ogoni struggle 
within the context of nonviolence and on the other is the Ijaw movement within a context of 
violence.  
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2.4 Narratives and the Dynamics of Choice 
 
In a study on identity and social movements, Polletta and Jasper (2001), put forward an 
argument that individuals decide to participate in movements because they corresponds to who 
they are and influences the methods of protest they adopt based on their collective identities. 
They also advanced that, forms of strategic choice that had movement leaders choosing among 
tactics, by crucially gauging environmental opportunities and limitations overlooked the basic 
reality that strategic options maybe inherently appealing. They mirror ‘what we believe, what 
we are comfortable with, what we like and who we are’. Taylor (1989: 28), notes that to’ 
identify who you are is to be positioned in moral space. Life itself, according to Bruner (1987: 
11), is a narrative. He suggests that world making, is the primary function of the mind and he 
argues that life is a selective accomplishment of memory recall and a construction of the human 
imagination as a narrative (Ibid: 13). It is existent in every age, place and society starting with 
the history of mankind (Barthes, 1977: 79; Cromer and Wagner-Pacifici, 2001: 163). In view 
of their constructed nature and reliance upon language usage and cultural conventions, life 
narratives consist of various types of story plots, also referred to as genres (ibid: 18; Halverson 
et al., 2011: 14; Feldman, 2001; Jacobs, 2001: 225). They are furthermore, embedded in the 
varieties of human experience and based on the importance of language to the negotiation of 
meaning and the social construction of identity in everyday life (Davis, 2002; Hinchman and 
Hinchman, 1997). These genres offer a means for linking the fundamental meaning structure 
of a narrative to its construction and acceptance (Jacobs, 2001: 225), the genre of tragedy 
fosters an anticipation of failure and resignation through the generation of a historical logic of 
permanence so profound as to be constant. This was exactly the background into which 
historical accounts of race, class and urban space were narrated in the outcome of the 1992 Los 
Angeles uprising (ibid: 228). The Ijaw narratives of resignation and resorting to violent militant 
actions could also be considered within this context as will be demonstrated in the succeeding 
empirical chapters.  
 
In relation to life histories and accounts and on the narrative construction of identity, sociology 
has witnessed renewed inquiries into the centrality of narratives as social forms of explanation, 
social processes in terms of storytelling and social objects for investigation (Davis, 2002; 
Somers, 1994; Maines, 1993; Griffin, 1993; Richardson, 1990). Narratives are scarcely 
explored by scholars in the study of social movements (Fine, 1995: 133), which is partly 
blamed on the persistent bias of theoretical elucidations such as resource mobilisation theories 
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that, with very few exceptions (Polletta, 1998; Hunt et al., 1994; Fine, 1995; Benford, 1993) 
focus on structural and interest oriented explanations to the almost marginalisation of ideational 
factors (Davis, 2002: 4). This is also evident in the literature on the Niger Delta conflicts, where 
scholars (Okonta, 2008; Watts, 1999, 2008b; Osaghae, 1995; Osaghae, 2008; Obi, 2006, 2007; 
Ikein, 2009) emphasise structural issues ( see Chapters Three, Four and Five) at the expense of 
the delineation of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements based on agency or on leadership and 
ideational choices between nonviolence and violence. Nonetheless, narrative is a strategic kind 
of movement discourse and a vital analytical concept (Davis, 2002: 4). Different group 
narratives comprise of various narrative frames that translate into numerous meanings in 
multiple narrative perspectives within which an episode could be regarded, but which is 
contingent on the story frames they employ and on the ways in which these frames fit into the 
broader meta-narrative about identity (Feldman, 2001: 133).  
 
Martin (1986) separated narratives into three groups, the first presenting narratives as a form 
of representation that consists of a sequence of events; narrative as a manner of speaking about 
events (as a discourse); and narrative as a verbal act in a social transaction highly sensitive to 
context. This supports the idea that narratives unite into a consistent relational entity of many 
contemporaneous activities and actions which may have been considered to be separate or 
disparate. This identity describes and assigns meaning to each of its components, and is 
simultaneously constituted by them (Griffin, 1993: 1097). As in the form of a collective 
identity, narratives construct experiences and request certain responses from their audience, 
they create the ‘we’ implying some degree of affective bond and a sense of solidarity and are 
used as foundations where social relationships are formed (Davis, 2002: 19). Such relationships 
transform the unfamiliar into familiar through social representations in narratives as collective 
meanings and attributes within a particular social grouping in that they establish frames of 
meanings in order to allow members to relate to the issues at stake (Foster et al., 2005: 8). 
Distinct group narratives should differ widely in features of plot, even though their historical 
circumstances maybe distinctive, even when the groups are situated in the same contextual 
situation (Feldman, 2001: 130).  
 
Regarding the differences between the Seminarians and the Apprentices’ Bruner and Feldman 
(1996), importantly suggested that huge variations exist in genres even between groups 
experiencing a commonality of issues. The two groups frame their narratives in a rich narrative 
of events in time and space, in which the Seminarians tell a story that ‘we are a small closed 
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group of actors …who share a common theatre technique and philosophy taught by our founder 
and sustained by our leaders. We have remained faithful to our common principles’, while the 
other group’s story is a sharp contrast, in terms of groups trying to work out their own approach 
to theatre, each in its own way (Feldman, 2001: 130).  As we shall see in the coming chapters, 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw groups fit neatly into the explanation put forward by Bruner and 
Feldman (1996). For instance, the Ogoni and the Ijaw communities are all located in the Niger 
Delta, all experience resource related environmental degradation issues, marginalisation and 
exclusion from the central state, poverty and such other similar situations, yet they tell their 
stories differently. Each group had different viewpoints on what was central in its theatre and 
different routes of relating to each other, just as the Seminarians and the Ogoni see their group 
as established on a set of principles. The Apprentices’ and the Ijaw in contrast worked at 
mastering different skills in different ways (Feldman, 2001: 130). The Ogoni demonstrated a 
strong culture of agency deciding the best way to engage the state, in the form of nonviolence.  
The explanation of conflict centred on narratives and stories, hence on the construction of 
meaning and on studies from an interpretive epistemology, indicating that human action is 
examined from within (Demmers, 2012; Sztompka, 1994; Callinicos, 1987). Agency based 
approaches emphasise that human beings and their organisations are purposeful actors whose 
actions help to reproduce or transform the society in which they live, thus, directly interfering 
with the relations of social domination (Touraine, 1977; Callinicos, 1987; Sztompka, 1994). 
Conversely, structure based theories view society as made up of social relationships which 
structure the interactions between these actors (Jabri, 1996).  Giddens (1984), notes that where 
structuralism sees only the constraining qualities of structures at work, agency based 
approaches focus on the individual actor, he sees agency and structure as mutually constitutive 
entities.  
 
Scholars of nonviolent action favour agency over structure (Sharp, 2005; Schock, 2005; 
Ackerman, 2007). They contend that, indeed, limited stable conditions exist that analytically 
establish if a nonviolent campaign can and will emerge and the possibility of its success. 
Generally, such advocates claim that competent nonviolent advocates can utilise almost any 
structural condition, employing nonviolent methods that are highly contingent and context 
specific (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015: 3). There is a strong sense of agency in the Ogoni 
case to warrant a claim that these people did what they did because they felt entitled to do so 
(Foster et al., 2005: 292). The plot of stories involves both agency and circumstances (Ibid: 




Rational choice theories of conflict places people as rational agents with options and choices 
even in conflicts in so far as the expected benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. The adoption 
of nonviolence or violence, therefore, is regarded as the outcome of individual rational action. 
People act rationally when they know what they want, understand how likely each course of 
action will satisfy them and at what cost and decide the action that would be most beneficial to 
achieve their ends (Hollis, 1994: 18; Cunningham, 2013: 293). Rationally, an actor is perceived 
as a purposeful agent capable of rational decision making, but Jabri (1996), suggests that, 
actors’ insights and analyses of the costs and benefits accompanying particular actions are 
motivated by the normative prospects associated with their roles.  
 
Civil resistance tradition accentuates practices of nonviolent action, strategic choice, and 
mechanisms within which nonviolent action creates social change which is a prioritised action 
favoured by social movement scholars (Giugni et al., 1998; Amenta et al., 2010) due to the 
fundamental role of strategy and strategic choice (Mccammon et al., 2008; Jasper, 2004; Taylor 
and Van Dyke, 2004; Ganz, 2009). Strategic choice concerns the active role of leading groups 
in influencing, through a political process the structures of their organisations (Child, 1997), in 
which leaders decide upon courses of strategic action (Child, 1972). The ability of such leaders 
to make a choice depends upon how far they could preserve autonomy within their 
environment. Leaders embedded in social bases with strong vertical and horizontal ties use 
these ties to create choices in integrated organisations. New processes and new functions are 
built upon pre-existing connections among leaders on the ground and in local communities 
(Staniland, 2014: 26). 
 
Decisions made by political actors with regard to strategies are based on three dimensions: 
legal versus illegal, institutionalised versus non-institutionalised and violent versus nonviolent 
(McAdam and Tarrow, 2001). Within these dimensions, movements engage in contentious 
politics in different ways, including peaceful, violent and occasionally a combination of the 
two (Asal et al., 2013: 305). Ideology, in addition to opportunity structure, resource 
mobilisation and grievance, has been included in understanding why social movement groups 
decide to engage in violent contention while others maintain nonviolence (ibid). When goals 
fail to be accomplished through institutional means, then claim makers embrace nonviolent 
protest. If that is also unproductive, then violence is approved (Schock, 2013: 281). Once 
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movements have emerged complete with organisations, leaders and members, strategic efforts 
to shape mobilising identities become imperative (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). This urgency 
is shown in ways that groups act together in pursuit of shared interests (Tilly, 1984: 11). 
 
2.4.2 Narratives and Violence 
 
Narratives, specifically those detailing political violence and painful pasts, could be regarded 
within three frames of connotations; the main actor, the event and the socio-political context 
of the event (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2001: 253). Vinitzky-Seroussi cites the examples of American 
soldiers killed in Vietnam, Jews murdered in concentration camps, and the death of Yitzhak 
Rabin and, while including the second frame of meaning, she alters the focus in the examples 
to the Vietnam War, World War II and Rabin’s assassination. Incorporating the third frame, 
she denotes recognition and consequences of American foreign policy in Vietnam; racist 
ideology of Nazi Germany; and the tussle between ethno-religious versus civil definitions of 
collective identity in Israel (Ibid).  
 
Violence within the perspectives of the Ijaw youth is only considered adequate when it is 
narratively constructed as indispensable and unavoidable by aggrieved groups. The 
motivations and qualities of the perpetrator and recipient of violence are framed within a 
narrative that justifies the inevitable necessity for confrontation (Smith, 1997: 97-98). This 
shows that discourse plays a major role in the legitimization of action. In his 1996 study of the 
legitimation of violence, Apter (1996: 2) concisely contended that people do not commit 
political violence without discourse, they need to talk themselves into it. In other words, for 
violence to start, it has to become imaginable first (Schroder and Schmidt, 2001: 2). Origins of 
violence could be located in the constellations of interactions between groups, ideologies and 
juxtaposed positioning’s which rise in the toxic mix (Foster et al., 2005: 66; Huggins et al., 
2002: 182), and these precarious combinations then interlock and resonate to engender violent 
tendencies (Foster, 2000: 9). Victims may also be perpetrators of violence (Foster et al., 2005: 
4). Violent imaginaries play a central role in the construction of the historicity of present day 
confrontations encouraging a hegemonic solidarity among the groups, which is achieved 
through their participation in narratives. These narratives incite members to perceive and 
support the violent course of action that their leaders presented to them as legitimate and 
justified (Schroder and Schmidt, 2001: 9;  Demmers, 2012: 132).  
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Such is the case in Nigeria, where the majority of the peoples in the Niger Delta are not satisfied 
with the way things are being done (Ukiwo, 2007; Okonta, 2008). This is particularly true in 
the area of resource governance, which has led to several violent conflicts of protest, leading 
to the rise in militancy and insurgencies (Ibid). Militancy is expressed not only in violence but 
also in words (Falola, 1998). Though some militants resort to direct violent action, by no means 
do all of them do so, contrary to what is popularly believed. Some militants are ethically and 
religiously exclusive and intolerant while others are not (ibid, Falola, 1996, p.81). Such 
imageries are replicated through a complex and multidimensional dynamics of group 
interaction (Ukiwo, 2007). Strong rationales must exist to guide otherwise sane individuals to 
agree that grave violence is the right thing to do (Corman, 2016: 9). Schroder and Schmidt 
(2001), ground their understanding of legitimacy on Weber's (1973) explanation which states 
that a social order is accepted as valid due either to its historicity, emotional value or 
instrumental reasoning (Demmers, 2012). The employment of discourse unfreezes overlooked 
versions of reality and reveals the ways in which they contribute to or challenge particular 
power relations (Foster et al., 2005: 275). Critics of discourse theory, at the same time, maintain 
that explaining ways by means of which violence is legitimised is not the same as accounting 
for its actual outbreak, as when compared to rational choice theory or the human needs theory, 
it fails to highlight the how and why of the concrete action itself. 
 
 Terrorism is another form of action that involves the use or threat of violence as a process of 
trying to achieve some sort of impact within a political context (Horgan, 2005: 1), and it is also 
referred to as political violence. It appears due to extremely complex and heterogeneous 
combination of sociocultural, psychological and political factors (Tololyan, 1989: 99), it is a 
creature of its own time and place (Cooper, 1985: 95). Abrahms (2008: 94), notes that people 
partake in terrorist organisations for the social solidarity irrespective of their political return, 
and their goal is mainly to create links with other members not the sole aim of realising the 
organisation’s agenda. Narratives are also used in such situations to establish the type of social 
solidarity needed to advance their cause. Terrorist motivation involves the need to belong to a 
group which becomes strategic to identity formation in the terrorist (Kaplan, 1981). This, as 
Gomel (2003: 44) notes, constitutes the only way a terrorist can make sense of his own actions, 
by identifying with a society that sees him as a frightening and incomprehensible other. In 
order to exist, terrorist groups also rely on some form of leadership; here we can consider the 
IRA leadership structure which has over the years remained intact (Horgan, 2005).  
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The frustration-aggression hypothesis has been used to explain that minority group 
movements’ turn to violence due to having an under privileged, disadvantaged status and an 
aggressive response to a failure to have their grievances resolved (Friedland, 1992). In line 
with this, Tittmar (1992: 65) attempted to situate terrorism also within the frustration- 
aggression thesis which, according to Berkowitz (1965), relates the response to the frustration 
or obstruction of the realisation of an individual’s personal or environmental goals.  Violence 
could perhaps be integrated into the discourse of domination since it becomes a signifying 
activity, representing something other than itself, the victory of an ideology, or the might of a 
state (Gomel, 2003: 7). It is, however not a rational tactical thinking but, rather, a substitute 
type of rationality or, built in narrative that varies in consistency with the stories that the 
terrorists and their sympathisers believe to be true (Corman, 2016: 17). For contemporary 
terrorists, this made it possible through the process of vertical integration within which master 
narratives on socio-cultural or religious stories are employed, to translate and connect events 
in the here and now (ibid). All members of a group share the mental representations of the 
tragedies that have befallen the group (Volkan, 2001: 87). 
 
Historical reflections help people become aware of the dialectic of choice in which the past is 
recollected and joined with the future by means of a political project in the present (Kratochwil, 
2006: 8). Historical awareness clearly indicates that not everything is possible, as 
disagreements are rife, collective action problems abound, dilemmas are real and institutions 
are sticky. Historical reflection does not provide us with a warrant to engage in fantasies of 
omnipotence solely because the necessities to be confronted turn out to be most man made. 
Such a reflection is, nevertheless, the precondition for a proper appreciation of action and 
agency (ibid).  
 
With the above theoretical discussions in mind, I shall now develop my own approach to 
addressing the main Research Objective: to examine the reasons why two ethnic groups, the 
Ogoni and the Ijaw, who live in exactly the same conditions and face the same structural issues, 







2.5 Research Questions 
 
1. Why did the Ogoni adopt nonviolence as a means of expressing their grievances while the 
Ijaw opted for a violent course of action? 
2. What role did the leaders of the two groups play in determining the strategy adopted in 
relation to the profile, nature and character of the rebellion? 
3. How important were the collective narratives developed by the two groups in accounting 
for the different trajectories in fighting the Nigerian state?   
4. Did the two groups organize themselves in ways which reinforced their strategic choices in 
relation to nonviolence and violence? 
 
In order to answer the research questions, the thesis will examine, 
1.  The collective narratives developed by the leaders of different ethnic groups in the 
Niger Delta, particularly the Ijaw and the Ogoni;  
2. The strategic choices and different courses of action taken by the leaders to express their 
groups’ grievances and frustrations against the Nigerian state and the reasons for those 
choices.  
3. The outcomes that led to the transition from a nonviolent to a violent situation in the 
case of the Ijaw. 
 
These will be analysed within the following sub-points: 
 
A. Narratives on nonviolence versus violence. 
B. Nature and goals of the leadership within the Ogoni and the Ijaw movements. 
C. The organizational structure of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements. 
 
The objectives of this research project are (1) to analyse the collective narratives developed by 
the leaders of different ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, particularly the Ijaw and the Ogoni, 
with the hope of providing a broader perspective on the emergence and management of 
violence in the Niger Delta. (2) To understand the strategic choices and different courses of 
action taken by the leaders to express their groups grievances and frustrations against the 
Nigerian state and the reasons for those choices. (3) To highlight the outcomes that led to the 
transformation of the Ijaw movement from a nonviolent to a violent posture. The emphasis on 
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acceptance and understanding of dominant narratives preached by group leaderships facilitates 
easy mobilisation of members, although the dominant narratives are sometimes flexible with 
the consideration of challenging new narratives (Ross, 2007). 
Within the context of this study, I understand that the questions of ‘why did the Ogoni adopt 
nonviolence as a means of expressing their grievances while the Ijaw opted for a violent course 
of action’; and ‘what role did the leaders of the two groups play in determining the strategy 
adopted in relation to the profile, nature and character of the rebellion’, will involve the 
extended analyses of the choices made by leaders in relation to nonviolence and violence. The 
application of narratives, leadership style and the organisation of the movements will be 
scrutinised in detail, precisely because, in the context of this project these are understood to 
contribute significantly to the creation of a dynamics of choices. This thesis uphold 
furthermore, that choices are important in particular to the framing of narratives and collective 
identities rather than the unspoken intentions of a leader. Therefore, the primary aim of this 
study is to make claims about the dynamics of choice in the emergence of nonviolent and 
violent responses that have emerged within the Niger Delta conflict with respect to the Ogoni 
and Ijaw ethnic groups. Based on the literature review, this chapter contends that the core of 
understanding the complexity and distinctiveness of the two movements lies in an analytical 
framework with a much narrower set of perspectives: the processes and mechanisms employed 
by the two sets of leaders in charting a course of action specific to their group will be examined 
in great detail. In this respect, the three empirical chapters (Three, Four and Five) will align 
more closely with how movement leaderships construct conflict through the formation of 
collective identities and actions, the framing of narratives, the style of leadership and 
specifically, how the organisation of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements against the state relate to 
nonviolence and violence respectively. 
2.6 Methodology  
 
In the course of the literature review, it became obvious that if the studies that seek to explore 
and gain deep understanding of why ethnic groups that share similar lived experiences and 
environments choose different steps in seeking solutions to their problems are based on the 
premise that require the conviction that the human world is an artifice, then the actors’ 
perceptions of their actions should be of importance (Kratochwil, 2006: 86). A crucial part of 
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the current thesis uses social constructivism as a framework of focusing on what we know and 
how we know it (ibid: 80). Kratochwil contends, furthermore, that constructivism is symbolised 
by clear ontological ideas regarding human action or praxis, as well as forwarding the 
understanding that meaning is use and that interaction among a group of persons is governed 
by conventions (ibid, Kratochwil, 2015: 25). According to Adler (1997:319), constructivism 
occupies the middle ground between rationalist approaches (realist or liberal) and interpretive 
approaches (poststructuralist, critical and postmodernist) and it founds new areas for theoretical 
and empirical study. Jorgensen (2015: 37) goes further by characterising constructivism along 
four different levels of reasoning, such as the philosophy of science, metatheory, theory and 
empirical analysis. Of these, empirical analysis was identified as key to the future of 
constructivism (Jorgensen, 2000; Keohane, 1988; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) in terms of 
the latter’s ability to provide empirical studies which would give constructivism a form of 
legitimacy as a theory (Jorgensen, 2015: 51). In international relations, things simply exist as 
results of human acts of conception that occur within a ‘cultural, historical and political context 
of meaning’ because, as social facts, they happen because of the worth and meaning ascribed 
to them (Fierke, 2016: 182). 
 
Constructivism advances an idea about the position of human consciousness in international 
relations (Ruggie, 1998:856), suggesting that the construction of the human world happens 
within the actions and activities of actors themselves (Kratochwil, 2015: 17). Based on the 
clear inter-subjective aspect of human action, a constructivist investigation displays the 
configurations of how actors recognise what forms of actions are worthwhile, vital and 
applicable (Ruggie, 1998: 856) thereby shaping their identities and interests in relation to social 
structures (Wendt, 1994: 358; Adler, 1997: 322). Reasons for people’s actions, according to 
Adler (1997), are ‘causes’ (Davidson, 1963) which indicate that when individuals act, they do 
so based on one origin or another when regarded from a constructivist approach. Furthermore, 
the idea of reacting or undertaking actions for reasons signifies applying an understanding of 
‘what is called for’ within a set of situations (Giddens, 1984: 345). This suggests a link between 
the identification of an underlying bond between ideas and material relations (Fierke, 2015: 
121). Although not in alignment with an accurately comprehensible world, constructivism 
endeavours, however, to depict the types of historical and culturally reliant communications 
that are contingent on social relations. Social constructivism symbolises an interest of social 
facts in international political life (Fearon and Wendt, 2002), making it a particularly suitable 
framework for the present study of the dynamics of choice in the Niger Delta conflicts due to 
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its potential to incorporate other vital features. Therefore, social constructivism is particularly 
relevant when explaining the adoption by individual group leaders of nonviolence versus 
violence as the key to understanding the choice between two distinct courses of action (Fierke, 
2015: 118).  
 
Such an understanding is important especially in appreciating how, in the process of reacting 
to similar structural issues groups change from one strategy to another (Fierke, 2015: 124) . 
The emphasis here is based on those collective understandings that represent the relevant facts 
and not merely observations constituted out of meanings that the Ogoni and the Ijaw have 
brought to their interactions (ibid: 192). These are in terms of the structural characteristics that 
ideas have as they serve as the medium and propellant of social action (Adler, 1997: 325). 
While searching for explanations in a variety of contexts, researchers must be mindful of the 
techniques they employ to avoid claiming that only one type of explanation fits all (Adler, 
2008). Accordingly, in its analysis of the Niger Delta conflicts, this study employs a multi-case 
studies approach as the most practicable method in which to arrive at answers in relation to the 
research questions and puzzle. While decried for being instinctive, old and unmanageable 
(Miles, 1979: 597), the case study approach is nevertheless a critical tool for researchers’ who 
examine conflicts (Yin, 2009) and it is well suited to the inductive objectives of this study 
(George and Bennett, 2005:19–21). As an approach, case studies are also crucial for description 
(King et al., 1994: 44): they allow for the understanding of the ‘why and how’ in conflicts, 
particularly by viewing them through the lenses of the key actors and aggrieved parties that 
used various strategies to express their grievances. Therefore, framing a case study towards an 
explanatory question could advance a more intensive and pertinent account, even if the study 
is eventually frustrated in its bid to offer even a single valid causal inference (King et al., 1994: 
45). 
 
Given the complexity of the dynamics of choice between the Ogoni and Ijaw movements, the 
choice of a method had to be based on one that permitted for a broad approach suitable for 
identifying critical mechanisms and variables of interest that would explain why one group 
adopted nonviolence while the other chose violence. Furthermore, since comparative case 
studies encompass the analysis and synthesis of the patterns, similarities and differences across 
two or more cases that share a common focus or goal (Goodrick, 2014: 1), its suitability, as 
will be seen in the Ogoni and Ijaw cases, needs to be emphasised. The deep understanding of 
each distinct and unique case is imperative in determining the foundation for the analytical 
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framework that will be used in the cross-case comparison (ibid) of the Ogoni nonviolence 
versus Ijaw violence. Comparative analysis answers to the necessity for ‘broadening the 
territorial scope and intensity of political information’ (Lasswell, 1968: 3-18 in Della Porta and 
Keating, 2008). This approach explains the similarity of the logic of the comparative method 
to that of other methods, due to its attempt to advance clarifications by the ‘systematic 
manipulations of parameters and operative variables’ (Smelser, 1976: 158; Lijphart, 1975: 
160). Generally, it targets the establishment of empirical relations between two variables. The 
case study method was chosen for the rich and in-depth analysis it can generate, especially 
when it includes face to face interviews’ as a form of oral history, and the absorption of written 
data from existing literature and other secondary sources. Yin (1994) offered four arguments 
for selecting a case studies method: to clarify complicated and causal links in real-life 
interventions; illustrate the real-life context within which the intervention has happened; define 
the actual intervention and; to investigate those circumstances in which the intervention under 
study has no clear set of outcomes. These are important especially for their ability to justify 
how and why the case studies are used to support the theoretical framework of this study.  
 
Arguably, although the case study approach is well suited to this research project, briefly 
outlining the methodological implications of comparative case studies and how these have been 
addressed in the study design becomes very vital. Deciding which observations to choose 
remains critical for the outcome of the study in qualitative research and for the extent to which 
it can deliver determinate and reliable results (King et al., 1994: 128). Selection bias can 
obstruct the researcher’s capability towards building generalizable claims in relation to other 
cases of significance in studies that examine the dynamics of choice between nonviolence and 
violence. Accordingly, selection should permit the ‘slight variation of the dependent variable’ 
(Ibid: 129) making the choices of the Ogoni and the Ijaw according to the divergent nature of 
their narratives, leadership and organisation based on their distinct choice between nonviolence 
and violence. While the researcher’s capacity to assess the impact of the identified variables is 
a frequent question posed at case studies (Ibid), accepting the limitation of findings becomes 
very important. Therefore, the inclusion of a process tracing aspect in comparative research 
could guide the researcher towards making tentative claims around specific variables deemed 
to be important, and which ought to be discounted (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). Process 
tracing provides an avenue through which the researcher looks closely (King et al., 1994: 226) 
at ‘the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes’ (Ibid). 
Characteristically, case studies merge various data collection methods that include interviews, 
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questionnaires and archival observations (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534) aimed at identifying causal 
mechanisms in empirical analysis (King et al., 1994: 86). These could be undertaken through 
analytic narrative, a form of process tracing which connects the actions to explain the 
consequence in interpretive case studies (Ibid). Vennesson (2008: 231) notes that process 
tracing could be accomplished within both a positivist and an interpretivist structure. Naturally, 
a positivist would recognise variables as underlying mechanisms, to tackle the gap created 
when ‘general effects are imputed to general causes’ (Vennesson, 2008). An interpretivist 
would analyse the perceptions and motivations of actors, suppositions ‘like rational utility-
maximisation which can here be subject to critical scrutiny’ (Ibid), suggesting that positivist 
and interpretivist approaches may occasionally be linked. Accordingly, process tracing could 
attend to the worry that case studies are not independent, it could guarantee that such 
correlations are revealed and recognised within the study. Scholars of interpretive 
epistemology insist on seeking the connotation of an action rather than looking for causes of 
behaviour; actions, for them develop their denotation from shared ideas and rules of social life 
(Demmers, 2012: 10). During the literature review and the field work for the current study for 
example, it became clear that debates within the Niger Delta conflict have been shaped both by 
developments within Nigeria and internationally, and that it was likely that international 
experiences had discernible impacts on the dynamics of choice made by leaders in the Ogoni 
and Ijaw ethnic groups. Therefore, to delineate the political significance of the roles played by 
narratives, leadership and the organisation of the two movements, process tracing was utilised 
in the study. Thus, the construction of meaning in this thesis is historically and culturally 
specific and could solely be examined in context and by incorporating the self-conscious 
viewpoints of the key actors. This is without over stating the fact that the level of description 
entailed to represent the richness of the cases may mean that the cases, and the key actors within 
the cases, are identifiable.  
 
The suitability of the historical approach in the construction of meaning is especially pertinent 
for case-oriented research designs which are ‘by definition context bound’(Della Porta, 2008: 
216).  In line with the categorisation in which one happening influences the next, historical 
institutionalists underscore the importance of ‘context and historical order of events’. This 
enables and supports, researchers seeking to explain both ‘continuity and change over time’ 
(Della Porta and Keating, 2008: 10). Historical institutionalism focuses attention to real world 
empirical questions, and considers the means in which institutions structure and shape political 
behaviour and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 118). It emphasises the role these institutions perform 
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in influencing behaviour, therefore, the use of historical institutionalism in analysing the Ogoni 
and Ijaw movements is strategic, because it helps us to understand why a certain choice was 
made in terms of nonviolence or violence, and why a certain outcome occurred (Steinmo, 2008: 
123) through engaging with historical narrative and evidence to try to find out causes.  
 
In order to carry out meaningful qualitative research on the Niger Delta conflicts, primary 
sources relating to the Ogoni and Ijaw movements, as well as government sources were 
identified as the target data. Secondary sources were used in the form of an analysis of the 
various discourses in the existing literature, archival materials and newspaper articles relating 
to conflicts. This became important due to the recognition of the significance of gaining deeper 
insights as the research seeks to enhance the understanding of the dynamics of choice between 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. The employment of discourse analysis 
helped understand how specific discourse structures affected the outcome of using different 
strategies to fight for related problems. Parker (1992) defined discourse as ‘a system of 
statements which constructs an object, mainly in relation to meanings, representations, and 
stories that in some way together produce a particular version of events (Burr, 1995). It is the 
social reasoning of a ‘socially constructed knowledge of some social practice established 
within fixed social settings and applicable to both large and small circumstances’ (Foucault, 
1977). The sentences and transcripts have been interlinked with interview scripts, existing 
literature, newspaper and archive materials, deliberately aimed at ensuring objectivity and 
enhancing the scope of the study. 
 
In this situation, face to face structured elite interviews were undertaken with key informants 
and actors of the two conflicts in the Niger Delta. However, asking questions and getting 
answers posed a larger challenge than it first seemed, yet the art of interviewing has proved to 
be one of the most influential methods used when attempting to understand our fellow human 
beings (Fontana and Frey, 1994: 361). At some point, semi structured and even unstructured   
interviews had to be used especially during the latter part of the research, when certain 
clarifications had to be made occasionally on the telephone. It is during the discussions with 
some of the ex-agitators in particular that unstructured questions had to be used in order to get 
to the contents that were relevant for this thesis. Most importantly, the researcher had to 
acclimatise to the domain of the groups being interviewed by sharing their anxieties and 
viewpoints at certain points. This proved strategic in order to even get their acceptance in 
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responding to the questions, obviously different situations required different interviewing 
techniques.  
 
Unstructured interviews provided greater depth than the other types, because it made ‘breaking 
the ice’ easier, the discussions were started on a general context before gradually moving on to 
the more specific ones (Ibid: 365). The interviews were mainly informal within an average 
duration of one hour depending on who was being interviewed. Nevertheless, in conformity to 
the semi structured style of interviewing, basic questions were initially put forward to all 
interviewees (Van Evera, 1997).  However, specific questions were posed to each interviewee 
depending on which group they represented, and in light of the position held by the interviewee, 
as it relates to the main research question. The chosen style of interviewing prevented the 
normal ambiguity of coding of schemes that places interviewees’ responses into broad 
categories as in structured interviewing (Burnham et al., 2008). The principal aim of the 
conducted interviews was to obtain more intense and clearer primary source material to support 
the understanding of the research questions and thesis puzzle, specifically, ‘why did the Ogoni 
adopt nonviolence as a means of expressing their grievances while the Ijaw opted for a violent 
course of action’. The quality of responses to the interviews proved to be invaluable for the 
interpretation of why the Ogon insist on nonviolence, while the Ijaw are consistently caught up 
between nonviolence and violence, which produced a finely grained explanation to the facts of 
the different components. The discourse in empirical qualitative inquiry demonstrates how 
beliefs are interlinked in the course of knowledge development through which experiential 
material is ‘constructed, interpreted and written’ (Keso et al., 2009: 53).   
2.6.1 Field Work, Access and Consent 
 
Access to the primary data for this study represents a major challenge, as getting access to the 
key informants and actors in the Ogoni and Ijaw movements was indeed difficult. Being an 
outsider, for about four months no one was responding to my emails requesting for interviews 
and information. A breakthrough came during the telephone discussions I had with three 
personal contacts who incidentally are outsiders too, Dr Kole Shettima, Mrs Maryam Uwais, 
and Saleh Ahmadu; and later on Jummai Umar and Fatima Akilu Sada, who understood my 
predicament and offered to introduce me to some of their contacts in the Niger Delta. 
Subsequently, I was introduced to Chris Newsome of the Stakeholder Democracy Network 
based in Port Harcourt, Rivers State; Tom Jackson Orage, a lawyer and the son of one of the 
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Ogoni four victims which Ken Saro-Wiwa was executed for; Professor Chidi Odinkalu a 
Nigerian lawyer and human rights activist; Mr Iniruo Wills and Dr Ferdinand Ikwang, the lead 
consultant of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme who collectively ensured that I had access 
to key informants relevant to my subject area. As a result of their experience in granting 
interviews to researchers, national and international media, the Ogoni group leaders were more 
receptive and much easier to engage with. The Ijaw on the other hand, was a mixture of those 
willing and some that had to be convinced before granting an interview, specifically the 
reformed militants. 
 
As the primary site for this research is the Niger Delta where the Ogoni and the Ijaw are located, 
interviews were conducted in several locations in Rivers and Bayelsa states. In addition, some 
took place in Abuja, the federal capital territory of Nigeria as well as Providence, United States 
of America and London, United Kingdom because two of the interviewees were not in Nigeria 
during the period I went for the field work and was opportune to gain access to them while on 
a professional development visit to the USA and in the UK because that is where my institution 
is located. After further discussions we agreed to meet in these two places as I would be there 
also for other academic activities. I set out for the field work hoping to get answers to my 
questions and also to find out if the narratives regarding the Niger Delta conflicts are still the 
same or whether there have been changes within the different groups. I arrived in Nigeria on 
25 July 2015 armed with various questions for the different groups I intended to interview. 
Before I started the interviews I was advised to paraphrase the theme of my research from 
nonviolence and violence to the different strategies used in expressing grievances by different 
groups in the Niger Delta, so as not to send the wrong message being someone from another 
region. Also, when addressing the militants, I was warned not to use the word violent militants 
but freedom fighters or ex-agitators.  
 
Accordingly, I felt it would be beneficial to discuss how the construction of both state and non-
state narratives and actions have contributed to transforming the conflict from  nonviolent 
agitations and protests to a fully violent form.  I set out to conduct 15 interviews but during the 
interviews I was asked if I was interested in interviewing some key people that engaged in the 
Niger Delta struggle and I said yes, which is why I was able to conduct 41 oral interviews and 
got access to some additional materials for the thesis. Some of the narratives quoted will seem 
quite long; this is mainly to share the depth in the discussions we had. The interviews were 
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spread over a period of twelve months because they involved different actors spread across 
Africa, Europe and the Americas. 
 
At some point, an offer was made to conduct interviews with Asari Dokubo, Boyloaf and 
Tompolo in the Republic of Benin and other locations, but due to the dangerous, volatile and 
sensitive nature of the conflicts, the offer was declined. I decided to decline because I was 
asked to move to insecure locations outside Nigeria, and I wasn’t guaranteed protection and 
security by the Amnesty office in Nigeria. However, the field work was necessary in order to 
gather the right data needed to facilitate the progression of this research, because it was 
understood that the most effective way to employ the research design at the heart of this thesis 
was to spend time in the area gathering information and conducting some informal interviews. 
It suffices to say that I met people who were receptive and willing to share their stories with 
me. 
 
My requests for access and interviews with Shell Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and a few other oil companies were not granted, even after signing several 
legal documents and sending several request. I was, in the end, able to engage with two 
confidential sources from the oil and gas sector who did not really reveal any information that 
would significantly enhance the study. Government sources were not directly included in this 
study because that would come afterwards based on the fact that the current study was aimed 
at exploring why certain groups adopt a certain strategy rather than another. The focus was on 
the aggrieved parties to the conflict and I came to certain conclusions especially on the 
importance of leadership and narratives because of the way conflict was constructed as well as 
the way the enemy (state) was also constructed. Therefore, logically understanding where the 
groups were coming from, what they wanted and where they are going became central to the 
study before analysing the interaction with the counterpart, the state. 
 
2.6.2 Key Informants and Interviewees 
 
The intention was to interview key actors from the Ogoni and the Ijaw movements, activists, 
government representatives and scholars on the Niger Delta. Fortunately, in the process of the 
fieldwork, I was opportune to interview 41 (see Appendix 1 for a list of all people interviewed 
for this study) people divided as follows, the Ogoni, comprising seven interviewees made up 
of individuals such as Professor Ben Naanen, Mr Ledum Mitee, Mr Legborsi Saro Pyagbara, 
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who have at one point or another been part of the leadership of the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP); Dr Peter Medee the current president of the Ogoni elite group 
KAGOTE; Barrister Tom Jackson Orage; Dr Alubabari Desmond Nbete  and Dr Owens Wiwa 
included because of their knowledge and involvement in the Ogoni struggle.  
 
On the Ijaw side, Dr Patterson Ogon, Dr Isaac Asume Osuoka, Mr Timi Keizer Ogoriba and 
Dr Felix Tuodolo were interviewed in view of their participation in the organisation and 
development of the youth conference that saw to the development of the Kaiama Declaration; 
Mr Iniruo Wills, Mr Marshal Kunoun, Dr Otive Igbuzor, Lancelot, Chief D.S.P 
Alamieyeseigha and Elder Godsday Orubebe for their active roles in the Ijaw quest for self-
determination; Belema Papamie, Kelechi Ameachi Justin, Chris Newsom, Inemo Samiama,  
Ken Henshaw, Ben Tantua, Jackson, Samuel Agbola, Professor Chidi Odinkalu, and Ukoha 
Ukiwo, based on their knowledge and activism on the Niger Delta conflicts. Additionally, the 
insider perspectives of some of the ex-agitations formed strategic pieces, especially in finding 
out why the Ijaw took up arms against the state. These involved interviews with General 
Andrew Azazi, General Peter Doloebiowei, General Abuja Seleoge, Comrade Ramsey Mukoro 
and Comrade Johnson Ajuwa.  
 
Furthermore, Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah, Gen Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, General 
Sarkin Yaki Bello (Rtd), Mrs Ihuoma Osaretin, Dr Ferdinand Ikwang, Kennedy West and three 
confidential sources by virtue of their involvement in the Niger Delta on the side of the state 
also became important in the study. Through the course of interacting with these individuals, 
whose knowledge and contribution proved invaluable to the study, I constantly engaged in a 
process of reflexivity, because I had to question and re-question my choices over and over 
again, just to ensure that they tallied with my main research question and would help solve the 
research puzzle (Keso et al., 2009).   
   
2.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical and conceptual foundations of conflict were examined as a basis 
for understanding conflicts in the Niger Delta. The focus has been about the choices groups 
make in conflict situations, with strong emphasis on the nexus between nonviolence and 
violence in the Niger Delta, and on how taking up violence is not just a question of leadership 
but, also of collective narratives. In surveying the literature, this study found that narratives 
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and identities, alongside leadership and organisation, play a significant role in movements’ 
decision making process, on the basis of collective identity which was framed within contexts 
that determine the choice of strategies adopted in conflict. Attention was paid to the dilemma 
faced while attempting to unpack reasons behind decisions taken by the Ijaw and the Ogoni, 
who in spite of their communal life experiences, differed in their strategies of engagement with 
the state.  
 
Structural and theoretical approaches used by scholars to explain the conflict were discussed, 
and their inadequacies in determining the influence of collective identities over movements’ 
strategic choices were examined and their short comings highlighted as they relate to the 
problematic natural resource Nigerian situation. The greed and grievance theses (Collier et al., 
2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009; Collier, 2007; Urdal, 2004), horizontal 
inequalities (Stewart, 2008; Stewart et al., 2008), frustration aggression hypothesis (Friedland, 
1992; Tittmar, 1992; Berkowitz, 1965) as well as the structure based approaches (Vanhanen, 
1990; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015) 
have made the deficiencies on the dynamics of choice apparent. The use of collective group 
narratives, however, provided more insights into how, in the framing of memories, movements’ 
made strategic choices of modes of participation (Polletta and Jasper, 2001) in both nonviolent 
and violent group actions, which further shows the limitations of structural causes in explaining 
conflicts.  
 
Since the aim was to focus on the dynamics of choice, identity framing was examined through 
the choice of strategic memory making narratives, demonstrated, for instance in the violent 
narratives, which were used by leaders to connect the strategic situation to the present-day 
reality (Snow and Benford, 1992). The adoption of narratives outlined the salience of linguistic 
aspects employed in violence in the sense that ‘in order to practice violence, you need to talk 
violence, and dehumanise the other in the language’, therefore, the narrative must show that 
there is nothing else you can do, and that you are constantly ‘victimised’ (Apter, 1996: 2), as 
seen in the Ijaw movement and also in the example of the Zapatistas and Sandanistas (Jansen, 
2007). While in the nonviolence scenario, it was acknowledged (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 
2015; Foster et al., 2005) that campaign leaders would operate contingent and context specific 
nonviolent methods within whichever structural condition they found themselves while 
employing peaceful narratives that indicate agency, knowledge of the situation and the 
legitimate channels through which their demands would attract the desired attention, as in the 
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Ogoni case. However, in attempting to carry out an effective empirical research on such a topic, 
various methods had to be employed by the researcher. As the chapter highlighted, it involved 
requesting access to key informants whose wealth of knowledge helped shape the direction of 
the thesis. The nature of interviews conducted with the 41 interviewees showed the value and 
depth of the information generated from using unstructured types of interviews. It provided the 
perfect opportunity to the researcher to easily break the ice through the introduction of general 
questions before narrowing down on to the specific contexts.  
 
Furthermore, within the combination of all these collective identities, memories, narratives and 
dynamics of choice exists some fundamental grievances against the state and an essential desire 
for change that could develop into mass movement, (Braithwaite et al., 2015) which is what 
the subsequent empirical chapters are going to analyse within the Ogoni and Ijaw contexts in 


























This first empirical chapter seeks to elucidate the reasons why although the Ogoni and the Ijaw 
reside within a related topography, sharing similar origins, values and culture, the narratives 
from the two groups do not present them as having a collective voice or as collectively 
representing the Niger Delta. The narratives will be analysed to show that the discourses used 
to denote the grievances of the two movements are distinct, with the Ogoni using a moderate 
nonviolent form of discourse while the Ijaw indicate a stronger and more contentious debate 
while charting a distinct cause. The chapter will make a clear distinction between the combative 
natures of the Ijaw narratives and the nonviolent expression of the Ogoni issues. This 
distinction will clarify that the narratives each work for particular communities that have 
significant context specificity of their own. The Ogoni and the Ijaw are represented within the 
commonality of their lived experiences in the region, witnessed under key standpoints 
including environmental, socio-economic, and political arguments (Saro-Wiwa, 1995; Okonta, 
2008; Naanen, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1995, 1999). 
 
In terms of underlying features like the deep historical political economy characteristics of 
Nigeria, the majority of scholars conflate the struggles in the Niger Delta as unitary and 
collective (Watts, 1999, 2003,  2008;  Peterside, 2001; Obi, 2006,  2007, 2009; Ukeje, 2001). 
The frustration-aggression thesis towards Nigeria’s nascent democratic process is characterised 
by several narrations of neglect, along with associated problems of poverty and deprivation to 
the detriment of ethnic minorities (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009; Osaghae, 1995, 2008; Ikein, 
2009). These problems include inadequate availability of essential social amenities and 
services such as electricity, health, pipe borne water and quality education (Okonta and 
Douglas, 2001; Ojakorotu and Morake, 2010; Ojakorotu, 2010; Omeje, 2004). Decades of oil 
exploration activities and the dangers of spillage and gas flaring exacerbated by environmental 
degradation (Okonta, 2008; Osha, 2006, 2007; Ukiwo, 2007; Frynas, 2001). While these 
perspectives have richly facilitated the knowledge and understanding of the issues, they 
indicate the existence of an array of distinct minority ethnic groups that have shared lived 
experiences on oil exploration activities. Although generally, the literature brings these 




Furthermore, Dibua (2005: 6), rightly points to the prominence given to the struggle for ethnic 
minority politics and environmental degradation by the activities of Ken Saro-Wiwa, but stops 
short of representing his actions as specific to the context of the Ogoni agenda and not to a 
wider Niger Delta cause. Similarly, Oboreh (2010: 18), contends that the people of the region 
progressively employed varying methods in order to attract the attention of the state to their 
marginalised and neglected condition. As a result of a failure of peaceful actions carried out in 
the region, the nature of the responses escalated and radicalised. This argument suggests that 
the people in the region acted at first peacefully and later more violently against both the state 
and multinational oil companies. Here again, while the assertions within the literature are 
generally correct, no distinction is made between the actions taken by the different groups in 
the region in relation to violent and nonviolent strategies and tactics. Furthermore, the studies 
by Ezirim (2011) on resource governance and conflict in the Niger Delta and Idemudia and Ite 
(2006), on demystifying the Niger Delta conflict while very important, focused generally on 
the link between oil and conflict in the region, but leave a wide gap in terms of how the different 
groups in the region construct and react to the oil related issues. To address the gaps left by the 
literature, this chapter argues that the actual perception of how the Ogoni and the Ijaw regard 
themselves and how they engage with nonviolence and violence have important implications 
for understanding the nature of the struggles in the region.  
 
By focusing on the Ogoni and the Ijaw, the analysis and findings in this chapter will analyse 
the ways in which each group constructs conflicts and reacts differently to the actions and 
inactions of the state. The linkage of the Ogoni and Ijaw narratives to distinct choices related 
to nonviolence and violence, will provide a more informed perspective in terms of the 
differences between the two movements. The chapter, importantly, contends that the conflict 
in the Niger Delta comprises different strategies, which are not one and the same. 
 
The main argument of this research project is that in spite of sharing common lived experiences 
within a common geographical location, the Ogoni decided on a nonviolent course of action 
while the Ijaw opted for a violent course of action. It argues, furthermore, that the differing 
reactions by the Ogoni and the Ijaw were due to three sets of factors: 1) the narratives 
constructed by the leaders, 2) the strategies developed by the leaders and 3) the organisational 
aspects of the movements. Firstly, therefore, this chapter will examine the collective narratives 
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developed by the leaders of the Ijaw and the Ogoni groups. Indeed, the nonviolent nature of 
the Ogoni struggle stands out of all the agitations in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Interviews for this chapter (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list and information of all 
interviewees) were conducted with selected key Ogoni and Ijaw leaders and representatives by 
virtue of their lived experiences as well as the knowledge they possess on the activities of the 
two movements. They comprise Barrister Tom Jackson Orage, Sir Dr Peter Medee, Dr 
Alubabari Desmond Nbete, Professor Ben Naanen, Legborsi Saro Pyagbara, Mr. Ledum Mitee, 
Dr Owens Wiwa, and Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah. While on the Ijaw side, interviews for 
this chapter were conducted with the following Ijaw youth leaders, Patterson Ogon, T.K. 
Ogoriba, Felix Tudolor, Isaac Asume Osuoka, D.S.P Alamieyeseigha, Iniruo Wills, Lancelot, 
Jackson, Otive Igbuzor, ex militant leaders Comrade Johnson Ajuwa, Ramsey Mukoro; some 
members of the civil society and activists such as Ken Henshaw, Inemo Samiama, Belema 
Papamie, Professor Chidi Odinkalu and some confidential sources. As well as key informants, 
these interviewees were also fully aware of the scope of the research and were willing to 
provide answers to the questions this project is seeking.  
 
A second empirical chapter will examine the nature of leadership among both the Ogoni and 
the Ijaw, and specifically, the leaders’ stance on the issue of violence versus nonviolence. It 
will analyse the deliberate nonviolent approach employed by the Ogoni leaders for both 
principled and pragmatic reasons, as against the fragmented strategies adopted by the Ijaw 
leaders. It will argue that the Ogoni leaders’ adopted strategy proved long-lasting, while among 
the Ijaw leaders a turn to violence prevailed.  Finally, a third empirical chapter will explore the 
structure and organisation adopted by the two groups to argue that the Ogoni developed  
organisational features aimed at advocacy, negotiations and peaceful links with international 
bodies, while the Ijaw developed an organisation fit for armed struggle. It will analyse the 
development and presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) which is an articulated set of 
demands of the Ogoni presented to the Nigeria state, in comparison to the Ijaw Kaiama 
Declaration which is similarly an articulated list of demands by the Ijaw youth. The chapter 
will also focus on the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) and compare it to the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Collectively, these three empirical chapters will 
seek to answer the main research question of ‘Why did the Ogoni adopt nonviolence as a means 
of expressing their grievances while the Ijaw opted for a violent course of action’.  
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Accordingly, the first half of this chapter will focus on the Ogoni, while the second half will 
focus on the Ijaw movement. The chapter will be presented in four different sections which 
will examine collective group narratives, the nature of the Nigerian state, transnationalism and 
internationalism and the impact of oil extraction (see Table 3.1 below). 
 
Table 3.1: Historical Narratives of the Ogoni and Ijaw. 
 
Ogoni Ijaw 
1. Collective Ogoni  Narratives  
 1.2 Constructing the Ogoni as a     
primordial nation from the 1990s 
 
      5.   Collective Ijaw  Narratives 
- Collective /one ethnic group 
-  Primordial nature of the group, 
linked to violence 
      2.   Nature of the Nigerian State  
-  Colonial state (humanizing the 
enemy) 
- Internal Colonialism exercised by 
Nigerian State and dominant Ijaw 
and Igbo within the Niger Delta 
(linked to nonviolence)  
6.  Nature of the Nigerian State  
 -  Colonial state (aggressive and   
confrontational) 
 -   Ijaw in direct confrontation with 




3. Transnationalism and 
Internationalism 
3.1 Stressing minority rights 
- Linkage to the United Nations 
and international NGOs 
connecting to the internationally 
accepted norm of nonviolence 
      7.  Transnationalism and    
Internationalism  
       7.1 Stressing Ijaw Minority Status 
-    Linkage to anti-capitalist 
struggles, connecting to discourse on 
violence 
      4.   Narratives on Oil 
       -    Ogoni grievances linked to 
nonviolence 
      8.   Narratives on Oil 
       -    Ijaw grievances linked to 
violence 
 
3.1 Collective Ogoni Narratives  
 
As indicated in Table 1 above, this section will analyse the collective Ogoni narratives and 
specifically the claim that Ogoniland was a peaceful area before the coming of the British 
colonial masters who forced the group to become part of the wider Niger Delta region. From 
the 1990s the Ogoni, under the guidance of Ken Saro-Wiwa, were constructed as one distinct 
ethnic group with a common identity. The significance of the land to the Ogoni will also be 
discussed to show how certain collective narratives engage positively with nonviolence. 
  
 82 
The Ogoni ethnic identity was constructed under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa in the 
1990s, revolving around their specific lived circumstances as a distinct nation challenged by 
immense economic and political difficulties (Okonta, 2008: 4). Born in 1941, Kenule Beeson 
Saro-Wiwa was a writer, civil servant, businessman, human rights activist, and environmental 
campaigner. He had a very strong passion for literary and scholarly quests, and this inclination, 
coupled with what he claimed to be a dehumanising situation faced by the Ogoni, led to the 
publication of a pamphlet entitled ‘The Ogoni Nationality Today and Tomorrow’(Osha, 2007: 
80). Scholars revealed that Ken’s love for the emancipation of the Ogoni was developed over 
a sustained period of time (Okonta, 2008; Osaghae, 1995; Comfort, 2002; Irele, 1998; Osha, 
2007). Most importantly, he appreciated the power of language and the fact that ideas cannot 
be killed, he knew that certain issues cannot be fixed by a show of force (Nixon, 1996: 10). 
Similarly, Senewo (2015), maintains that Saro-Wiwa not only appreciated the dilemmas of his 
people but also courageously challenged these difficulties against the odds of the might of the 
Nigerian state.  
 
Saro-Wiwa claimed that the Ogoni increasingly realised that their leaders had faithfully co-
operated with the rest of Nigeria but that this faith had been seriously misdirected as each ethnic 
group had its own agenda, entirely unconnected to the value of collaboration in a multi-ethnic 
country (1992: 92). Consequently, individual and collective recollections of experiences 
through engagements with other ethnic groups within common socio-political associations and 
processes equipped the Ogoni with the necessary motives to advance their identity (Isumonah, 
2004: 440). In the 1990s, some Ogoni leaders, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, Garrick Leton, 
Bennet Birabi, E.N. Kobani, Ledum Mitee and Albert Badey, developed a narrative whereby 
the Ogoni were constructed as a distinct ethnic group in the Niger Delta, claiming to have 
settled in the area long before the fifteenth century and established within the six kingdoms of 
Babbe, Eleme, Gokana, Ken-Khana, Nyo-Khana and Tai (Saro-Wiwa, 1995: 12). This 
narrative, according to Saro-Wiwa’s own assertion, developed as a result of the perception of 
exploitation felt by the Ogoni within a nation to which no one paid loyalty to but for personal 
or ethnic benefits (Saro-Wiwa, 1995b: 92). According to Isumonah (2004: 434), an ethnic 
group is characterised by a common awareness of group membership both among insiders and 




Figure 3.1 Map Showing Ogoniland  
 
Source: United Nations Environmental Programme Disasters and Conflict. 
www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/tabid/54124/ 
 
The Ogoni are located in the easternmost part of the fertile plateau bordering the eastern half 
of the Niger River Delta in Nigeria, (see Figure 3.1). Approximately 1,300 sq. kilometres in 
land area, Ogoni is bounded on the east and north by the big bend and mouth of the Imo River, 
on the west by Okrika and Port Harcourt city, and on the south by Andoni and Bonny (Kpone-
Tonwe, 1997: 1). Similarly to the other groups in the Niger Delta, the Ogoni were mainly 
fishermen and farmers, who at one time were accused of cannibalism, murder of twins and 
sundry primitive practices (Okonta, 2008: 50).  
 
3.1.1 Constructing the Ogoni as a Primordial Nation from the 1990s 
 
Scholars have offered a number of explanations to assert the primordiality of the Ogoni that 
mainly revolved around the relationship they share with the land. Saro-Wiwa contends that the 
Ogoni had inherited a valuable portion of land endowed with the rich plateau soil that provided 
agricultural blessings, while the rivers flowing along the borders of the area abounded with fish 
and seafood (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 12). This idyllic existence, according to Osaghae (1995: 392), 
was dramatically interrupted by oil production activities which ‘changed the circumstances of 
intra-Ogoni relations as well as those of its relationship with other groups and the state’. This 
particular emphasis on environmental degradation and its disastrous consequences on the 
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sources of livelihood of the Ogoni peoples provided a new basis for forging closer ties to deal 
with common problems (ibid). In the words of Saro-Wiwa, 
Ogoni was always a blessed land. The plateau soil was extremely rich, the fresh 
water streams and the surrounding seas brimmed with fish, and the forests had an 
abundance of animals and hard woods preserved by the environment conscious 
Ogoni (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 18). 
 
Saro-Wiwa identified Ogoniland as a paradise where socio-economic, environmental and 
religious issues were combined into specific rituals and procedures.  
The land is god and is worshipped as such. The fruit of the land, particularly yams 
are honoured in festivals and, indeed the annual festival of the Ogoni is held at the 
yam harvest. The planting season is not a mere period of agricultural activity, it is 
a spiritual, religious and social occasion. Tradition in the Ogoni local tongue 
means doonu kuneke, the honouring of the land, earth, soil, and water (Saro-Wiwa, 
1992: 12.). 
 
Saro-Wiwa constantly reiterated the significance of the land to the Ogoni by drawing on its 
spiritual and economic importance in relation to the devastation caused by oil exploration and 
exploitation. The Ogoni narratives, like other nationalist narratives, construct the Ogoni people 
as a separate ethnic group with an exclusive link to their territory, that became violated by oil 
exploration (Gellner, 1983: 1; Grosby, 2005: 5). Gradually, the Ogoni claim became stronger 
in the 1990s, when they contended that they belonged together and constructed the Ogoni as 
having a special spiritual attachment to their environment. This narrative clearly suggests 
sanctity and nonviolence even at that early stage, and this corresponds to the notion of 
communities being ‘imagined where members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ 
(Anderson, 1991: 6). Saro-Wiwa reiterated the importance of mobilising every Ogoni person 
based on the necessity of their unity in terms of their culture, language heritage, and the 
importance of cooperating with one another on the Ogoni agenda (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 75).  
Additionally, in a speech delivered to the Kagote club3 he openly referred to a united Ogoni by 
stating that, ‘we have been faithful to this agenda which we set up for ourselves; we have 
established the Ogoni identity and placed Ogoni on the national agenda; we have mobilised all 
Ogoni people (Ibid: 111). Even at the domestic level, the significance of the land is further 
emphasised by Barikor-Wiwa (1997: 2), who justifies that traditionally, the land has given 
                                                          
3 An elite club in Ogoniland, which will be discussed in the chapter on organisation.  
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some form of independence to Ogoni women, the proceeds of which are used to feed and 
provide for the family.  
According to Naanen (1995: 85), the crisis of legitimacy which dominated the Nigerian state 
drove citizens to draw back from the Nigerian identity fostered by the postcolonial state into 
ethnic, communal, and other types of identities. Although the Ogoni claim to be a primordial 
ethnic group with an ideal past, Cayford (1996: 187) argues that this unity of determination 
claimed by the Ogoni from the 1990s is a recent creation. He explains that the Ogoni are made 
up of three subgroups comprising Gokana, Khana and Eleme-Tai, which do not share a strong 
ethnic connection. Each subgroup has its own vernacular and is further split into clans (Ibid). 
 
From the 2000s, the dominant narratives on the primordial nature of Ogoniland have been no 
different from what emerged in the 1990s. The land is presented as the most important source 
of economic power and social prestige in Ogoni society (Okonta, 2008: 32). For instance, 
interview with Orage illustrated that: 
 
The Ogoni are traditionally farmers and fishermen and like any other community 
worldwide, land is a critical element of human existence. We are both riverine and 
up land communities (Interview 27 July 2015). 
 
According to Nbete (2006), the land is truly precious to the Ogoni. One reason put forward 
revolves around the Ogoni being predominantly farmers, living very close to nature. He argues 
that,  
Economically, the land was of great value but years of oil production led to its 
devastation. The Ogoni people like going to the forest to behold the beauty of nature 
with an unbroken attachment to the land. The forests were abodes for their 
ancestors, deities, anything that destroys the forest was not only destroying their 
source of livelihood but also their connection with spiritual deities (Interview 27 
July 2015). 
 
This therefore suggests that religion was an important component around which the social life 
of the Ogoni revolved. As Okonta (2008: 37), points out, ‘each house hold had its ancestral 
shrine with existing clan wide deities’. The narrative suggests Ogoniland as a nonviolent 
mythical place where human beings and nature co-penetrated each other, until oil production 
disrupted and destroyed the idyllic existence. They imply the function of spirituality and the 
sense of belonging to stimulate the notion of peace within Ogoniland.  
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In the mid-50s, prior to the advent of oil exploration in commercial quantity, the Ogoni were 
blessed with rich alluvium soil and hence, agricultural production was rather lucrative (Okonta, 
2008; Osha, 2007; Osaghae, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1995). Mitee argues that, 
 
Environment in our context is different from the western concept of flora and 
fauna. It has a spiritual significance, we believe there are certain forests that are 
sacred, certain rivers we don’t fish, and certain animals are portents of human 
beings. It beholds on the community to protect those values (Interview: 2 August 
2016). 
 
Before the British arrived, the land was not an issue of contention within the Ogoni. Okonta 
(2008: 32), explains that lineage was the major factor through which land was accessed and 
was communally owned.  He argues that ‘the norm was such that, various percentages of land 
resided in lineage heads (adult male) who then distributed them to individuals based on the 
ritual and social norms that guided their use’, adding that land was not exploited commercially. 
According to Naanen,  
Land wasn’t a commodity it didn’t have value, land couldn’t be bought or sold it 
was communal tenure, but with increasing monetization and economic 
development, land started having value and all these communities became deeply 
attached to it (Interview: 31 July 2015).  
 
Therefore, according to Comfort (2002), the Ogoni deemed the connection and non-
exploitative link to the land as certified by a supreme authority. Going back to the narratives 
of the 1990s, Saro-Wiwa claimed that violations on the environment amounts to being violent 
on nature, 
 
Environmental degradation is a very high form of violence. We will never resort to 
violence, but we will tackle the irresponsible leadership of this country […] I am 
prepared to work for this justice, and there are several ways to it. I believe that an 
informed citizenry will stand up against dictatorship and social injustice. And the 
first thing to do is to mobilise all our people to realise that (Saro-Wiwa, 1993a). 
  
In another medium he recounted that: 
  
 Over the past 30 years, I have made representations, in writing and in person, to 
the power elite in Nigeria to put an end to the misery, or at least to mitigate the 
harm which they do to the Ogoni environment. I have not only failed to convince 




These quotes show that the relationship between the Ogoni and the land is so strong that 
they regard anything that violates the peaceful nature of the land as extremely offensive, 
hence stressing the importance of claiming back their land from exploitation but without 
the use of force. This intimate connection with the land indicates that the Ogoni have 
assigned enormous divine importance to the environment, believing it to be the life 
source of their communities as well as an abode of their sacred deities. By claiming to 
mobilise the Ogoni to realise the negative impacts of an abused environment, Saro-
Wiwa introduces the nonviolence narrative to the Ogoni by stressing never to use 
violence. In his words,  
To show the outside world that the Ogoni are determined, brave people that would 
not go under, and that they are not going to allow themselves to be victims of 
environmental genocide. This form of genocide is an ecological war that is very 
serious and unconventional because no bones are broken, no one is maimed. 
People are not alarmed because they can’t see what is happening, but human 
beings are at risk, plants and animals are at risk. The air and water are poisoned, 
finally the land itself dies (Saro-Wiwa, 1993a). 
 
These assertions correspond to Okonta (2008) and Osha's (2007) work on Ogoniland where 
they note that precolonial Ogoni was a peasant and political community in which subsistence 
farming and fishing were the major economic activities. The inference, therefore, is that to the 
Ogoni, the land is regarded as having a strategic and unquantifiable socio-economic value. 
Osha concludes that the Ogoni had a distinct mythological view of their land, thereby making 
any outside possession of Ogoniland an unbearable infringement of their spiritual existence 
(2006: 21; 2007:70). Owens Wiwa supports the argument that what affects the land directly 
impacts on the Ogoni: 
 
 Ken wrote that Ogoni is the land, the land is Ogoni. We are Ogoni and the land 
is called Ogoni, because in many earlier literature you will see what is called 
Ogoniland, there is nothing like Ogoniland, Ogoni is a land and the people are 
also Ogoni, we are Ogoni (Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
The preceding narrative makes the assertion that anything that devalues or devastates the land 
was seen as a threat to their very existence. This intense relationship between the Ogoni and 
the land, as Wiwa points out, is such that the land and the people are one, and are articulated 
as such in the local language (Snow, 2003: 2). There are lots of names for the spiritual trees, 
sacred rivers and lakes, and the traditions are very important, when people are ill, they revert 
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back to indigenous beliefs and folklore (ibid). This implies that the land was worth more than 
the material environment, its spiritual significance for the Ogoni was paramount.  
 
Naanen even stated that the Ogoni did not travel much; they were mainly sedentary in their 
area (Interview: 31 July 2015). This is an indication that their communities had lived locally 
for generations unlike the Igbo, who had migrated to the area for economic reasons. In this 
way, the Ogoni are presented as a primordial community with unique rights to a specific 
territory. Tam-George (2010), referred to the Ogoni as an endangered peasant community. In 
the words of Naanen,  
The Ogoni yesterday were self-sufficient in palm wine and palm oil production, 
these were industries that gave jobs to lots of Ogoni youth. Today the Ogoni tend 
to be backward looking, they attempt to go back and use things our forefathers used 
in order to survive, not knowing that those things can no longer work today 
(Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
The narratives from the 2000s seem to show the continuity of the power of narratives developed 
under Ken Saro-Wiwa and others of a very self-sufficient land that was greatly endowed until 
the coming of outsiders in the form of the British colonial masters.  
 
3.2 Nature of the State 
 
The previous section presented the primordial narratives of the Ogoni and the immaterial 
relationship they share with their land. This section will examine the lenses through 
which the Ogoni view the colonial state and how the group humanized their enemies in 
the process to refuse taking up arms against the state, or indeed against the Ijaw and the 
Igbo. It will analyze Ogoni group narratives to explain why in spite of feeling oppressed 
by their fellow Niger Deltans, they maintained a nonviolent attitude in their struggle. 
This will include the adoption and application of the internal colonialism concept 
moderated within a human rights context and constructed in a liberal form as opposed 
to a Marxist stance.  
 
Saro-Wiwa (1992: 15) contended that the Ogoni regarded the British administration mainly in 
terms of upholding law and order through the setting up of courts and for tax collection, which 
were never utilized to their advantage (1992:16). He explains that the process through which 
Nigeria came into being in 1914 saw the forcing together of a large number of contrasting 
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ethnic groups with varying languages, cultures and histories (ibid: 19). This, according to Saro-
Wiwa, was a deliberate strategy to steer the Ogoni into extinction (ibid: 18). Which, according 
to Okonta's (2008: 74) assertion, the Ogoni opted to stand for their interests in the political 
arena against the oppressive nature of the state. 
 
In support of the above assertion, Mitee (1999: 431-433), stressed that the Ogoni decided to 
take charge of their destiny due to the nature of the state created by the British, which, although 
was meant to be a federal system, it was transformed into an oppressive unitary set-up. He 
clarifies that through the force of violence and political corruption, succeeding governments 
consistently ignored the rights of minority groups in collaboration with multinational oil 
companies. Similarly, Osha (2006: 14), points to two main forms of colonialism within the 
Ogoni context: the one being imposed by the British colonial regime and the one pursued by 
the postcolonial state. As regards the latter, the Ogoni leaders often exemplified the actions of 
the postcolonial state as a type of internal colonialism, in other words, the substitution of 
foreign colonialism with a local version (Mitee, 1999: 431).  
 
The Ogoni internal colonialism concept was developed in the 1990s by some leaders like Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and Ben Naanen. According to Saro-Wiwa, British colonialism forced alien 
structures on the Ogoni and steered them into domestic colonialism, starting with the 
administration of Ogoni as part of Opobo division in 1908 up to the creation of Rivers state in 
1967 (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 73). Naanen contends that internal colonialism arose in Nigeria not 
based on economic domination, but through a skilful pursuit of control critically facilitated by 
numerical predominance (Naanen, 1995: 49). The concept originated in 1957 during the great 
independence movement of the old colonies, and it refers to a structure of social relations based 
on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups (Gonzalez-
Casanova, 1965: 27-33). The claim in Ogoniland is that of being dominated internally by the 
Igbos and the Ijaw, following Van den Berghe’s (1957) definition of the term as rule of one 
ethnic group over other groups situated within the same unbroken boundaries of a single state, 
and the presence of an internal government and relations of economic inequality (cited in 
Walls, 1978).    
 
For many Ogoni leaders, internal colonialism remains a valid concept with which to assess 
their situation. According to Nbete (2012: 50), the concept correctly represents the strain 
between the core dominant groups and the peripheries in the Nigerian state, which to a large 
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extent contributed to the central problems affecting the country. He asserts that post-
independence from 1960, the south has continuously suffered underdevelopment and 
marginalization due to exploitation by the northern part of the Nigerian state in particular, and 
also by the other dominant groups. Ogoniland, he argues, remains one of the most 
underdeveloped regions within the Niger Delta, and it represents a periphery within the 
evolving Nigerian capitalist economy (ibid). The region, he further explains, is typified by a 
dual class structure with the dominant groups made up of the ruling class and the minorities as 
subordinates, the latter located mainly in the south. He further clarifies the paradox the Ogoni 
find themselves in within the southern region, as they are being exploited by an internal ruling 
class in the form of internal colonialism (ibid). Naanen points out that, 
 
The traditional system at some point started to buckle under when oil operations 
started from the 70s when we were battling with internal colonialism, by our 
neighbours. Ogoni was treated virtually as a colony by the larger numerically more 
preponderant ethnic neighbours especially the Igbo (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
Internal colonialism in Ogoniland is presented as a crude, unfeeling, and horrific practice 
whose approach has been an offensive usurpation of economic resources and dehumanisation 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 73). This model of political supremacy and oppression talked about by the 
Ogoni is indicated as a new form of colonialism, which is not enforced by foreigners but by 
local and national influential groups that enjoy the control of power (Naanen, 1995). Naanen 
illustrated a setting in which the benefits which are supposed to go to the Ogoni were 
superseded by the stronger dominant ethnic groups (ibid). While internal colonialism was 
primarily a Marxist concept going back to the 1960s, the Ogoni leaders in the 1990s linked it 
to issues of human and minority rights arguing that it had to be confronted by peaceful rather 
than revolutionary means. Naanen clarified that, 
  
Internal colonialism may not necessarily be Marxist, and it could be liberal. It 
wasn’t originally a pure Marxist approach but you could apply that to class, even 
the division of the world into rich nations and the peripheral nations, in which the 
periphery is exploited for the benefit of the metropolis. But basically the way that 
Hechter did it, was a liberal formulation (Interview: 29 July 2016). 
 
Hechter's 1975), view of internal colonialism as the unbalanced form of development between 
the distinct core and the peripheral groups corresponds to the Ogoni situation where dominant 
groups make up the core and the Ogoni the periphery, as argued by Naanen. He further clarified 
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that the inclusion of internal colonialism to the Ogoni cause is based on Hechter’s analysis on 
the British experience:  
 
The British experience, where the English were regarded as the core and the rest 
of Britain, Scotland, and Wales as the fringe of British system. It analysed the 
English domination of the United Kingdom. We applied it to the Ogoni cause 
whereby the local ethnic communities dominated the Ogoni right from the 
beginning of the 19 and the 20 centuries. Through the migration of ethnic 
communities into the area and how they imposed their rule and their supremacy 
on the Ogoni. That was part of the origin of the domination, which people 
consolidated in the post-independence years under the post-colonial state 
(Interview with Naanen: 29 July 2016). 
 
 
Furthermore, Nbete (2012: 59), observed that, theoretically, the right model for elucidating the 
Ogoni case is depicted in terms of internal colonialism and how it relates to the minority oil 
producing areas in Nigeria. Specifically, it is indicated by the ways in which the grave and 
deliberate misuse of Ogoni resources added to the cultural division of labour that marginalises 
them. The assertions by Naanen and Nbete fit into Osha's (2007: 73), contention that the issue 
of internal colonialism dates back to years of overlooking the minorities’ issues and grievances. 
This enhances the claims made by the Ogoni that internal colonialism occurs in the country. In 
the 1990s, Ogoni leaders, including Saro-Wiwa, Leton and heads of the clans in Ogoniland 
declared that Ogoni resources were channelled to the other regions for the advancement of the 
power controlling groups, while they lingered in a deprived and inadequate environment. 
Naanen, for instance, maintains that the southern minorities had long suffered from internal 
colonialism carried out through the control of political power (Naanen, 1995: 91). It is 
important to clarify that the Ogoni construction of internal colonialism relates only to the Igbo 
and the Ijaw, not to other groups within the region. In the words of Naanen,  
 
Internal colonialism does not apply to the Nigerian state, it will be inappropriate 
to apply it to the larger dominant groups, it applies mostly to the minorities 
(Interview: 29 July 2016). 
 
Mitee adds that,  
 
Internal colonialism in Ogoniland was historical, from when we were first in the 
eastern region, when the majority of the government of the eastern region was in 
the hands of the Igbos. The minorities issue was even looked at by the Willinks 
Commission, where it stated that the government of Nigeria should not so much 
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oppress the people of the Niger Delta, that the people will revolt and then troops 
will be required to quell that rebellion (Interview: 2016).  
 
The internal colonialism narrative that started in the 1990s by Saro-Wiwa and Naanen 
continues to date in Ogoniland and the mode of presentation is devoid of any inclination to 
violence. The emphasis, rather, is on internal domination, and at this stage the complaints are 
being addressed within the norms of nonviolent civil engagement such as protests and letter 
writing. The adoption of nonviolence in addressing the Ogoni cause signals a strong feeling of 
agency that suggests a path to be chartered towards getting attention to their cause. In the words 
of Saro-Wiwa, 
 
It is very important that we have chosen the path of nonviolent struggle. Our 
opponents are given to violence and we cannot meet them on their turn, even if we 
wanted to. Nonviolent struggle offers weak people the strength which they 
otherwise would not have. The spirit becomes important and no gun can silence that 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 194). 
 
This suggests that using nonviolent actions in the Ogoni struggle was understood to be a 
powerful psychological political weapon and moral armour for the oppressed minorities against 
the oppressors, viewing it as a form of moral advantage to be gained. This relates to Saro-
Wiwa’s argument on true federalism, which, as he asserts, would greatly improve the well-
being and happiness of peoples in the Nigerian state (Nbete, 2006: 174). Nbete concludes that, 
  
To avoid a situation where the rights of the minority are subsumed under the tyranny 
of the majority, you have to recognize the different categories and groups of people 
and their needs so that there can be peace. (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
These narratives serve as a validation of the argument showing that the Ogoni narratives engage 
positively with nonviolence and are related only to the marginalization and oppression suffered 
by the group.  
 
3.3 Transnationalism and Internationalism 
 
The previous section analyzed the Ogoni perception of the state and how the Ogoni agenda was 
linked to internal colonialism but with a liberal connotation as opposed to its original Marxist 
stance. This section will analyze the internationalism as well as the transnationalism of the 
Ogoni struggle, as will be demonstrated with an emphasis on human and minority rights 
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violations. It will show how the deliberate adoption of a narrative acceptable to the United 
Nations gave the Ogoni the edge they needed to attract international attention. Specifically, the 
inclusion of human rights to the Ogoni agenda will show how the linkage to the UN and other 
international NGOs helped shape the struggle in line with the internationally accepted norm of 
nonviolence, which the Ogoni group maintains today. To determine what these narratives 
connote, and how they relate to nonviolence, it will also focus on narratives linked to the claims 
made by the group on what they considered as factors responsible for their predicaments.   
 
Since the late 1980s the Ogoni situated their claims within a global discourse of social justice 
and human/environmental rights, aimed at controlling oil resources and a right to self-
determination (Obi, 2009:475).  The adoption of the internationally recognised discourse on 
human rights in the 1990s by Ken Saro-Wiwa highlighted, for instance, the UN regulations 
Procedure 1503: ‘if a case is presented and the UN investigates and sees a consistent pattern of 
rights violation, a reference will be made to the Nigerian government and action will start from 
there’ (Saro-Wiwa, 1993b). The inference, therefore, is that the main aim was the insertion of 
clear-cut issues related to the UN as a means of attracting specific attention to their plight that 
would automatically draw immediate consideration from the Nigerian state.  
 
Comfort (2002: 229), argues that such accounts of struggles for environmental rights relate to 
fights for environmental conservation aimed at ending poverty and they indicate a deep 
contestation of international models of development responsible for growing inequality. 
However, while this argument has validity, it does not explain how the inclusion of rights 
relates to the nonviolent construction of the Ogoni struggle, which is the gap this chapter seeks 
to fill. According to Saro-Wiwa, 
 
The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) was a real find, the 
great appeal for me was its insistence that its members forswear violence in their 
struggle (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 94). My contact with them, other organizations and 
activists such as Michael van Walt van der Praag, introduced me to the nature of 
nonviolent struggle for rights, and I thought I could do the same for the Ogoni (ibid: 
101).  
 
The argument that the narratives of the Ogoni are linked to nonviolence was also put forward 
by Naanen in his recounting of how adopting a narrative acceptable to the UN gave the Ogoni 
the legitimacy they needed in attracting attention. He reiterated that, 
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The UN recognize all manner of rights, it enforces rights of minorities. They give 
them rights within their present states because they don’t encourage secession. In 
the case of Ogoni, human rights abuses were very rife. You have to know where to 
tag your struggle, to be able to identify issues that the international community 
would support. Nobody would have encouraged the Ogoni to struggle for an 
independent state, which is the main reason for remaining nonviolent, with violence 
nobody would have supported us (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
This reconstruction by Naanen shows that the Ogoni made a deliberate plan, knowing fully 
well the importance and recognition attached to all manner of rights by the UN whose support 
would provide them with the moral and political legitimacy they needed. Further justifying the 
use of rights, Pyagbara notes that,  
 
After the collapse of the Cold War, the rights of communities were actually 
maturing, the UN in 1992 had passed the Declarations on the Rights of Minorities 
and by that time the working group on Indigenous Population had almost 
concluded a 10-year draft of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People. 
We saw ourselves as a community that have indelible rights, and felt most of our 
issues were actually bordered on denial of rights, not from a needs based 
perspective, which is why the entire theory of the Ogoni people was cast in terms 
of violation of rights (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
Obi (2008: 13), corroborates this by arguing that in the 1990s, the Ogoni movement, which 
was intentionally nonviolent, accentuated the use of public space for contesting the military 
administration and oil companies through peaceful demonstrations. Interviewees also pointed 
to the Ogoni leaders finding inspiration in the writings of philosophers on the issues of 
people’s rights. According to Nbete, 
 
Ken followed the examples of philosophers like Thomas Paine who wrote the 
famous rights of man, John Locke on people’s right to self-determination, 
people’s rights to existence. They are affirmations of several other international 
declarations of human rights (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
The inclusion of narratives linking the powerful concepts of internal colonialism and human 
rights in ways that support nonviolence is an aspect that has been overlooked by scholars. Some 
of the work by Okonta, Osha, Obi, Osaghae, Ikelegbe, and Watts have explored specific 
dimensions of internal colonialism and human rights, however, their analysis did not dwell on 
how the two concepts have arguably contributed to a peaceful strategy in fighting the Ogoni 
cause. Hence Naanen’s assertion that:  
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The discourse between internal colonialism and human rights took place 
simultaneously, the internal colonialism actually predates the human rights issue. 
Right from the beginning of the century up to the time of the civil war, and it even 
continued under the new regimes in Nigeria, but the human rights issue was mostly 
associated with the Babangida and Abacha eras (Interview: 29 July 2016). 
 
During the military administration (1983-1999) which was generally regarded as authoritarian, 
Naanen suggests a narrative of clear understanding, choice and inclusion of human rights to 
the Ogoni agenda strategically. Therefore, what emerges from the Ogoni leaders’ narratives is 
a sense of positive agency, as exemplified in the linkage of their movement to global 
environmentalist movements. This fits into Comfort's (2002), assertion that Saro-Wiwa’s 
enunciation of environmental unfairness stands out from the typical Nigerian political tradition. 
She argues that his stand on environmental justice shows similarities to ethnic politics but goes 
further to show a new social construction revolving around environmental justice. This in turn 
derives its legality from Saro-Wiwa’s claim of Ogoni nationhood, and his belief in the Ogoni 
as a principled group of environmental overseers linked with nationalist narratives. This was 
demonstrated in the inclusion of internal colonialism, human rights and minority discourses in 
the Ogoni cause, which can be argued was due to the intellectual quality and knowledge of 
their leadership.  
 
3.3.1 Stressing minority rights 
 
As well as human rights, the Ogoni leaders pitched the group’s grievances also in relation to 
minority group’s rights. Consequently, the Ogoni struggle, according to Nbete, 
 
Was for political autonomy, economic emancipation, and recognition of their 
cultural identity and affirmation of their identity as a people.  The recognition of 
minority rights, does not mean that their rights should be trampled upon, they 
should have equal rights with every other group within the nation (Interview: 27 
July 2015).  
 
In support of this view, Mitee recounts that: 
We felt we had to do something to check what we thought was the marginalisation 
of our people both politically and economically. We needed a fair proportion of 
the resources of our land for our own development, and the protection of our 
environment (Interview: 3 August 2016).  
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It was against this background in the 1990s that the Ogoni claimed to have come together as 
one ethnic group, to fight for the rights their indigenes had been deprived of. The suppression 
of the Ogoni cultural identity is also included as one that was being pursued by the Nigerian 
state, as it concentrated more on the protection of the three major languages of Hausa, Yoruba 
and Igbo.  Nbete further remarked that,  
 
In the early 60s-70s the Ogoni language was studied in primary schools but it came 
a time that only the three major languages were studied, today no secondary school 
recognizes any of the languages of the ethnic minorities. We felt that this region 
that was giving so much to the nation was being threatened and instead of being 
integrated we were being assimilated, gradually facing an erosion of our cultural 
identity (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
Okonta argues that the centralisation of politics at the national and local levels left the Ogoni 
with the perception of being subjects again, similarly to the colonial era (Okonta, 2008: 136). 
Accordingly, Nbete presents the Ogoni story as a classic example of a people who, far from 
securing their civic rights, became minorities instead of full citizens. He portrays the Ogoni as 
an involuntary minority within a minority:  
 
The Ogoni don’t like being called a minority, but it is a label that they have found 
themselves in. They want every person, every group to be seen as an individual 
first and then as groups (ibid). 
 
The struggle for minority rights is also presented as a peaceful struggle in line with international 
norms, as Saro-Wiwa narrated: 
We are involved in a passive resistance. We are appealing to the UN that the 
matter is beyond the care of the Nigerian government […]. The UN should come 
in and save the Ogoni people and the Delta minorities because the rest of the 
country is incapable of doing it (Saro-Wiwa, 1993b). Under the UN regulations, 
anybody can take a case against a government, this is then presented to the Sub-
Commission of Human Rights on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. I believe there must be peaceful protest, the rights of 
people in the oil producing areas are being abused. These people are being driven 
to extinction and it’s their responsibility to stand up and say no to it (ibid). 
 
In another forum, Saro-Wiwa maintained that:  
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Our stand is purely moral, that is all we have as a minority. We are only using 
the weapons that are available to us. I myself am a peaceful man (Saro-Wiwa, 
1993a). 
 
These quotations show that, although the Ogoni perceive themselves as an oppressed minority, 
in fighting for their rights the nonviolence norm had to be maintained. Here again, the Ogoni 
present a positive sense of collective agency in the use of nonviolence which they know is the 
internationally accepted norm. 
 
3.4 Narratives on Oil 
 
The previous section explored the internationalism and transnationalism of the Ogoni struggle 
to include internationally accepted norms recognised specifically by the UN and the 
international community. This section will now focus on how the Ogoni construct their 
grievances in relation to the discovery of oil, which they claimed has impacted negatively on 
their lives while maintaining a nonviolent course of action. The issues here will include the 
ownership, share and allocation of oil revenues. 
 
HRW (1999: 6), reported that Nigeria’s political economy recorded a major change with the 
location of oil, which accounts for more than ninety percent of revenue to the state. It argues 
that these resources have been utilised to the detriment of the vast majority and to the benefit 
of a few, while accounting for negative impacts on the environment in the oil producing areas 
(ibid). Based on the Nigerian constitution, the state owns all minerals, oil and gas, and has sole 
responsibility for negotiating the terms and conditions of oil production activities. The 
Petroleum Act of 1969 cap 350, the Land Use Act cap 202 (Obulor, 2009: 128), are some of 
the laws of the Federation of Nigeria that committed everything above and below the land to 
the state. Shell controls a joint venture that produces close to one half the country’s crude oil, 
while Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip, and Texaco run other joint ventures, with a variety of other 
international and national oil companies operating smaller businesses (ibid: 7). However, 
decades of oil production activities in the Niger Delta have had severe devastating effects on 
the environment and the livelihood of the majority of the inhabitants of the resource producing 
areas (ibid). The discovery of oil has been both a blessing and the major contributing factor to 
the troubles in the region (Darah, 1995). According to Saro-Wiwa,  
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The oil belongs to the landlords. Ogoni is older than Nigeria; any community 
producing oil is older than Nigeria; the oil is their property, [...] the Nigerian 
government has no reason whatsoever to appropriate the royalties to itself, and it 
has been doing so to all Delta people minorities who produce oil (Saro-Wiwa, 
1993b). 
 
Saro-Wiwa (1992: 24), also claimed that the arrival of Shell-B.P armed with oil mining licence 
(OML) obtained from the colonial administration marked the beginning of extinction in 
Ogoniland which the people were ignorant of. The Ogoni, according to Mitee (1999: 431), 
whose land was used for oil producing activities, were not considered worthy enough for 
consultation and negotiations which led to subsequent agreements between the state and Shell. 
Interview with Nbete (27 July 2015) highlights that 
The multinational firms have had several years of oil activities without giving back 
anything. Shell is number one, then other allied firms like Chevron, Total and 
recently TotalFina, but basically we don’t really talk much about the other firms 
because Shell has controlling interest. Even in the major oil block in Ogoni OML 
114, Shell has the operating license. Even within the Nigerian setting the NNPC5 
has less than Shell. 
 
Similarly, interview with Medee revealed that, 
 
The level of devastation we have witnessed continued, the entire eco system and 
the farmlands were destroyed. Not only were health challenges posed as a result of 
this devastation, but the main sources of our livelihood were also destroyed (27 July 
2015). 
 
The Ogoni elites understood that the oil wealth flowing underneath Ogoniland was almost 
imagined and not a tangible benefit since it conveyed poverty, injustice and death (Nixon, 1996: 
6). The presence of oil failed to usher in the prosperity associated with resource exploration, 
and has instead subjected the Ogoni ecosystem to substantial damage (Okonta, 2008: 3). 
Moreover, as Okonta argues, from 1989, a new phase of the Ogoni struggle was initiated with 
a programme of mass action and passive resistance on the one hand, and on the other, a 
transformed determination to emphasise the environmental outcomes of oil extraction with 
strong emphasis on the role played by Shell on group rights within the federal structure (Watts, 
1999 2003:22). This suggests that from 1989, the group witnessed an increased awareness and 
                                                          
4 Oil Mining lease (OML) 11  
5 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
 99 
knowledge of the ill-effects of oil production activities as well as the peculiar situation within 
which the Ogoni found themselves. This some of the leaders felt obliged to challenge. 
 
Interview with Orage attests to this: 
 
The policies of Shell operations in Ogoni were totally unfavourable, it was 
operating on the basis of a licensed agreement with the government. We felt that 
the lack of development, and environmental degradation were problems to which 
Shell and the government were accountable for. This is why when the agitations 
came they became obviously the people from whom the Ogoni people sought 
demands from (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
Sharing a similar opinion, Naanen also blamed the state and the oil conglomerates: 
 
The state for putting the conditions for the marginalization and Shell for 
completing the marginalization through environmental devastation. The Ogoni 
felt the government was an entity opposed to their interest (Interview: 31 July 
2015). 
 
Interview with Owens Wiwa further highlights the gravity of the situation, 
We used the medium of what affected us most, environmental genocide. You have 
that sense that you are going to die. The core thing that God gave you to survive is 
going away, the vegetables are no longer growing or if they grow, they have 
different colours. The fish from which you get the proteins are no longer thriving. 
Then the government is nonchalant, is in an unholy alliance with the oil company 
(Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
In this context, Saro-Wiwa argued that the achievement of political autonomy and the right to 
use a fair proportion of Ogoni resources for its development was a responsibility of all Ogoni, 
but he clarified that this was not a call to violent action (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 74-75). Although 
Saro-Wiwa challenged the destruction caused through the activities of oil exploration which, 
as he claimed, had destroyed the spiritual connection the Ogoni shared with the land, he opted 
pragmatically to lay claim to the revenues gained from the oil that flows beneath Ogoniland, 
as both a right and a form to redress the people’s suffering. Ejobowah (2000: 36) notes that 
ethnic groups like the Ogoni have increasingly challenged the state’s control of rents and 
royalties and laid ownership claims to the resources produced from their land. This is attested 
to by Osaghae (1995: 340), who argued that in laying ownership to the oil produced in 
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Ogoniland, the Ogoni, as other oil producing areas, themselves instead of the state claimed to 
be the rightful recipients of the revenue accrued, based on the principle of derivation.  
 
The derivation principle requires that states be given apportionments from the main fund in 
strict percentage to their input to the fund (Ashwe, 1986: 88; Abubakar, 1986: 263; Frynas, 
2001: 32). This viewpoint, according to Akinola and Adesopo (2011: 252), requires that 
inhabitants of the revenue generation zone must have been affected in terms of external costs 
manifested through pollution and interference of socio-economic activities occurring from oil 
production, as a form of compensation. However, the derivation principle encountered several 
manipulations resulting from changes in governments, therefore indicating a harsh decline 
from 100 percent in 1953 to 50 percent in 1960; 45 percent in 1969; 20 percent in 1975; 1.5 
percent in 1982; 1.0 percent in 1990; 3.0 percent in 1992 to the 13 percent being given to the 
oil producing communities, which is supported by section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution 
(Anyanwu, 1997: 190; Sagay, 2001; Rapu, 2006: 13; Othman and Williams, 1999: 28; 
Nwajiaku, 2005: 468; Frynas, 2001: 32-33). Further evidence from interviews with Nbete 
suggest that: 
 
Prior to the discovery of oil, the principle of derivation held sway in Nigeria, the 
percentage of revenue that accrue to the area was upwards of 80% at some point 
it was about 90%, it dwindled to about 70 and then when eventually oil was 
discovered it fell to a paltry 0.5% and then after so much struggle it was increased 
to 13% (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
For the Ogoni, therefore, the principle of derivation formula changed drastically (Nwajiaku, 
2005: 468). Naanen clarified that,  
 
From the 70s, when we began to have massive oil spills compensations were in 
pittances. The Ogoni felt excluded from the oil economy, we felt disempowered, 
helpless and we wanted to be empowered and treated as equal citizens in Nigeria 
(Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
In a similar vein, Medee emphasised that,  
Some of our people who had opportunities to western education also had 
information about how oil-bearing communities are treated in the world.  All these 
culminated in the desire and necessity to come together as an ethnic group and 
articulated the need for better treatment for our people and to address the effects 
of oil exploration in our communities (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
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The impact of the preceding narrative is the intensification of disagreements between the oil 
companies and the Ogoni people. It was the balance of power between the multinationals and 
the forceful apparatus of the state that ultimately defined the outcome of the struggle (Obi, 
1997: 144). Although the narratives in this section depict some of the historical characteristics 
which engendered oppositions within Ogoniland, there seems to be no indication towards 
violence. Instead, as argued, the narratives indicate the emphasis on peaceful claims for better 
treatment and for recognition of the rights of the Ogoni to a fair share of the oil revenues.  
 
The first part of this chapter presented collective Ogoni narratives indicating the construction 
of a primordial Ogoni nation, the perception of the state including views related to internal 
colonialism, internationalism and transnationalism in terms of minority rights issues and 
linkage of the Ogoni cause to internationally recognised norms, as well as narratives on oil. 
These collectively have shown how the narratives engage positively with nonviolence, 
especially through the linkage to the spiritual significance of the land and in relation to the UN. 
Through the linking of environmental destruction, economic exploitation, denial of human 
rights and ethnicity as noted by Comfort (2002: 342), the Ogoni leaders attempted to construct 
a collective identity of peaceful resistance. The connection between environmental issues, basic 
human rights and social justice suggests an intense contestation of international developmental 
trends that have hastened increasing disparity, environmental contamination and land closures 
(ibid: 329). This chapter has argued that these narratives relate only to the Ogoni and not to 
other groups in the region. The following part will present the Ijaw narratives which, in contrast 
to the Ogoni’s, engage positively with violence. 
 
3.5 Collective Ijaw Narratives 
  
This section will focus on the Ijaw narratives in comparison to the Ogoni’s and how they 
engage with violence. It will show that the Ijaw narratives of the 1990s started off on a peaceful 
note but changed in the latter part of the years to violence partly as a result of the extrajudicial 
killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and partly in reaction to the repressive action of the state in response 
to the Ijaw agitations. As mentioned earlier, the key argument of this section is to demonstrate 
that the narratives of the Ijaw engage with violence, bearing in mind the common lived 
experiences of the two groups. It is significant to point out from the beginning that, unlike the 
Ogoni who emphasized their specific identity in all discussions, most of the Ijaw leaders 
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referred to the group as constituting the Niger Delta because they are the largest and dominant 
ethnic group in the region during the field interviews conducted.  
 
Pre-colonial Ijaw regarded kinship ties based on clans as the most important decision-making 
unit, with the adult male population playing a key role in the process (Leis, 1964: 829). 
Traditional governance was vested on the village head also known as the ‘amanyanabo’ and 
on heads of lineages as against a general assembly of men (Dike, 1956: 31). Before the 
colonisation and subsequent independence of Nigeria, the Ijaw were a politically and socially 
isolated group in spite of their location along riverbanks (Leis, 1964: 829). Leis argues that the 
group was drawn together through common rituals, beliefs and intermarriages and a shared 
belief in being related through descending from a distant ancestor (ibid). According to Ariye 
(2013: 28), pre-colonial Ijawland was regarded as a non-centralized group, characterized by 
lineage groups founded by various sons of the founder of the village. In comparison to the 
Ogoni, in the area of religion, he explains that each unit, Ibe, had a chief priest, Pere, who 
presided over general annual gatherings and the worship of a single national god, while the 
Ogoni were noted to have had several deities. The political system in the western Delta was 
led through a village administration unit Ama-Okosowei, based on the autonomous settlement 
devoid of a centralizing force. 
 
The Ijaw is the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta which consist of sixty eight independent 
clans, spread within six states: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Ondo and Rivers, it is the 
fourth largest ethnic nationality in Nigeria (Etekpe, 2009: 142). Due to the complex nature of 
the terrain, the Ijaw are broken into subgroups that speak reciprocally unintelligible tongues of 
the Ijaw language (HRW, 1999: 82). It is estimated that approximately eight million people 
portray themselves as Ijaw, mainly situated along the riverine areas (ibid: 83). The distinction 
between the riverine and upland areas in the region is of foremost cultural and geopolitical 
significance, and it is embedded in the arguments over the rights of the oil areas (ibid, 83). The 
Niger Delta situation is somewhat complex in the sense that even before independence, the 
peculiar situation of the environment and how it affected the lives of the people were actually 
part of the issues which the people raised. These situations led to the setting up of the Willinks 
Commission in 1958. 
 
Several Ijaw narratives from the early 1990s revolve around the area known as the Niger Delta 
region. Benatari (1998), argued that the formation of the Ijaw ethnic nation was a gradual 
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process, historically dating back to the period earlier than 400 CE i.e. 500 BCE to 700 CE (AD), 
during which the proto-Ijaws or ‘ancient people’ ancestors settled in the central Delta and 
merged with immigrants that later came to the area. The Ijaw, just like the Ogoni, are 
represented as traditionally farmers, fishermen, and producers of palm oil. However, the 
narratives of the Ijaw as it will be demonstrated are not as focused on the construction of a 
collective identity in relation to the importance of the land as that of the Ogoni. Rather, the Ijaw 
emphasize the process of state creation that led to the destruction of the Ijaw environment.  
 According to Papamie, 
There are geographical delineations within the Niger Delta, there is a western and 
central Delta. The western Delta is more of Delta state and a small part of Ondo 
state, that is Ijaw, the central Delta is Bayelsa state, the eastern Delta is Rivers 




 Map Showing Ijaw Area 
 
 
Source: Wadoo.org http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/maps/WestNiger_Ethnic.html 
Ijaw leaders such as Wills explain that,  
 
Pre independence, the colonial masters knowing that there were fears amongst the 
various minorities in Nigeria, decided to set up the Willinks Commission to 
investigate their fears and to proffer responses. That commission recommended 
that the region should be declared a special development area, and a board be set 
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up to deal with the development of the region, that’s the Niger Delta Development 
Board (NDDB) (Interview: 29 July 2015). 
 
Another dimension of the Ijaw grievance in relation to the Ijaw environment also related to the 
pre independence era, as Osuoka puts it:  
 
Even before independence the peculiar situation of the environment and how it 
affects the lives of the Ijaw, were presented, and that led up to the setting up of the 
Willinks Commission in 1958. The Commission was very particular when it 
highlighted the environment and the importance of taking particular actions, it 
proposed the setting up of a special development focused programme for the region. 
But that was even before oil added a new misery into the complex developmental 
challenges of the Niger Delta (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
It is instructive at this point to briefly discuss the Willinks Commission Report, which forms a 
vital aspect in understanding the Niger Delta conflict. Prior to Nigeria’s independence and out 
of anxiety of apparent marginalization and neglect, political leaders from the region, including 
the Ijaw and Ogoni, advocated for a self-governing region to avoid being subsumed under the 
control of the major tribes. This led the British colonial government to establish the Willinks6 
Commission in 1957 to carry out a review on the fears of domination presented by the 
minorities. According to Watts and Ibaba (2011: 8), the commission was expected to establish 
the evidence regarding the concerns of minorities in any part of Nigeria, and to recommend 
ways to protect them (Umukoro, 2011: 8). It noted the particular challenges affecting the region 
due to the difficulties of the environment, thereby recommending that the area be regarded as 
a special area requiring special attention (ibid: 16). Interestingly, according to the Ijaw, the 
vital recommendation of the commission aimed at alleviating ethnic based control politically 
and enhancing development failed to occur in independent Nigeria (Anele and Nkpah, 2013:15; 
Watts and Ibaba, 2011: 8). This perceived failure of mitigating political, ethnic domination and 
improving development is emphasised by Ogon:  
 
The Nigerian state did not take the recommendations made by the commission as 
important, not all the recommendations were implemented. Even the NDDB that 
was created did not perform according to expectations (Interview: 30 July 2015). 
 
This suggests that even before the 1990s, the perceived failure on the part of the state to 
respond to the recommendations of the Willinks Commission is presented in the Ijaw leaders’ 
                                                          
6 Sir Henry Willinks, a respectable Queen’s Counsel commissioned in September 1957. 
 105 
narratives as one of the first examples of a narrow-minded behaviour and a constant refusal to 
listen to and respond to peaceful rights claims. 
 
The metamorphosis of the Ijaw grievances and how they are currently expressed are 
attributable to natural human psychological factors of frustration and anger. The dominant 
narrative among Ijaw leaders, as shown, refer back to several complains and appeals made from 
before independence to the 1990s, which yielded very few or no results. In this situation, the 
group decided to consider a mix of options from the orthodox to the unorthodox. Nevertheless, 
in discussing the Ijaw grievances that were not addressed by the state, the interview with Wills 
highlights that:  
 
Through the military years, there were a lot of advocacy and appeals by the leaders 
of the region, such as Dapa Briye, Professor Claude Ake, Melford Okilo, and Obi 
Wali. That advocacy continued and most of the intellectuals, wrote tons and tons 
on issues of greater autonomy, fiscal federalism, resource control. But instead of 




In a similar interview, Ogoriba points to the fact that,   
When we raised our heads to say that these things are not proper, the government 
will do things in a way to keep us in perpetual quietude, for example, arrests and 
widespread hostility. There was no peace, they burnt down our towns like Odi, 
Umuechem in the 90s, just to make sure that we don’t talk. Did they want us to 
continue to agitate so that could wipe us out of the surface of the earth?  
(Interview: 10 August 2015).  
 
What seems to emerge from the Ijaw narratives, are historical feelings of real frustration and a 
sense of impotence in terms of being faced with a government that refused to address their 
complaints and issues. There is a strong perception also of neglect dating back to before the 
advent of commercial oil production. Ogoriba recounts that,  
 
Back in the 90s, they used brute force on us, there were gun boats, check points, 
we were under a bond, we were held hostage, particularly in places where we go 
to hold our meetings in the Delta. At that time the level of consciousness was 
rising, so we had to champion the cause of our people with the small education 
that we had (Interview: 10 August 2015). 
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As seen in the Ogoni section, Ogon, one of the moderate Ijaw youth leaders, also points to the 
attitude of the state in relation to the significance to the Ijaw of the land as a source of 
livelihood: 
In most cases, you see no trespass clearly written on farm lands, pipes are not laid 
deep down in the mud. People are denied access to their farms that normally 
should be a resource for feeding themselves (Interview: 30 July 2015).  
 
Attesting to the land issue, Lancelot, another Ijaw youth leader, asserts that,  
 
Land is at a premium which is the one on which the average African has almost a 
near spiritual tie to. But by instrument of government policy it is expropriated and 
the people are not directly or indirectly benefitting from its wealth. It is aggregated 
anger at that situation that gave rise to the charters of demand (Interview: 31 July 
2015). 
 
Coming back to the current perceptions within the Ijaw, Wills reiterated that, 
 
Currently there are communities where you have to drive 1 or 2 hours by boat to 
get to, with appalling conditions. Imagine this whole area 50-60 years ago and 
how remote it was to government’s attention in Lagos (Interview: 29 July 2015). 
 
Here again, the late 1990s narratives suggest a series of factors that aggravated the anger and 
sense of perceived exclusion from the real political process and marginalization. The frustration 
and marginalisation issues evident in the Ijaw narratives seem to be directly linked to the way 
the state upset the Ijaw communal order. Osuoka concludes this thus:  
 
Each community had its own order, how things are done, decisions made and 
implemented. But you bring in an external community extending and imposing its 
system upon the other communities. Then you have a situation where a particular 
community, whether in the form of state or pre state formation now decides to 
forcefully override an existing communal order, it uses violence, and it is not only 
Europeans that did it (Interview: 31 July 2015) 
 
Thus far, the narratives presented from the moderate Ijaw youth leaders are devoid of violence, 
even though they express dissatisfaction with the nature of state responses to the Ijaw issues, 
which has some semblance to the Ogoni nonviolent narratives. The next section will discuss 
how the state is perceived by the Ijaw and how it relates to the violence imposed on the 
communities that serves to exacerbate the frustrations and impotence suffered by the Ijaw 
thereby impacting on their movement.  
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3.6 Nature of the State  
 
In comparison to the Ogoni construction of the colonial state in terms of internal colonialism, 
this section will present how the Ijaw construct their marginalization outwards against the 
central Nigerian state and the dominant Igbo ethnic group. But similarly to the Ogoni narratives 
on the nature of the state, the Ijaw analysis can be seen as a form of internal colonialism, 
although the Ijaw leaders I interviewed do not speak in terms of internal colonialism. This 
section will also analyse the prevalent attitude of aggression and confrontation adopted by the 
Ijaw leaders from the late 1990s as against the nonviolent tone of the Ogoni of the early 1990s.  
Inferences were made in some of the interviews to the nature of the state constructed by the 
colonial masters’ pre 1960, and accordingly, this section will examine the Ijaw narratives in 
relation to historical grievances from the colonial era to the 1990s. This is aimed at presenting 
and analysing the contents of the narratives to show how they relate to violence, which is an 
important gap in the Niger Delta literature this chapter aims to bridge. It is important to point 
out here that as discussed in the previous section, violence in the region started fully in the late 
1990s, after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. According to Mamdani (1996), the 
colonial state was authoritarian and committed to extraction rather than to the development of 
the colonised states, forcing colonial subjects to finance the expenses of their infrastructural 
development (Nwajiaku, 2005: 465). Osaghae argues that the Ijaw underdevelopment began 
with the discriminatory and anti-Ijaw policies of the British who seemed bent on punishing 
members of the group who as middlemen, sided with the Portuguese against the British both 
in slave and in legitimate goods trade (Osaghae, 2008).  
 
In the 1960s, Isaac Adaka Boro accused the Nigerian state of not finding it important to 
provide the inhabitants of the Niger Delta with pipe borne water, be it in the salt water washed 
creeks or in muddy fresh water rivers. People drink from the most squalid wells and so 
dysentery and worm diseases are rife, despite being the richest in water (Boro, 1982: 66). In 
1963, Boro claimed to have conducted a political sampling of the Ijaw and discovered that 
most of the youths were frustrated with the general neglect and were ready for any action led 
by an outstanding leader to gain liberty (ibid:75). According to Watts (2003), prior to the 
outbreak of the Nigerian civil war, Boro and his band of followers were able to capture almost 
all of Ijaw territory within two weeks (Osha, 2006) and declared a Delta Republic, which 
Watts (2003:21) referred to as a ‘desperate cry for some sort of political inclusion’. Prior to 
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the uprising, Boro specifically expressed his frustration with the Nigerian state in not doing 
enough for the Niger Delta by reporting that:  
 
Year after year, we were clenched in tyrannical chains and led through a dark alley 
of perpetual political and social deprivation. Strangers in our own country [….] the 
day will come for us to fight for our long denied right to self-determination […] If 
Nigerian governments refuse to do something drastic to improve the lot of the 
people, a point of no return will be reached (Boro, 1982). 
 
According to Osuoka,  
There were communities that didn’t have state forms of organisation, but in the 
coastal city states you had such states having power and instruments of government 
that were more or less professional. But to create that authority, you needed to use 
force to maintain and get people to control even the business that the state was 
concerned about. The state at that time was like a mega corporation, which the 
Nigerian state is right now (Interview, 2015).  
 
This fits into the explanation by Ogoriba of how the Ijaw visualise the state in the form of a 
mega corporation borne out of the colonial rule. He argues that,  
 
The state formed by the colonialists has a character and purpose. In the Nigerian 
constitution, there is a section on fundamental objectives of the purpose of the state, 
the colonial state had a purpose to plunder, take, loot, remove resources as much as 
possible, which is violent in character (Interview: 10 August 2015). 
 
Some of the radical moderate Ijaw leaders argued that the Nigerian state is dominated by the 
Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, the three major ethnic groups in the country. For instance, Gbomo 
Jomo7, (2011), relates this domination to what he termed as ‘uneducated and unexposed 
Northern Nigerians who the British judged most obedient and easy to control from England’. 
Right from independence, he argues, each Nigerian ruler loyally subscribed to servitude of the 
British, in total indifference to the interests and well-being of the people (ibid). Moreover, the 
nature of the Nigerian state has been described explicitly by Osuoka, one of the architects of 
the Ijaw Kaiama Declaration, as violent. The Kaiama Declaration represents an articulated set 
of demands from the Ijaw youths to the state that is similar to the Ogoni Bill of Rights, and it 
will be analysed fully in Chapter Five, to demonstrate the closest the Ijaw movement ever came 
to nonviolence, which was short lived. Osuoka expressed that, 
 
                                                          
7 Spokesman of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). 
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The state is not extracting to replace, it is creating an infrastructure that will see to 
the land being wasted, which is violence on nature. Ideally, the idea of a state is a 
political community, but when you have the colonial state that has not achieved 
community, although it has political force, and you have communities that are in 
conflict and competition with it, which are mostly resolved through violence 
(Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
He further clarifies that:  
 
 We had a situation where those communal forms were wiped out by force in the 
period of European colonialism. The process of establishing colonial rule over the 
territory involved the slaughter and massacre of people that attempted to resist, 
causing disruption and the dislocation of communal forms and cultures making the 
character of the state such that seeks to maintain the monopoly of violence 
(Interview: 31 July 2015).  
 
Osuoka’s assertions above connect the state to direct violence, which Weber holds as ‘that 
entity which upholds the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement 
of its order’ (Whimster, 2003; Gellner, 1983). Unification was accomplished mainly through 
state violence; furthermore, the colonial policy objective was fundamentally to integrate 
Nigeria into the world capitalist system. And in order to achieve this strategic objective, the 
colonial state decided to use bayonets and cannons (Fanon, 1963: 36). The Ogoni’s peaceful 
struggle was branded by Ijaw leaders as an example of a failed strategy that vindicated the need 
to resort to violence. Ajuwa states that, 
 
After the death of Saro-Wiwa, when we see that if we did not carry arms the 
government is not going to respond, that is why we changed that system to gun 
system (Interview: 10 August 2015).  
 
In the later Ijaw narratives, like those of the Ogoni, the correlation of the state and violence is 
strongly asserted (Whimster, 2003). The narratives tell of a critical historical juncture 
represented by the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the then military administration headed by 
General Sani Abacha. This event is argued to be one of the most significant factors that 
transformed the Niger Delta conflict into a violent militant activity (Isumonah, 2004; Comfort, 
2002; Oboreh, 2010). Furthermore, the Ijaw narratives that emerged after the death of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa will reveal the representation of the nature of the state mainly in terms of violence, 
accompanied by strong arguments suggesting that the only effective way to respond to the 
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state’s behaviour was through violence. Ogon tells the story in ways that clearly depict the 
recourse to violence as a defensive strategy in the face of state brutality:  
 
Saro-Wiwa, a campaigner for peace died a violent death, his killing did not bring 
the government to address our issues. The people felt the need to upgrade. So 
shutting down the oil production will hurt the economy and will force the 
government to respond. Even when you are having peaceful protests you are being 
brutalized and detained, what then was the value? But these were peaceful rallies 
sometimes all women yet the army will come with force. What kind of reaction 
would you expect? (Interview: 30 July 2015). 
 
This perspective is also corroborated in the words of Ramsey:  
 
The government doesn’t listen to us in the Niger Delta, after Ken Saro-Wiwa was 
brutalized and killed by the soldiers we decided to physically fight for our rights. 
Because government uses violence we too will use violence (Interview: 10 August 
2015). 
 
These narratives indicate how the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa was not seen only as an Ogoni 
issue; the Ijaw constructed it as a problem that affected them too, especially the young people 
in the IYC who launched the operation climate change as a response to his execution. The 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa is depicted as a turning point in the Ijaw leaders’ narratives in the 
late 1990s, which from that time engaged positively with violence. They also suggest the turn 
to violence as a direct result of frustration with the engagement process of the state. However, 
it can also be argued that the representation of violence as being constitutive of the nature of 
the state response in earlier narratives by the Ijaw leaders, had already paved the way for 
justifying a violently confrontational struggle.  
 
It is instructive to note at this point that while the Ogoni are able to define the state as a form 
of internal colonialism, the Ijaw are not able to do so. Although the Ijaw leaders I interviewed 
did not speak in terms of internal colonialism, their examination of the state had many 
similarities with the Ogoni. This suggests that the Ijaw situation can be seen as a form of 
internal colonialism except that, whereas for the Ogoni, they are more clearly articulated, being 
a minority oppressed by minorities themselves. What emerges from the Ogoni claim and that 
of the Ijaw is a distinction that, for the Ijaw, there is a sense of desperation, frustration and a 
strong sense that there is nothing they can do against a state that is over powerful. Whereas 
from the Ogoni narratives, what seems to emerge is a sense of agency that there is something 
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they can do about the Nigerian state’s actions, if they link up with movements across the globe 
as well as with international struggles. Therefore, the analysis indicates the emergence of 
feelings of real frustration and a sense of impotence on the part of the Ijaw, which may be 
regarded as the main reason that eventually lead them to the adoption of violence.  
 
3.7 Transnationalism and Internationalism 
 
This section will analyse the internationalism as well as the transnationalism of the Ijaw 
struggle. Unlike the Ogoni, who put emphasis on human and minority rights, the Ijaw 
emphasized international struggles which engage positively with violence. This will further 
indicate the ways in which the two movements are quite distinct.  
 
While the Ogoni pitched their struggle along international norms of human and minority rights 
and direct connection to the UN, the same cannot be said of the Ijaw movement which emerged 
from late 1998. The interview with Felix Tuodolo revealed that,  
 
From 1997 to 1998 we didn’t do any international campaigns at the time we 
started, everything we did was within Nigeria and later with Friends of the Earth 
and Human Rights Watch (Interview: 28 January 2017). 
 
In the same vein, additional interview with Kunoun highlights that: 
 
What the Ogoni did was as an ethnic group and they started from the home base 
and internationalised it, but ours didn’t go that way, there wasn’t anything solidly 
done from the home base as an ethnic group (Interview: 28 January 2017). 
 
Ogoriba adds that, 
 
We felt that if we now write a charter from that our conference, it will be known 
the world over, and that was what we achieved, called the Kaiama declaration 
(Interview: 28 January 2017). 
 
Although these quotes indicate that the Ijaw as a group did not engage in transnationalism or 
internationalism in 1998, the interview with Ogon brings to light some direct engagements 
done at the international level by the Ijaw Youth Council in 1999.  
 
One was our official letter to former president Jimmy Carter in 1999 and he also 
replied to us, supporting our option for peaceful engagement with the government 
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and his offer to also speak with the military government at that point in time 
(Interview: 31 January 2017). 
 
In a letter to President Jimmy Carter, the Ijaw Youth Council stated that: 
 
We believe that any dialogue with the government and oil transnationals must be 
genuine, frank and devoid of intimidation […] there should also be local and 
international mediators. Honestly, dialogue is the sweet song the Ijaw youth have 
chorused since the Kaiama Declaration. The position remains the same and urgent 
(Ijaw Youth Council, 1999b).   
 
The above quotes indicates both international and transnational links, specifically, the interest 
of the youth leaders in peaceful engagement with the state, suggesting nonviolence within the 
Ijaw in 1998. The IYC official letter to former President Jimmy Carter dated 2 March 1999 
was a direct response to his visit to Port Harcourt. The letter, while thanking him for the visit 
in February of the same year, contained a brief history of the Ijaw problems as well as the need 
for urgent developments with the state and oil companies. It also stated that 
The greatest achievement of your visit was your helping to present our grievances 
to the Nigerian people, particularly the out-going head of the military government 
(Ijaw Youth Council, 1999b). 
Our survival is at stake. For four years we have been on the receiving end of 
ecological violence, waged most relentlessly by the transnational oil companies. 
We cannot afford to be under the spell of military violence, in the last year of the 
twentieth century. The twenty first century should usher in a decade of peace, 
justice, equity and good governance for all peoples (ibid). 
 
This shows some attempt at internationalisation in spite of it not being as widely recognised as 
that of the Ogoni which was done on a collective group platform. On the Ijaw part, the attempt 
was made with such organisations based on individual direct engagement. President Carter 
replied with a recognition of the nonviolent nature of the IYC engagement at that time: 
 
I was encouraged to see that you are searching for a peaceful resolution to your 
grievances with the federal government and foreign oil companies, and urge you to 
continue this approach […] Since meeting with your council members […] I have 
encouraged both Head of State Abubakar and President-elect Obasanjo to pursue 
an earnest dialogue with various people in the Delta (ibid). 
 
According to Ogon,   
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Part of the issues we dealt with internationally was that of the human rights. We 
needed organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to 
monitor the environmental impact of oil production, and the human rights abuses 
occasioned by civil protests and the reaction of the state especially the military, the 
extra judicial killings (Interview: 31 January 2017). 
  
Going back to a 1999 HRW report titled ‘The Price of Oil: Human Rights Violation in the 
Niger Delta’, it was a direct result of the Ijaw attempt to get the international community to 
follow closely what was going on in the region. Ogon further recounts that Amnesty 
International, Friends of the World, and Oil watch Africa, were some of the international 
organisations they were involved with. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Cable 
News Network (CNN) sent reporters such as Sam Olukoya and Jeff Koinange to follow up on 
the activities in the region. He informed that,  
 
An exchange programme was organised with a group of environmentalists around 
the world that witnessed persons from all over the world going on a net tour of the 
Delta. Physically to learn about the challenges that we face and see what support 
they can give (Interview: 31 January 2017).  
 
Additional international support to the Ijaw movement came in the form of a media publication 
signed by about five hundred organisations. Ogon explained that, 
 
In 1999, about 500 organisations and notable personalities around the world carried 
a full-page advert in the Guardian newspaper expressing concerns about steps taken 
by the government. The military onslaught against Ijaw youths in the aftermath of 
the Kaiama Declaration, titled ‘We Are Watching’ (Ibid).  
 
This came in the form of an open letter to the state, highlighting that,  
 
We the undersigned, are extremely concerned about the deployment of troops in the 
Ijaw region of the Niger Delta which has left scores of people dead and countless 
others injured […]. The Ijaw are, like the Ogoni before them, demanding for their 
rights to clean air, water and land by exercising their right to peaceful protest and 
assembly. […] (The Guardian, 1999).  
 
Here again, similarly to the Ogoni struggle, the peaceful and nonviolent nature of the 
initial Ijaw movement is demonstrated. There was specific mention of this in line with 
the support they got: 
We support the nonviolent struggle of the Ijaw for the protection of their 
environment and the provision of human needs. We strongly condemn the 
 114 
deployment of troops in the Ijaw region resulting in torture, shooting and deaths of 
nonviolent protesters. […] (ibid). 
 
Additional attempts at internationalisation were made by other notable Ijaw leaders such as 
Oronto Douglas, who in 2001 promoted the Ijaw cause in Canada (Bob, 2014: 329). Ogon 
explains that what they wanted at that time was the assurance that even if companies have been 
given the licence to explore for oil, they were not granted the licence to pollute the environment. 
 
Oronto also had the opportunity of addressing some members of the European 
Parliament which led to the visit of some members of the Italian parliament to the 
Niger Delta to review the activities of Agip Oil Company. I took them round for 
one month to explore areas where Agip does its operations. At the end of the day it 
resulted in their interactions with the management of Agip on our behalf (Interview: 
31 January 2017).  
 
Attesting to this revelation by Ogon and in response to claims made by Oronto Douglas on 
behalf of the Ijaw in a speech at the “Petrolio ambiente e diritti umani” Conference in Rome 
May 1999, suggesting that Agip oil company might be involved in human rights violations 
and in practices against the environment in Nigeria. In a letter to Oronto Douglas dated 2 June 
1999, the management of Eni Agip were quick to respond to these claims, stating that they 
were untrue and unfounded. The letter which served as an invitation to Oronto, stated that: 
 
Clearly you received wrong and misleading information about our Group’s 
activities in Nigeria. […] We would like and we feel we have the right to an 
opportunity to correct any wrong information you may have received in the past, so 
that you may obtain a fair and truthful picture of our activities in Nigeria […] (Eni 
Agip Letter, 1999). 
 
This action by Eni Agip also indicates additional impacts the internationalisation attempt 
made by some of the Ijaw youth leaders had on the international community.  However, 
the appearance of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) marked 
the turning point within the Niger Delta conflict from nonviolent protests to armed 
insurgency (Obi, 2012). This action further attracted negative international attention to 
the predicament of the Ijaw (Cornelissen et al., 2012). According to Bob (2014: 329), the 
emergence of radical movements and their engagement in kidnappings and other social 
vices in the region scared off international support, unlike in the Ogoni struggle. Although 
militant leaders, such as Asari Dokubo, claimed to have gained international military 
training and support in Libya (Marquardt, 2007), this further indicates some additional 
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levels of internationalisation of the Ijaw struggle that clogged off the initial nonviolent 
support the Ijaw had. The role played by Asari in the Ijaw struggle marked the turn of 
their movement from nonviolent to violent. This will additionally support the argument 
of this thesis that the Ogoni and Ijaw conflicts are distinct from one another. These will 
be discussed fully in the subsequent chapters on leadership and organisation.  
 
 3.7.1. Stressing the Ijaw Minority Status 
 
Idemudia and Ite (2006: 391), portray the discovery and subsequent exploration of oil as an 
important period in the history of the Ijaw from 1965, with the implication that oil production 
transformed the region into one of great geographical importance. The discovery of oil is 
perceived to have motivated and emphasised the perception of minority position especially for 
the Ijaw, and has led to a fluid relationship between the state and the communities (Alapiki and 
Allen, 2010: 37). One Ijaw leader emphasised that,  
 
Politically the population consists mainly of the minority ethnic groups and they 
don’t wield enough power. There are different cycles of poverty that reinforces the 
poverty level and the political inequities causing the under development of the place 
(Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
In similarity to the Ogoni leaders finding inspiration from philosophers like Thomas Paine and 
John Locke, interviewees pointed out that the youth leaders in the IYC during the late 90s, such 
as Osuoka, Ogon and Tuodolo found inspiration in the works and actions of revolutionary 
leaders and philosophers such as Karl Marx. Ogon recounts that 
 
Ijaw Youth ideology pre-Kaiama Declaration, most of the key leaders were active 
in university mobilization against military rule through the instrumentality either of 
the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Students Union 
Governments or then National Association of Rivers State Students (NURSS). The 
radical elements in unionism and the desire to challenge the dictatorship of the 
military had emboldened and given direction to the planning and execution of the 
struggle. Amongst them were those whose thinking were influenced by the 
revolutionary thoughts of Che Guevara, Hugo Chavez, Franz Fanon, Karl Marx and 
regular interactions with great minds like the late Professor Eskor Toyo8 and Fela 
Anikulapo-Kuti9 (Interview: 17 January 2017). 
                                                          
8 A revolutionary leader of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and Professor of Economics also 
known as Asuquo Ita, was a Nigerian Marxist scholar, human rights activist and academic at the University of 
Calabar, Nigeria.. 
9 The legendary Nigerian Afro beat musician and pan Africanist. 
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Although the above quote shows certain interests and inclinations towards revolutionary 
leaders, the actual linkage to these is missing in the Ijaw movement. The Ijaw 
internationalisation was not done in a collective institutional way like the Ogoni who worked 
together as an ethnic group through the adoption of nonviolence. As discussed earlier, some of 
their activities were done on an individual level. Although attempts were made as seen in the 
earlier quotes, the narratives by Ijaw leaders do not fully situate their struggles within the 
international arena as part of a global anti-capitalist movement. In other words, evidence does 
not fully indicate the connection of the Ijaw movement to other international struggles, unlike 
in the case of the Ogoni. Rather, they emphasize the perception of being isolated from the 
political and economic systems (Ebeku, 2002).  
 
3.8 Narratives on Oil 
 
This section will present the distinction between how the Ogoni and the Ijaw construct their 
grievances in relation to the discovery of oil from the 1990s to date. To determine what the 
narratives connote and see how they suggest violence, the focus here will be on the claims 
made by the Ijaw on what they considered as factors responsible for their predicaments.  
 
Specifically, the enactment of the Petroleum Act of 1969 which bestowed all the oil and other 
mineral resources to the federal government, has been regarded unfavourably especially by the 
Ijaw. The Ijaw lay a strong claim to the oil, which they argued belongs to their communities 
and whatever is coming out of their land should benefit them first. Just as argued by the Ogoni, 
the Ijaw also painted a picture of severe environmental degradation, inadequate capacity to 
manage resource extraction or pursue avenues aimed at rectifying environmental policies as 
well as strong feelings of neglect. Over the years, derivation revenues have decreased 
significantly and have negatively impacted on the revenues available to the Niger Delta, while 
those accruing to the other regions have increased drastically (see the discussion on oil related 
policies and derivation formula in the Ogoni section). 
 
Recounting the negative impact of the petroleum act, D.S.P Alamieyeseigha (the Governor 
General of all Ijaw) highlighted that’ 
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Our Petroleum Act of 1969 consigned everything to the federal government, 
everything on, above and below belongs to the state, oil majors have this contractual 
agreement with them, and they have no business with the communities. Even when 
there is oil spillage that damages their economic life, the oil majors will be the 
judge, complainer and the advocates (Interview: 2 August 2015).  
 
The nationalisation of all land under the administration of state and local governments under 
the Exclusive Economic Zone Decree and the Land Use Decree, was an attempt to harness the 
various land tenure systems within the central Nigerian state and placed all land in the trust of 
local state governments (Obi, 2006; Okorobia, 1999; Omeje, 2006). The perception of the 
impact of this law among the Ijaw is one of deep injustice because, as they argue, no discussion 
or consent was obtained from the host communities. This perception in the region resulted in 
protests and mobilisations by the Ijaw and other ethnic minorities such as the Ogoni, 
increasingly demanding for economic justice, greater political power and ownership and 
control of the resources produced in their area. The interview with Jackson points the 
accusation directly to the oil related policies:  
 
 We blame the laws of the nation which puts the ownership of the land at the 
instance of the federal government and the ineptitude of those in power. The law so 
specifies that the accruals of the land goes straight to the government and then it 
was expected of government to plough back what comes from the land to the 
respective communities, but that hasn’t been the case (Interview: 3 August 2015).  
 
Jackson’s quotation refers to issues raised in reports released in 1995 by the World Bank and 
Human Rights Watch in 1999, where they stressed the negative impacts of oil production 
activities that had ruined the environment and caused several health problems and injuries 
(World Bank, 1995; HRW, 1999). Similarly, Bartlett and Miller (2012: 16), argue that decades 
of estrangement from the state since independence from the 1960s to the 1990s, led to 
individuals becoming prey for violent creed. Ogon recounts that: 
 
Most Ijaw communities, pre-Kaiama Declaration, were enmeshed in intra and inter-
communal conflicts dictated by the politics of the oil companies. The issues in 
contention were the location of oil facilities and the patronage that local and 
traditional leaders get from the companies exploiting for oil. (Interview: 17 January 
2017). 
 
Accordingly, the 1990s witnessed outbreaks of Ijaw youth protests, some of which resulted in 
direct confrontation with state and multinational forces and in damage to oil industry 
infrastructure (Wimborne, 1991; Osaghae, 1995). In some instances, these hostilities tampered 
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with internal security and threatened the cohesion of the region due to their bandwagon effect 
and connection to violence. According, to a research done by Bob (2002), ethnic leaders of 
groups such as the Ijaw, formed associations tasked with lobbying the state for a better 
proportion of the oil revenues and enhanced political participation, but most of them witnessed 
severe military action by the state forces (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Attesting to this, Ogon 
reiterated that, 
 
Our resolution was therefore to deal with oil related conflict reconciliation between 
and among communities pointing out the collective gains and challenging the 
practice by the oil transnationals and the loss we get from fighting among ourselves. 
We had a team of legal volunteers who gave a voice to the already traumatized 
communities. Reports of the activities of the transnationals in different locations 
were monitored and publicized (Interview: 17 January 2017). 
 
He adds that: 
 
The legal volunteers (Oronto Douglas, Uche Onyeagucha, Dr Bello Orubebe, Dr 
Sam Amadubuogha, Hon Kingsley Chinda, and Peace Awari) mostly civil society 
activists took up service free cases for communities impacted by the oil activities. 
While some of the cases were resolved through mediation, some went to the court 
(ibid). 
 
These further confirm the existence of non-combative attempts made by Ijaw youth leaders in 
the 1990s pre-Kaiama Declaration to deal with oil related frustrations and grievances, even 
going so far as to mediate within and between warring Ijaw communities. But in order to better 
illustrate how the Ijaw leaders developed a more combative attitude and later turned to 
violence, from this point onwards, the focus will be on narratives from the more recent period. 
In an interview, Jackson related the underdevelopment of the region to oil being a curse to the 
region:  
 
The mineral deposit of the place which was supposed to be a blessing turned to be 
a curse because the resources of the land that were expected to be tapped and used 
to develop the area, are used to develop Abuja, Lagos and other areas where the 
resources are not tapped from (Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
Another Ijaw leader, Wills, who attested to the deliberate neglect experienced by the Ijaw, 
expressed similar views:  
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Successive governments have so for neglected to develop the region and give us what 
is due to us and just simply refused to pay some attention to us (Interview: 29 July 
2015). 
 
These narratives further confirm the feelings of anger and frustration with the neglect the region 
has suffered from when oil was discovered in the area. In this context, Idemudia and Ite (2006: 
394), argue that the Niger Delta conflict is a product of structural deficiencies inherent in the 
state and systemic anomalies within its society. They further argue that, as a result of these 
deficiencies, the people were without any form of control with regards to their destiny in the 
post-independence era, which translated into poverty, social instability, and backwardness. 
Supporting this view, Ogoriba recounts that:   
 
We tried but they don’t care. Why should we continue suffering this neglect? We 
have to tell them, and we have said enough is enough and we are equal to them. We 
cannot play like the Ogoni, there must be attention to Ijaw issues (Interview: 10 
August, 2015). 
 
While the Ogoni, according to Comfort (2002: 329), pitched their struggle within 
internationally recognised issues directly connected to environmental and human rights issues, 
the Ijaw stressed isolation and extreme aggravation at the state without an option of how to go 
about engaging an over powerful state by peaceful means. Ogoriba further notes that,  
 
Still the injustice is plenty, we go to school no job, we don’t go to school no job, so 
why should we continue listening to them? We have to act, the Ijaw cannot continue 
sitting down and listening to lies from the government that we don’t see. If we behave 
like the Ogoni they will finish us (Interview: 10 August 2015). 
 
In support of the above assertion, Jackson is quick to point out that,  
 
We are still under subjugation in the hands of the powers that be, this Ijaw struggle 
is still on, even though we want things to change, we have still not achieved anything 
significant as Ijaw (Interview: 3 August 2015).  
 
While the Ogoni construct their arguments based on the notion of internal colonialism tempered 
by a discourse on human and minority rights that stress human agency at the local, national and 
international levels, the Ijaw’s perceive themselves as helpless victims of deliberate and 
calculated decades of neglect. They seem to induce a strong form of collective negative stance 
with regards to the state and the major ethnic groups deemed to be enjoying the resources 
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produced in the region while the producers bear the brunt of the excesses of the oil exploration 
process.  
 
This fits into Ukiwo's (2007: 609) conception of the marginalisation of the Ijaw being a trigger 
to the claim by Ijaw youths, that the majority status has given easy access to the major ethnic 
groups to dominate the Nigerian federation, creating an unfavourable revenue distribution 
method to the disadvantage of the Ijaw. Alamieyeseigha (2005: 65), even added that unrest 
began soon after the discovery of oil in the Ijaw community of Oloibiri in Bayelsa state, as it 
became apparent that the oil companies operating in the area had little regard for the wellbeing 
of local people. Similarly, Samiama is quick to support these views in relation to the 
enforcement of proper oil practice mechanisms. He clarified that,  
 
We feel helpless, caught between a government that doesn’t care about us and 
companies who are just interested in profit (Interview: 29 July 2015). 
 
In support of the above assertion by some Ijaw leaders, Odinkalu, a human right activist, 
highlights some negative physical actions by the state in relation to oil extraction. He 
emphasised that,  
Government has not enforced proper oil field practice, pipe lines are not properly 
submerged, blow outs happen, people live under 24 hours of sunlight from the gas 
flaring, people are dying, communities and sources of livelihood are being 
destroyed, poverty is increasing (Interview: 4 August 2015).  
 
These quotes indicate that from the time oil production activities started in the region even to 
the present, the feelings have been the same. There has been no change in the narratives as 
regards the accusation of neglect and indifference by the state or indeed the helpless victimhood 
of the Ijaws. This perception of decades of betrayal by the state apparent in the Ijaw narratives 
reflects a set of beliefs related to confrontations with broader political structures of governance. 
They blame the authoritative and uncaring nature of the state for the harsh lived experiences of 
the people in the area. Jackson explained that, 
 
They have been cheating us, they take the resources to the north and other parts and 
they want us to be quite and law abiding, it can’t be this way. We have to show 
them that we are the owners of the oil, they will no more dictate to us, we have to 
take control. (Interview: 3 August 2015).  
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Attesting to the inactions of the state outlined in the above quote, a confidential source 
explained that, 
 
We began to feel why are we taking this very peaceful strategy, it is not working, 
and the government is not listening, it will only listen when people are violent 
(Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
For decades, the poor response by oil companies to appeals from the oil producing communities 
requesting for compensation for environmental damages received unfavourable responses, 
arguing that their agreements were with the central state authorities, on whom responsibility to 
develop the area lies (Osaghae, 2008: 201). This perceived state failure to deliver on the political 
and socioeconomic benefits due to the region forced the aggrieved communities to finally take 
up arms to fight for their rights (ibid). Supporting Osaghae’s arguments, a confidential source 
interviewed reiterated that,   
 
When there is a protest they use the federal power, but nobody cares to ask what 
has led to this protest. The state is not interested in the welfare of the Ijaw people 
(Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
Reaffirming this, Ajuwa, an Ijaw ex-agitator clarifies that:  
Today because of oil we don’t have jobs, Niger Delta problem will not end, not 
only because of the problem but the issues have not been addressed (Interview: 10 
August 2015) 
 
As argued earlier, these narratives clearly show an inclination towards violence; the frustrations 
and anger are clearly spelt out within a harsh uncompromising discourse, while on the part of 




This chapter locates the historical narratives based on the lived experiences and grievances of 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw within the Niger Delta region. A close observation of the two sets of 
narratives reveals that the two groups are putting forward similar claims, but the means 
employed in response to the behaviour of the state and the oil companies are content specific 
to the group in question.   
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The Ogoni narratives were presented in four key sections. The narratives constructing the 
Ogoni as a distinct ethnic group were presented through sharing a unique link to their land, 
engaging positively with nonviolence because of the spiritual relationship they share with 
nature. Additional narratives on the Ogoni’s perception of the nature of the state were analysed, 
specifically, how they were treated as an internal colony by the Igbos and the Ijaw. The 
awareness that the Ogoni constitute a minority group within a minority led the main leaders in 
the 1990s to opt for a strategy of internationalism and transnationalism. Despite the frustrations 
and discontentment, the narratives do not indicate violence. Instead, they tend to link the Ogoni 
issues to a positive collective agency through human rights discourse, international solidarity 
and peaceful engagement with the state. Finally, narratives on oil were included to show the 
grievances expressed by the Ogoni with the discovery and exploration of the mineral resources 
in the area. Although, the narratives indicated clear frustrations with the activities, here too 
they were devoid of violent connotations.  
 
The Ijaw narratives indicate similarities in terms of being a peaceful agrarian society before oil 
exploration. When it comes to the nature of the state, however, the Ijaw narratives were more 
confrontational and the grievances were directed at the three major groups in the Nigerian state, 
the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. This showed another major distinction between the Ogoni and the 
Ijaw constructions; while the Ijaw blamed their domination on the central state, the Ogoni 
stressed the notion of internal colonialism of which the Ijaw and the Igbo were the guilty 
parties. Here too, the language used by the Ijaw to describe the nature of the state suggested 
violence, with the state being accused of governing systematically through force exemplified 
especially in the oil related activities. While the Ogoni presented their frustrations in moderate 
terms, the Ijaw narratives were strongly expressed and aggressive in the language used.  
 
The transnationalism and internationalism section analysed the attempts made by the Ijaw at 
internationalising their struggle. While evidence shows some initial interests in revolutionary 
ideas in relation to Franz Fanon, Che Guevara and others, there is no direct entrenchment of 
these ideas to the movement, unlike that of the Ogoni nonviolence stance. Additionally, 
attempts at the internationalism and transnationalism of the Ijaw agenda were initiated but not 
on a pan-Ijaw ethnic platform. They were mainly done on individual basis, as shown in the 
activities carried out by Patterson Ogon, Felix Tudolor and Oronto Douglas. These were 
exemplified by interactions with international personalities and organisations such as President 
Jimmy Carter, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, who indicated support for the 
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nonviolent nature of Ijaw engagement at that time. However, this relationship came to a 
premature end with the transformation of the engagement into armed militancy as seen in Asari 
Dokubo, who claimed to have attended military trainings in Libya. These highlight further 
distinctions in terms of the internationalism of the two movements, within the context of the 
Ogoni maintaining a strong sense of agency, while for the Ijaw it became fractured with a major 
emphasis on frustration and desperation  
 
 Finally, narratives on oil within the Ijaw highlighted the open discontentment and anger for 
the oil production activities directed at the state and multinational oil companies. To conclude, 
therefore, this chapter presented the prelude to the dynamics of choice between nonviolence 
and violence based on the narratives from the Ogoni and the Ijaw. It showed how the narratives 
do not present the Niger Delta region as one, but are articulated differently in relation to specific 
ethnic groups. The next chapter will present strategies adopted by the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders, 

























The previous chapter outlined the dynamics of choice between nonviolence and violence based 
on the narratives of the Ogoni and the Ijaw leaders. It examined in more detail the construction 
of historical narratives based on their lived experiences and grievances against the Nigerian state 
and multinational oil companies. The chapter also demonstrated the main difference in the 
narratives that emerged in the late 1990s following the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, and showed that 
there were already precedents from a previous period especially that of the Ijaw. Leaders are 
obviously fundamental because of the indispensable role they play in shaping movements 
(Nepstad and Bob, 2006), which are influenced by the social and cultural capital they have 
(Bourdieu, 1991). This chapter is concerned with the nature of leadership within the two 
movements, and the ways in which the Ogoni leaders preached nonviolence and the Ijaw 
preached violence. Specifically, it argues that while the Ogoni are able to demonstrate one style 
of leadership, the Ijaw appear to have two types of leaders; one was more similar to the Ogoni 
favoured nonviolence, but was then replaced by another type that was completely different and 
promoted violence.  
 
It will set out the process of interactions and negotiations within the two groups that justified the 
different courses of actions taken to express their grievances and frustrations against the Nigerian 
state.  It will also explore the different strategies employed by the Ogoni leaders in terms of the 
massive systematic campaigns of communications at different levels established by Ken Saro-
Wiwa. It will detail the principled and pragmatic approaches adopted by the Ogoni leaders as 
against the Ijaw leaders whose strategies were not as disciplined or as focused on media 
campaigns. This chapter will show that at a later stage, the Ijaw leadership was fractured and 
fluid, hence it did not include campaign strategies and other methods adopted by the Ogoni 
leaders. This fluid and fractured nature of the Ijaw leaders will, in comparison to the Ogoni, be 
analysed to show what leadership capital the Ogoni were able to provide, and what leadership 
capital the Ijaw were able to provide and how it differed from one another. Therefore, the 
inclusion of leadership capital here denotes contrasting levels of material wealth in the form of 
economic capital, varying degrees of prestige, honour and social distinction as symbolic capital, 
as well as educational qualifications, knowledge and skill referred to as cultural capital (ibid) that 
collectively impact life choices advanced by leaders to their movement. In other words, how the 
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noteworthy status, prestige, and social recognition (Nepstad and Bob, 2006) the Ogoni and Ijaw 
leaders possessed became symbolic capital that heightened their capacity to organise either 
nonviolent or violent collective actions. For instance, as the chapter will demonstrate, how the 
leadership and guidance of Ken Saro-Wiwa influenced the Ogoni movement towards nonviolence 
while the Ijaw struggle emerged fluid and fractured and engaged more with violence. It will 
specifically highlight the context-specific cultural capital (ibid) of the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders as 
it relates to the viewpoint and goals of the various leadership styles witnessed in the movements.  
 
While most scholars focus on Ken Saro-Wiwa as a remarkable leader, (Comfort, 2002; Watts, 
2003, 2008; Watts and Ibaba, 2011; Osha, 2006; Cayford, 1996; Bob and Nepstad, 2007), this 
chapter will show that although his leadership style led to some disagreements within the group, 
the Ogoni leaders who followed him such as Ledum Mitee, Ben Naanen and Legborsi Pyagbara 
also continued to adhere to and preach a strategy of nonviolence. On the Ijaw side, I will show 
that the absence of a collective unity and formidable leadership led to the adoption of a more 
violent strategy. Additionally, the chapter will show how the leaders of the Ogoni and the Ijaw 
responded differently to the actions of the Nigerian state in response to their discontents and 
agitations. It will examine specifically, the ways in which these two sets of leaderships 
contributed to the different views on violence versus nonviolence. On the Ogoni side, interviews 
were conducted with Owens Wiwa, Ledum Mitee, Tom Orage, Alubabari Desmond Nbete, 
Legborsi Pyagbara and Ben Naanen, while on the Ijaw part Patterson Ogon, Isaac Osuoka, Iniruo 
Wills, a confidential source, and Andrew Azazi were interviewed. In addition, the views of Ken 
Henshaw and Bishop Mathew Kukah are included based on their involvement and knowledge of 
the subject area (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of Ogoni and Ijaw leaders, activists, and key 
informants). 
 
This chapter will be presented in three sections, which will comprise: timing of the struggle, 
outlook of the leaders and social status of the leaders (see Table 4.1 below). 
 Table 4.1: Outline of the nature of the leadership within the Ogoni and Ijaw movements. 
Ogoni Ijaw 
2. Timing of the Struggle  
a. Ogoni Leadership Early 1940s (Paul 
Birabi) 
4. Timing of the Struggle 
      4.1 Ijaw Leadership Early 1960s (Isaac   
Adaka Boro) 
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b. Ogoni Leadership From the 1990s 
(Ken Sari-Wiwa, Ledum Mitee, 
Legborsi Pyagbara) 
       4.2 Ijaw Leadership since the 1990s 
(Fragmented) 
2. Outlook of the Leaders 
- Nonviolence (ERECTISM) 
5. Outlook of the Leaders  
- From Nonviolence to Violence   
3. Social Status of the Leaders 
- Education 
- Life Experiences 
6. Social Status of the Leaders  
 - Education 
- Life Experiences 
 
Accordingly, the first half of the chapter will discuss the nature of Ogoni leadership and the 
second half will focus on the Ijaw leadership.  
 
4.1 Timing of the Ogoni Struggle 
 
Over the years, scholars have proffered various explanations on the nature of leadership offered 
by the Ogoni elites. Okonta maintains that the first effort made by the Ogoni to recover the civic 
rights they had experienced in precolonial times Nigeria was after the Second World War in 1945. 
This was an initiative inspired by the nationalist agitations that spread across West Africa, led by 
elites and demobilized Ogoni soldiers such as S.F. Nwika, Kemte Giadom, Timothy Naaku Paul 
Birabi and F.M.A. Saronwiyo (Okonta, 2008: 64).  They founded the Ogoni Central Union (OCU) 
as a social and cultural platform for all Ogoni, which was tasked from inception to unify the 
groups that made up the Ogoni with an emphasis on socio-economic advancement. The 
organisation was mandated to include ordinary people and traditional village rulers as well as 
officials of the native authority, a leadership initiative which, as Okonta (ibid: 64) explains, 
sought to overcome the disunity resulting from conflicts of interests between the elites, the people 
and the traditional title holders who were regarded as being subservient to the colonial 
administration. Although Isumonah (2004: 439), contends that the OCU was not endorsed by all 
Ogoni, notable achievements of the OCU leadership was the insistence of a distinct identity for 
the Ogoni in a petition made to the Resident, in which they requested a separate administrative 
division for Ogoniland (Loolo, 1981: 20). The leadership made another request for the 
establishment of a new Rivers province in a petition made to the then Governor of Eastern 
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Nigeria, which accordingly led to the establishment of the Ogoni Division in 1946 (Rivers 
Province Document, 1947).  
 
According to (Watts, 1999, 2003), Ogoniland was progressively integrated into a distinct group 
through the 1930s and the demand for a distinct political division then flourished under the very 
first pan-Ogoni union with achieved a positive outcome with the creation of the Ogoni Native 
Authority in 1947. This shows that political developments were gaining momentum within the 
continent and on a modest scale in Ogoniland. The deduction, therefore, is that from the early 
1940s deliberate attempts were made by Ogoni leaders to establish a united Ogoni with a 
collective identity.  
 
4.1.1 Ogoni Leadership Early 1940s - Paul Birabi 
 
The first Ogoni struggle was initiated by Naaku Paul Birabi during the period of his studies in 
London, where he became aware of grassroots politics as well as the significance of being 
organized around a common political platform. This awareness was a result of his membership 
of the West African Student’s Union, a London Based union that struggled for constitutional 
transformation in West Africa (Okonta, 2008: 67). He was the very first Ogoni indigene to earn 
a university degree in mathematics in 1948 from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, 
as well as a fellowship from the Royal Geographic Society (FRGS) of Kings College London 
(Ogoninews, 2015; Okonta, 2008). He was part of the Nigerian delegation to the London 
conference of 1953 which negotiated Nigeria’s independence (Ogoninews, 2015). It is important 
to note that during the time of Birabi, Ogoniland had very few schools as it was too expensive to 
send a child to school, and no post primary schools were available in the area. As an educational 
ambassador, Birabi emphasized the need for community-based educational programmes as the 
ideal route to advance the Ogoni community, and at the same time, aroused the political 
consciousness of the Ogoni people (ibid).   
  
Birabi’s return to Nigeria coincided with Sir John Macpherson’s10 1948 mandate to district 
officers to embark on a political enlightenment campaign to attract local people’s participation in 
the coming elections, aimed at transferring substantial legislative power to the regional 
governments (Okonta, 2008: 67). To Birabi, for administrative autonomy to take place the Ogoni 
                                                          
10 Governor of Nigeria 5 February 1948-1 October 1954. 
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had to be politically mobilised in order to sway the regional government’s policies. Okonta argues 
that, with the knowledge that the Ogoni were not united around a common political platform and 
because the OCU had become inactive as a result of some of its key members being away for 
further studies (ibid), Birabi embarked on a campaign aimed at raising the political awareness of 
the Ogoni on the need for formal education. He visited one Ogoni village after the other while 
promoting the setting up of a new organization that would give proportional representation to 
each of the clans11 in Ogoniland (Ogoninews, 2015; Okonta, 2008). Birabi stated that ‘for the 
quest of the autonomy of Ogoniland to successfully influence the policies of the Nigerian state 
and be rewarded economically and socially, the Ogoni had to be seen as one, speaking with one 
voice, under a platform where all sections would be represented’ (Okonta, 2008: 66). This 
heralded the birth of the Ogoni State Representation Assembly (OSRA) in 1950 with Birabi as 
president, while the OCU was disbanded. The OSRA was created to further the advancement of 
a common Ogoni ethnic identity and to foster the interests of all Ogoni (Isumonah, 2004: 440). 
It comprised of the executive officers, the Gbemene Barasins12, ten representatives each from the 
three largest clans Gokana, Nyo Khana and Ken Khana, and six each from the smaller clans of 
Tai and Eleme (Okonta, 2008).  
 
In the period 1952-1953, Birabi under the umbrella of the OSRA, was particularly noted for the 
full participatory discussions he had with his people during his tour of the villages, after which 
he was able to influence the OSRA to build a post primary school in Ogoniland. Okonta (2008) 
concludes that through such grassroots dialogues, Birabi was able to instil not only the need for 
unity within Ogoniland but also the importance of obtaining formal education. Furthermore, it 
was to Birabi’s standing that by 1953, a school was established in almost every village in 
Ogoniland through the help of the Christian missionaries, indicating his commitment to bring 
education closer to his people.  Even though Birabi started political enlightenment in Ogoniland, 
events between 1948 and 1958 were overshadowed by Nigeria’s quest for independence (ibid: 
71). The adoption of grassroots dialogues and participatory discussions by Birabi indicates the 
inclination to nonviolence from the early stages of his awareness in attracting the attention of the 
Ogoni people to the importance of education, and a collective unity under one organisation. This 
standpoint is yet to be adequately linked to the 1990s struggle reignited by Ken Saro-Wiwa by 
scholars, which makes it central to understanding it as the foundation of the choice of a nonviolent 
                                                          
11 The five tribes that make up Ogoni nation. 
12Key holders of the five clans.  
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course of action within the Ogoni movement. This thesis is providing insights into key decisions 
taken in charting the Ogoni cause based on the strategic choice of nonviolence by the leaders. 
 
In spite of the attempts by the OSRA, the Ogoni were not a united group, which was demonstrated 
by the preference shown by the Eleme subgroup in favour of having a council of its own not 
under the Ogoni in 1956 when the colonial administration offered to change the Ogoni Native 
Assembly into a Local Government to be regarded as Khana County Council (Isumonah, 2004: 
441). This supports the assertions made by Watts (2003); Ikoro (1996) and Isumonah (2004) that 
as far back as the 1950s, the Ogoni were a divided group who did not speak with the same voice.  
Even though the Eleme openly showed their resistance to being under an Ogoni leadership, there 
is no evidence of the use of violence to support their preference; they are still together as part of 
one group.  
 
The Ogoni became involved in politics under the aegis of the OSRA when Birabi steered the 
group into politics on the side of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons13  
(N.C.N.C). In 1953, he was actively involved as a party member when the leadership crisis that 
entangled the N.C.N.C leadership at the Eastern House of Assembly in Enugu escalated (Okonta, 
2008; Ogoninews, 2015). The crisis was in opposition to the dominance of the Igbo within a 
party that comprised other minority ethnic groups in the Niger Delta.  During his membership 
of N.C.N.C, Birabi was part of the team along with representatives of the Northern People’s 
Congress14 (NPC) and the Action Group Party15 that negotiated the Nigerian independence with 
the British Government at the constitutional conference held in London. He was also the 
president of River’s association, an organisation set up to canvass for special treatment and the 
provision of social amenities for the Niger Delta people, which offered him an opportunity to be 
part of the team that developed the proposal to resolve the sufferings of the Niger Delta presented 
to the Willinks Commission of Inquiry in 1957 (ibid). These were the foundations of the creation 
of the present Rivers state in Nigeria, which was established in the late 1960s.  
 
It has been established by scholars (Okonta, 2008; Isumonah, 2004) that in the course of 
preaching Ogoni unity and identity, Birabi maintained a peaceful and nonviolent character. 
                                                          
13The Igbo and Christian controlled party led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, and part of a coalition of conservative 
parties that made up Nigeria’s government at that time.  
14 A party led by northerners and those of Islamic faith.  
15 The Yoruba controlled party led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.  
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There has been no record to link him with the use of words that would suggest violence by the 
group. The focus of the Ogoni ethnic mobilisation in the 1950s rested in requests for better social 
status and Western education (Isumonah, 2004: 440). Birabi’s path to greatness has been 
connected to various activities and achievements during the last five years of his life, so much 
so that the Ogoni regard him as a leader and motivator of the various changes that occurred 
within Ogoniland between the years 1948-1953. Birabi died in 1953, his death bringing an end 
to the first phase of the Ogoni struggle (Okonta, 2008: 71).  
 
After the death of Birabi, no significant struggle was recorded in Ogoniland until Ken Saro-
Wiwa emerged as a political figure determined to pick up from where Birabi left. In 1962 the 
Ogoni Divisional Union (ODU) was set up as a result of the collapse of the OSRA as an avenue 
to advance Ogoni interests leading to the creation of Rivers state in 1967 (Isumonah, 2004: 441). 
The ODU preserved the Ogoni minority awareness within the state. It was replaced by two not 
very political Ogoni ethnic organisations such as the Ogoni club which comprised young Ogoni 
graduates and the Kagote club made up of the  Ogoni elite (Ibid: 442) and, as later will be 
demonstrated, the MOSOP. The next section will present the development of Ogoni strategies 
by Saro-Wiwa, in terms of the methods he employed to unify the Ogoni as one people and the 
similarity of some of the activities carried out by the MOSOP to that of the OSRA, which 
according to Okonta (2008: 68), ‘ mirrored Birabi’s grassroots politics, to some extent’.  
 
4.1.2 Ogoni Leadership (From the 1990s)   
 
After Birabi, Ken Saro-Wiwa became the second notable Ogoni leader, he was president of 
MOSOP from 1993 to 1995 and, as mentioned in the previous section, the group had not engaged 
in any significant requests or resistance before he emerged. Osha (2007) argues that self-
determination wasn’t at the forefront of Saro-Wiwa’s thoughts pre 1970s owing to his 
membership of the Interim Advisory Council of the then Rivers State during the civil war, and 
appointment as a commissioner in 1968. His removal in 1973 from the Rivers state cabinet led 
him to the wealth generation and investment, through trading and acquisition of landed property 
(Ibid). However, the inability of the Nigerian state to adequately address the Ogoni requests for 
full citizenship rights (Okonta, 2008), in addition to the jeopardised physical and psychological 
well-being of the group (Osha, 2007: 80) prepared the ground for the emergence of  Ken Saro-
Wiwa as a leader of the Ogoni. He vowed to ensure a more improved life for the Ogoni people 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 49), and the ethnic minorities and indigenous people of Nigeria (Osha, 
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2007). After his unsuccessful attempt to get into the Constituent Assembly of 1977, Saro-Wiwa 
maintained that the late 1970s served as an inspiration for him to be charting an Ogoni agenda. 
Participation in the Constituent Assembly to Ken was regarded as a final attempt to secure the 
long anticipated full citizenship for the group. He, however, failed to acquire the necessary 
support by Edward Kobani, an influential Ogoni elder, who had the largest Ogoni grassroots 
support at that time, when Kobani decided to endorse another candidate to represent the Ogoni 
at the Assembly (Okonta, 2008). Saro-Wiwa appealed against his defeat in the elections and 
claimed that the loss was due to his being ‘blocked by some educated Ogoni people and then by 
the rulers of Nigeria’ (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a), who, as Okonta argued, were not in favour of Saro-
Wiwa’s participation at the Constituent Assembly, as they regarded him an Ogoni nationalist 
that would ask uncomfortable questions (Okonta, 2008: 156). Saro-Wiwa stated that: 
 
I analysed why all my hopes for the Ogoni has failed to materialise. …I found that 
the task was gargantuan one which would require an almost superhuman effort. My 
failure up to 1973 I could ascribe to my relative youth and inexperience. My failure 
in 1977 I could put down to my not having organised the Ogoni people properly. 
But I also knew that any such organisation would require a lot of energy, patience 
and money (Saro-Wiwa, 1995:55-56).  
 
This defeat, according to Okonta, became a lesson that Saro-Wiwa applied in the construction 
of Mosop in 1990, ensuring that influential politicians, such as Edward Kobani, were a party 
to it (Okonta, 2008), although they would eventually fall out as a result of the divisions within 
MOSOP (see Chapter Five). As a result of his failure in 1973, Saro-Wiwa shifted focus away 
from the government to television production, writing and journalism in the 1980s. His satirical 
television series, Basi & Company, which depicted the everyday activities of gang elements in 
Lagos, Nigeria became incredibly well-liked. He wrote regularly for the Nigerian Sunday 
Times, authored several novels and poetry pieces in engagements that further increased his vast 
audience (South African History online) and that resulted in his identification as a ‘perceptive 
commentator and champion of minority rights’ (Okonta, 2008). Meanwhile, this perception of 
the political insignificance of the Ogoni and in particular the group being shut out of the formal 
institutional structure thereby negating the Ogoni meaningful self-representation stimulated 
Saro-Wiwa’s desire to lead the group in charting a new course.  
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The 1985 military rule under the Babangida Administration increased economic and social 
divisions in the country, enabling marginalised groups like the Ogoni who were also facing 
environmental degradation exacerbated by oil exploration to utilise the opportunities and form 
novel coalitions such as Saro-Wiwa’s MOSOP (Okonta, 2008; Osha, 2007). Worthy of mention 
here is Saro-Wiwa’s engagement with the Babangida Administration in which he was 
appointed and served at the directorate level of the Directorate of Social Mobilisation (Osha, 
2007). The struggle to challenge the state and the multinational oil companies became central 
to the activities of Niger Delta environmentalists. Saro-Wiwa who, in various dimensions, had 
been part of the government, rose to challenge the central state and the multinational oil 
companies due to the region’s environmental degradation triggered by the exploration and 
exploitation of the Niger Delta resources (Amusan, 2009). Saro-Wiwa’s actions came after 
about thirty years without any visible expression from the region after Adaka Boro. Saro-
Wiwa’s activities coincided with the criticism of the poor human rights records of the then 
undemocratic Military Administration of General Abacha exacerbated by the lack of 
transparency, both of which made Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP popular (ibid). His objective of 
having a loose national state or even an independent state within Nigeria by way of his Ogoni 
Bill of Rights marked a turning point in the politics of oil resources in Nigeria (ibid). Unlike 
that of Adaka Boro, Saro-Wiwa’s movement, as we shall see, was predicated on the principle 
of intellectual struggle by means of constructive criticism and dialogue (Etemike, 2009).   
Described as a man of peace, Saro-Wiwa’s struggles were constructed on the view point of 
nonviolence depicted in his organisation of the Ogoni people using socio-cultural and 
educational tools (Ashforth et al., 2010). Saro-Wiwa has written that, 
 
My worry about the Ogoni has been an article of faith, conceived of in primary 
school, nurtured through secondary school, actualised in the Nigerian Civil War in 
1967-70, and during my tenure as a member of the Rivers State Executive Council, 
1968-7. My first thoughts on the matter were published in my pamphlet The Ogoni 
Nationality Today and Tomorrow in April 1969. (Saro-Wiwa, 1992). 
 
This assertion by Saro-Wiwa corresponds to Cayford’s  observation that, in the wake of the 
Ogoni elites drive towards a broader unity after 1945, the consequences of environmental 
damage and  lack of development became obvious and led to the recognition of common threats 
and a common goal in line with earlier unifying efforts (Cayford, 1996: 187). Owens Wiwa 
reiterated that  
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The problems were common, there was oil in all the kingdoms maybe apart from 
one, but even that one had a lot of gas, so the problem was environmental. Initially 
there were no politics to divide the leadership, it was the commonality of the 
problem that brought the people together (Interview: 3 August 2015) 
 
Additionally, Comfort (2002: 3), argues that Saro-Wiwa took advantage of his insider 
experience to press forward environmental justness and nonviolent ways to social change. In 
the words of Saro-Wiwa, 
 
I am creating the Ogoni people, first and foremost, to come to the realisation of 
what they have always been which British colonisation tried to take away from 
them. My effort is very intellectual. It is backed by theories, thoughts and ideas 
which will, in fact matter to the rest of Africa in the course of time (Saro-Wiwa, 
1993a). 
 
In another forum Saro-Wiwa further stated that:  
I have lived through most of the period covered by this sordid story, I watched as 
they went into decline. I have watched helplessly as they have been gradually 
ground to dust by the combined effort of the multinational oil company, Shell; the 
murderous ethnic majority in Nigeria and the country’s military dictatorship. Not 
the pleas, not the writing over the years have convinced the Nigerian elite that 
something special ought to be done to relieve the distress of the Ogoni (Saro-Wiwa, 
1992). 
 
These inferences by Saro-Wiwa suggest the careful thinking done before attracting the peoples’ 
support to the Ogoni struggle. The misfortune faced by the Ogoni provided Saro-Wiwa with a 
clearer distinction between minority and extreme minority standings. Comfort (2002:232) 
described Saro-Wiwa’s political development as both logical and contradictory, formed to an 
extent by his activism on the Ogoni cause within both national and international contexts. This 
assumption was confirmed by Saro-Wiwa in his autobiography when he noted that ‘certain 
conclusions have since conditioned my attitude to change and society in Nigeria’ (Saro-Wiwa, 
1995a: 61). He pointed out that:  
 
Trudging over the 100 rural villages, in which the Ogoni lived, I was able to see 
for myself what the Ogoni as a people needed […] But even more importantly I 
could see that what they required most was the formation of a mass organisation 
to press their rights (Ibid:40) 
 
This indicates that the significance of bringing the Ogoni together to challenge the Nigerian 
state became a philosophy advocated by Saro-Wiwa, through representations in person and in 
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writing and using the tools of nonviolent advocacy. Saro-Wiwa’s one-year tenure as the 
director of MAMSER16 has been credited with shaping his political thinking and strategies that 
eventually led to the creation of MOSOP (Okonta, 2008: 171). Tam-George viewed Saro-
Wiwa’s philosophy in terms of his effort to reterritorialise his area of expertise to the grassroots 
as a way of galvanising communal backing and involvement (Tam-George, 2010:289).  These 
may have been the contributory factors to Saro-Wiwa’s determination to offer some 
philosophical resolutions to Nigeria’s problems. His clear observation and understanding of 
the prevailing political conditions in America and the Western European states he visited 
helped in his integration and acceptance of the universally valid generalizations influencing 
political actions of the state (Nbete, 2006:164). 
 
This determination created several conflicts and divisions within the group as well as with the 
state which saw to the murder of four prominent Ogoni elites in Giokoo, which led to the arrest 
and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa along with nine others (Ogoni nine)17. They were accused 
and charged with instigating the murder of the Ogoni four by the Abacha administration. The 
Ogoni nine were found guilty and hanged on 9 November 1995 (Okonta, 2008: 229). Comfort 
(2002:235), argues that the trial of the Ogoni nine was marked by anomalies and contravened 
vital doctrines of fair, objective and impartial judicial trials. This indicates that the legitimacy 
of the tribunal was questionable because, as she argues, it was selected by the illegitimate 
regime of General Sani Abacha. The defence lawyers, Comfort reiterated, were prevented 
access to their clients, and prosecution witnesses were said to have been compromised with 
bribes during the trial by government operatives in order to give false information. Reacting to 
the arrest and judgement passed on Saro-Wiwa, Owens claimed that,  
 
Abacha just wanted to kill him, there’s no question of that, all that was a rouse. He 
didn’t arm anybody (Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
Giving a first-hand narration of events that happened in Giokoo, Medee recounted that: 
 
Saro-Wiwa was supposed to address a conference in Gokana, everybody was 
expecting him but he didn’t show up. The killings were purely circumstantial, it 
was neither planned nor was Saro-Wiwa part of it. Government used the 
opportunity to clamp down on him and other leaders of MOSOP (Interview: 27 
July 2015). 
                                                          
16 Directorate of Social Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Social Justice , and Economic Recovery 
17 Ken Saro-Wiwa, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpunien, Baribor Bera, Saturday Dobee, Felix Nwate, Nordu Eawo, 
Paul Levura, and Daniel Gbokoo 
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Andrew Apter argued that the state’s rush and immediate execution of Saro-Wiwa and the 
others followed the internal colonial logic of divide and rule (Apter, 1998: 145). In line with 
Wole Soyinka’s claim of the trial being a sham;  
 
Saro-Wiwa’s fate had long been sealed. The decision to execute him and his eight 
companions was reached before the special tribunal was ordered to reconvene and 
pronounce a verdict that had been decided outside the charade of judicial 
proceeding (Soyinka, 1996).  
 
Medee insists that it was a kangaroo trial where the accused were not given a fair trial by the 
Nigerian state. He explained that,  
 
First there was some kind of fear in Ogoniland because we never felt that the 
international community will be there and Ken Saro-Wiwa will be executed and 
they couldn’t stop his execution. We felt that if you push this thing as far as Ken 
did you may go the same way he went. There was some kind of disillusionment 
and a sense of abandonment (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
This suggests some form of disappointment from the failed expectations the group had on the 
international community, arising from the fact that the group was aware that before his 
execution, Saro-Wiwa made very good efforts in soliciting for help and support from the 
international community. Even Amnesty International adopted Ken, Dube and Nwinee as 
prisoners of conscience (ibid, Hunt, 2005:125).  Help came for Ken and the others from people 
and international organisations such as Greenpeace; The Body Shop; Amnesty International; 
PEN International’s Committee for Writers in Prison; UNPO; the UN Working Group for 
Indigenous People; the Association of Nigerian Authors; the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
and William Boyd (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a: 236). The support from the listed organisations 
confirms the impact and appeal the Ogoni struggle had on the international community which 
raised the hopes of the Ogoni people. 
 
However, in reality, mobilisations within Ogoniland at that time were very troubling because 
whether Saro-Wiwa and the other leaders appreciated it or not, the nonviolent approach they 
adopted threatened the Abacha regime’s survival, and within the context of any threat to a 
regimes survival, different states react differently. According to Ukiwo, 
The reactions of the Abacha administration could be interpreted in two ways, on 
the one hand, to defy both the Ogoni and the international community that isolated 
it, and on the other hand, to send a signal to the other groups in the Niger Delta of 
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what would be fall them if they take the path of the Ogoni (Interview: 14 June 
2016). 
 
Reactions in Ogoniland were supressed by the government as detailed by Wiwa. It was even 
illegal to express grief over the death of Saro-Wiwa in Ogoniland; it was an unaffordable 
luxury. When the Ogoni heard the first radio reports announcing the executions, huge numbers 
spilled onto the streets, wailing with grief. But within hours, four thousand troops were 
deployed to arrest anyone mourning the Ogoni nine in public (Hunt, 2005: 284). Pyagbara 
stated that, 
 
We still believe strongly that the state wanted to crush the movement, and the 
hanging of the Ogoni 9 consummated the whole thing about turning the entire 
movement to an underground movement. Although their hanging marked the 
period of Ogoni repression, on the flip side, rather than killing the struggle, that 
was the highest time that Ogoni people demonstrated their resilience, we resolved 
to continue struggling (Interview: 31 July 2015) 
 
In the same vein, Wiwa also recounted that,  
 
There were peaceful protests, which is what Ken had asked for and people were 
shot at. The core MOSOP leadership were hunted, we all moved out to where we 
could go, there was literarily tens of thousands of people in the Republic of Benin, 
just a fraction of that were able to go abroad and there was active hunt of MOSOP 
literature. They did not only want to decapitate the brains of the movement, 
remove the brains from the stem, they also wanted to remove the hands and the 
legs (interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
The aftermath of the killing of the Ogoni nine was marked with harsh army repression which 
significantly subdued major response within Nigeria and was coupled with the fact that 
MOSOP was fragmented by factionalism (Bob and Nepstad, 2007). Marion Campbell 
described the execution of Saro-Wiwa as an effort by the state to squash an opinionated 
criticism of a corrupt national government and an unfair multinational oil corporation 
(Campbell, 2002: 39). According to Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, the Ogoni struggle weakened 
quickly when the leader of the protest movement, Saro-Wiwa, was executed (Demirel-Pegg 
and Pegg, 2015: 654). They argue that protest movements, as put forward by social movement 
scholars, disband as an after-effect of the division between radical and moderate protesters, but 
in the Ogoni case they demobilised as a result of the repression and might of the military 
regime. Highlighting the fact that states can successfully prevent the rebound consequence of 
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suppression even if the protest continues nonviolently (ibid: 656), which the military regime 
did by going after the members of MOSOP most of whom went underground while some fled 
the country. From 1995, most of the surviving MOSOP leaders were scattered and settled in 
whichever countries that offered them asylum. These wide geographical distances further 
intensified the already prevailing generational and subethnic contentions (Bob and Nepstad, 
2007: 1388) which affected the immediate remobilization of the Ogoni struggle.  
 
After Saro-Wiwa’s death, the notable alliance of international interests that he had begun to 
build and that brought together minority rights advocates and environmentalists, stretched past 
what he had ever imagined (Nixon, 1996: 10). Despite the demobilization of the Ogoni protest 
campaign after his execution, MOSOP continued with nonviolent resistance, which is the 
legacy of Saro-Wiwa they have retained. The legacy of Ken’s struggle against the ecological 
destruction of his native Ogoniland created by multinational oil corporations (Brittain, 2015:5) 
is one that will be recalled and discussed over and over within and outside Nigeria. Within the 
wider Niger Delta, political mobilizations of minority groups, as seen in the presentation of 
charters, declarations and bill of rights, bear the traces of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Ogoni Bill of 
Rights and his notions of self-determination (see Appendix 3), political autonomy and resource 
control continue to dominate political requests within the region (Isumonah, 2015; Demirel-
Pegg and Pegg, 2015). Even while they were underground, Ledum Mitee continued operations 
in his capacity as the president after Ken. 
 
After Saro-Wiwa, leadership was passed on to Ledum Mitee in 1995, Ben Naanen and 
subsequently to Legborsi Pyagbara in 2008. The focus here will be on Ledum because Naanen 
only served as the Chairman, Provisional Council, of MOSOP in 2012 after Ledum Mitee was 
removed from office. He also, incidentally, was the secretary general from 1992- 1999 while 
Pyagbara, whose tenure is on-going, is the current president. Ledum Mitee was one of the key 
actors of the struggle who participated from the beginning and went on to become the leader 
of MOSOP. Similarly to Saro-Wiwa, Mitee also had his leadership issues, depending on whom 
you talked to in Ogoniland; some saw him as a sell-out, but he was able to lead the organisation 
for 10 years without violence, which makes his leadership too important to be ignored. In a 
discussion with Ukoha Ukiwo, the Ogoni under the leadership of Ledum Mitee almost became 
like an NGO unlike during the time of Saro-Wiwa when the movement was a public concern, 
a mass movement. Under Mitee, the organisation collected several grants and engaged in one 
project after another which led to increased suspicion about his leadership.  
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At that time, the international system as evolved had changed, at the early 
stages international development concerns recognised social and labour 
movements and gave them support. But later on the people getting support 
are the NGOs, which led the Ogoni to form a foundation known as MOSOP 
Foundation, which has deviated the notional symbolic issue of individual 
Ogoni contribution although, Ken can hardly say that he made much of that, 
it was mainly symbolic (Interview: 14 June 2016).  
 
Among other things, Mitee has been accused of deceiving and misleading the Ogoni people for 
almost 10 years, some claimed that he was never elected as a leader nor appointed by Saro-
Wiwa as he had stated. Rather, he was accused of serving the interest of the Nigerian state and 
Shell. Interview with Orage revealed that,  
 
Today people like Ledum Mitee have all participated in the government they all 
said they don’t want, why are they participating? Have the Ogoni demands been 
met? (Interview: 27 July 2015).  
 
Mitee was noted to have worked with the state at various points as would be highlighted 
in the section on the social status of the leaders below. Whilst supporting the direct 
accusation made by Orage, Nbete points to the involvement with the state as having 
conceded the Ogoni struggle. He explained that, 
 
Subsequent leaders after Saro-Wiwa adopted a leadership style that falls short of 
what should have been the model of leadership. This is supposed to be a grassroots 
movement and Ledum Mitee adopted some kind of elitist approach, he was 
insulated from the people and became closer to the government, the very people 
that you are supposed to confront. To us that would easily compromise the fervour 
of his confrontation with the state. There has been a progressive decline  after Ken, 
the present leadership falls far short of what we had under Ledum Mitee (Interview: 
27 July 2015). 
 
This suggests that the movement under Mitee faced several leadership issues, mainly in the 
relationship with the state, which some of the Ogoni are still not in support of.  Although 
accused of failing to unify the Ogoni as Saro-Wiwa did, Mitee addressed the Ogoni using 
similar ways as Saro-Wiwa, through using nonviolent language targeted to the people. For 
instance, in an Ogoni speech in 1997, he stated that,  
 
Nothing is more reassuring than the fact that in spite of these repressive efforts 
intended to silence and intimidate us, we have by our courage, resilience and 
discipline cast out the yoke of crass complacency and passivity that has enslaved 
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many an oppressed people. Your courage has demystified the oppressor. Your 
resilience in the face of agonies has attracted world attention and reprieved the 
oppressor a slumbering conscience. Your discipline in the face of provocations has 
inspired hope and rewarded faith in non-violence as a weapon for fighting 
oppression (Mitee, 1997).  
 
However, contrasting the accusations and despite being blamed for not serving the Ogoni 
people effectively, further evidence from selected speeches Mitee made indicate efforts to 
sustain the struggle. Even in 2007, he reiterated that the rejection of all attempts by Shell to 
force its way back into Ogoniland was a sacred duty which fate had pushed upon the Ogoni 
people. He stressed that,  
 
A failure to contest it would be a disloyalty to dead Ogoni leaders like Saro-Wiwa and 
further enslavement of the living and continuous depravity of Ogoni prosperity. I call on 
the Ogonis and their supporters to step up their rejection and non-cooperation with all 
instruments of oppression and repression […] I appeal to all Ogoni to nonviolently resist 
to the last man any attempt by the company to stage a forced or forged return to 
Ogoniland until our demands are met in full (ibid).  
 
Additional evidence from the speeches indicate pleas he made to governments, organisations 
and supporters of freedom and justice around the world to exert their influence and intensify 
pressure on Shell to show consideration for the environmental and human rights of the Ogonis 
as well as the wider Niger Delta inhabitants (Mitee, 1999: 437-438). He argued that his 
leadership tried its best to prove that mass based, disciplined movements can effectively 
regenerate a declining people and through reliance on discipline, primordial values, morals and 
cultures, affected people and societies can effectively renew themselves while challenging 
oppressive governments nonviolently (Ibid :437). The use of phrases such as courage, 
discipline and resilience in the face of agonies, suggest a nonviolent undertone along the style 
of leadership demonstrated by Saro-Wiwa. Therefore, the assertions show that even though the 
Ogoni movement was faced with internal disagreements and conflicts, they did not lead to 
violence within the group. This further indicates a collective awareness that the best way to 
fight an authoritarian system is through nonviolence.  
 
4.2 Outlook of the Leaders 
 
This section will focus on the Ogoni leaders understanding of and participation in international 
debates on issues relating to the global environment. Specifically, it will discuss Saro-Wiwa’s 
strategic option to link the problems faced by the Ogoni to international environmental 
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movements in order to better challenge the state. This will highlight the deliberate adoption of 
nonviolence and the principles of ethnic autonomy, resource and environmental control 
(ERECTISM). To Saro-Wiwa, ethnic domination disintegrates cultures of the controlled 
vulnerable groups, and suppresses the fulfilment of one’s own potential, indicating that the 
employment of ethnic autonomy provides groups the avenue to advance specific political 
institutions (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a, p. 67) to maintain its own culture and identity. For the Ogoni, 
Saro-Wiwa connects ethnic autonomy to resource and environmental control based on the 
correlation natural resources have with the physical environment and the importance 
environmental issues attract in the international arena majority (Nbete, 2006).  
 
Environmental justice became for him a vital notion within which to engage the state and Shell 
(Nixon, 1996:5). In Saro-Wiwa’s view, a unitary constitutional framework is not right for a 
highly multi-ethnic state, and this thinking informed his proposal of an Ogoni agenda (Nbete, 
2006). Nbete explains that the Ogoni agenda:  
 
Postulates the equality of all ethnic groups, within the Nigerian federalism as well 
as the evolution of proper, undiluted federalism in the nation. In this way Nigerians 
will not be oppressed, their creative spirit will be freed and their productivity and 
self-reliance promoted. Cheating will end in the nation and corruption will be 
minimised and justice will prevail (ibid). 
 
 In the words of Saro-Wiwa,  
 
Three events have encouraged me to now place the issue before the world: the end 
of the Cold War, the increasing attention being paid to the global environment, and 
the insistence of the European Community that minority rights be respected, albeit 
in the successor states to the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. What remains to be 
seen is whether Europe and America will apply in Nigeria the same standards which 
they have applied in Eastern Europe (Saro-Wiwa, 1992:7). 
 
This quote indicates that because of the events mentioned, Saro-Wiwa was very much aware 
of the importance of shifting from previous narratives of internal colonialism towards 
emphasizing current issues of human rights and the environment in order to achieve the Ogoni 
objective. The interview with Nbete revealed that Saro-Wiwa clearly understood the discourse 
and narratives of international politics:  
 
The environment was not the only thing that the Ogoni people were fighting for but 
he realized that in the 90s, there was an increasing awareness of the need to protect 
the environment, there was so much talk about global warming, and ozone layer 
depletion. He keyed into the global narrative, so even the issue of political 
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marginalization which was a major factor was kind of subordinated to the 
environmental pollution and the Ogoni caught international attention (Interview: 27 
July 2015).  
 
The interview further clarified that:  
Saro-Wiwa came up with a principle, a paradigm which he called ERECTISM, 
that various ethnic groups should have control over their resources, and then they 
could pay taxes to the federal government for the running of the wider state (ibid). 
 
Saro-Wiwa thus linked the Ogoni agenda to the understanding of getting redemption for the 
group through federalism as a solution to their problems, through the concept of ERECTISM 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1995a:98). He portrayed the Ogoni as fighting a war of genocide while in the 
process of reconstructing their proud heritage as a primordial nation (ibid: 149). The concept 
of ethnic autonomy advanced by Saro-Wiwa does not imply complete isolationism or a 
sovereign status for the ethnic groups but, it rather emphasizes the right of the preservation of 
the cultural heritage of the different peoples that make up the federation. Just as Nbete 
(2006:172), argues, resource control constitutes the cornerstone of Saro-Wiwa’s political 
theory in that it relates to regional control of resources which should entail the vesting of 
ownership and right to allocate resources to the regions that produce them. The environment is 
also a resource, therefore Saro-Wiwa’s idea of environmental control meant that a considerable 
measure of control over the environment exercised by the regions will promote a culture of 
environmental protection (ibid).  
 
Even in the insistence of ERECTISM, there is no suggestion that violence should be used. In 
Nbete’s words, nonviolence was adopted by the Ogoni because, 
 
We thought we were dealing with a people that are truly human who have conscience. 
Knowing that in terms of violence the Ogoni probably do not have the strength. It 
would be counterproductive to wage a confrontational war against the state, with all 
its resources. If we were able to convince them, to realize the evil in depriving a 
people of their means of livelihood, of robbing them of their very existence, they will 
be forced to realize what they were doing was evil and also tangential to the principles 
of growth and development (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
This brings up an important element of the Ogoni struggle which is that of ‘humanising the 
enemy’. According to Gubler (2016), to humanise members of the outgroup is often considered 
the first step towards reconciliation, but in the Ogoni case this humanization failed to produce 
the expected positive attitudinal change that the Ogoni expected the state would empathise 
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(Gubler et al., 2016) with their situation, and that would lead to a change of hearts and minds, 
but they were ignored. They had a humanized view of the state which determined the 
approaches they employed in their struggle, indicating the importance of the ideas and values 
of their main leaders.  
Owens Wiwa explained that Ken’s leadership role was portrayed through an unwavering 
commitment to nonviolence by his ensuring that MOSOP was committed to nonviolence as a 
strategy.  “Alo be, iko be, nale begin” was his slogan in the Ogoni language, meaning we will 
fight with our brains, not with a knife (Hunt, 2005:64). Nbete (2006:173), further argues that 
Saro-Wiwa’s inclination to nonviolence was shaped by the ideas of Martin Luther King Jr., 
Mahatma Gandhi, Desmond Tutu, Bell Hooks, Cornel West and Rabindranath Tagore, as well 
as by his passion for classical literature (ibid). Nonviolence was introduced to the Ogoni 
through various strategies such as dialogue, protests at national and international levels, mass 
mobilisation, boycotts and other forms of civil disobedience.   
 
Being informed by the Gandhian philosophy entailed that like all nonviolent narratives, the 
Ogoni struggle was driven mainly by the power of its ethical argument and the creativeness of 
its methods of protest against the Nigerian state. For the followers of Gandhi according to 
Klitgaard (1971:2), Satyagraha is ordinarily described as nonviolent resistance and is 
conceived of as the anticipation of hope in the future, a long expected channel of peaceful 
conflict resolution. Gandhi appears as one of the most outstanding figures, and his notion of a 
political struggle was nonviolence. In Bose (1991) words: 
 
In Gandhi’s theory of peace, human value takes great prominence. Nonviolence 
(Ahimsa) is a way of life rather than a tactic, and together with the search for truth 
(Satyagraha), makes the difference between passive submission to injustice and an 
active struggle against it. This struggle excludes both physical violence and casting 
the opponent in the role of the enemy, and hence presupposes compassion and self-
criticism. 
 
Further ideologically based explanations have been offered by other Ogoni leaders who support 
the adoption of nonviolence. Interview with Pyagbara, the current MOSOP president revealed 
that, 
 
Our struggle was patterned around the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence 
which was also used by Martin Luther King Jr. We didn’t see those who oppressed 
us in the classical sense as enemies, we saw them as largely those who are not 
practicing the real tenet of love. For us, it was also going to be suicidal to march 
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a population of less than one million in a violent rebellion against a powerful army. 
MOSOP wanted to breed new grounds, we felt the need of using a new strategy 
of engagement with the state. It also helped us gain more sympathy than a violent 
struggle (Interview: 31 July 2015) 
 
In the words of Saro-Wiwa: 
 
Violence is not the answer to a fascist government. We must continue a nonviolent 
struggle. It is very expensive to do that, it is hard. But it is the only way that our 
way can proceed. There is no other way. We will never resort to violence. But we 
will tackle the irresponsible leadership of this country. Our struggle has been well 
defined and has been well thought out (Saro-Wiwa, 1993a). 
 
Following the presentation of Saro-Wiwa’s nonviolent leadership style, it is important to state 
that his leadership was not without criticisms. Osaghae (1995:334) reports that Saro-Wiwa was 
publicly accused of wrongly calling the struggle an Ogoni struggle by Bardian Lekara of Bori 
Polytechnic, who claimed that Saro-Wiwa mislead and brain washed the Ogoni people for 
personal gains. Saro-Wiwa was particularly accused of not championing the Ogoni cause and 
also not helping the Ogonis when he held positions in government (ibid), as well as being ‘testy, 
inflexible, self-aggrandizing and presumptuously ambitious’ (Nixon, 1996:10). But in spite of 
these internal disagreements, the Ogoni maintained even after Saro-Wiwa’s execution in 1995, 
the principle of nonviolence that he had introduced. Despite the demobilization of the Ogoni 
protest campaign by the Nigerian state, the Ogoni have continued with nonviolent resistance, 
the OBR, as well as the internationalisation of the Ogoni struggle, thus retaining the legacies 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa. 
 
In the course of his leadership, Saro-Wiwa seemed to use two arguments. Firstly he used the 
idea of being principled, where he emphasised the principles of nonviolence as advocated by 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. Under the principle of nonviolence, he did not kill to 
achieve his goals, these he achieved with the help of a few key people in Ogoniland through 
mobilisation at the community level, interviewing and interacting with the Ogoni people about 
their needs and what they wanted to see in Ogoniland (Atiri, 2004). Secondly, Saro-Wiwa used 
a pragmatic argument with his knowledge of the small number of Ogoni indigenes within 
Rivers state. He operated with the understanding of the Ogoni being a minority nation, small 
in size and number geographically, therefore to engage in a violent resistance against the might 
of the Nigerian security forces would have been, for him, counterproductive and a disadvantage 
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to the group. This further explains the dynamics of choice adopted by the Ogoni, in terms of 
the principle of nonviolence entrenched socially and politically. The principle of leadership 
was another strong norm; he was able to effectively bring together the Ogoni leaders with the 
youth, women and men through the speeches he made during the meetings and gatherings he 
attended. 
This section has shown that seeking international recognition specifically without the use of 
violence was strategic to the Ogoni cause, as seen in leaders’ deliberate efforts in presenting 
an internationally oriented language of nonviolence in relation to their struggle. This also 
suggests that the Ogoni leaders understood that in order to succeed, nonviolence had to be 
preached to the people to make them understand how their sufferings related to the outside 
world. This section has shown furthermore, that the preaching’s by Ogoni leaders engaged 
positively with nonviolence: that even where there were dissatisfactions and conflicts as seen 
in the Eleme case and that against the various leaderships, the movement was devoid of 
violence, and they maintained the principle of nonviolence. 
 
4.3 Social Status of the Leaders 
 
This section will show the degree of leadership capital the Ogoni were able to provide in terms 
of the centrality of their social and educational characteristics as it differs from the Ijaw 
leadership. It will highlight how the role of agency stands out within the Ogoni leadership, and 
suggest leaders who were able to take advantage of these conditions in charting the Ogoni 
agenda (Nepstad and Bob, 2006:3). In particular, in the case of the Ogoni, from the previous 
chapter we can see a precedent in the 50s that was clearly a statement, a narrative of 
nonviolence from a very important and influential leader Birabi that was then reinvigorated by 
Saro-Wiwa in the 1990s. The argument here relates to the importance of how these two leaders’ 
level of education, work experience, exposure and world view helped articulate their 
grievances to the kinds of networks they have which enhanced the engagement and 
maintenance of nonviolence in their struggle. It would be recalled as mentioned earlier, that 
Birabi, often referred to as the father of modern Ogoni (Teniente, 2014), was the first Ogoni 
university graduate who, as a result of his exposure to western education in the United 
Kingdom laid the foundation to educational awareness and development within the Ogoni. 
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Prominent Ogoni leaders, such as Ken Saro-Wiwa gained international attention and 
recognition based on his disposition as a writer, publisher, environmentalist and human rights 
activist (MOSOP, 2004:1). Saro-Wiwa’s environmental and human rights quest provided him 
the opportunity to frame the Ogoni agenda within internationally recognised matters especially 
in the United Nations as the voice of the Ogoni, where he successfully entrenched the 
peculiarities faced by the Ogoni as a minority group in Nigeria. His exposure to the UN and 
such other international organisations as Green Peace armed him with the knowledge and 
understanding of nonviolence as the only acceptable language of presenting grievances 
internationally in order to be recognised. Saro-Wiwa was the main reason that the Ogoni 
mobilised effectively in spite of the internal divisions and challenges the movement faced. 
Saro-Wiwa embarked upon massive sensitisation campaigns on the importance of charting a 
nonviolence course for the Ogoni agenda if they wanted to succeed.  
 
Most of the subsequent Ogoni leaders have been graduates and some also hold postgraduate 
degrees, at times obtained at international universities. For instance, Benedict Bernard 
Benapena Naanen (Ben Naanen), graduated from the University of Nigeria Nsukka and had his 
postgraduate education in Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Ledum Anazor 
Mitee is a lawyer by training from the University of Nigeria Nsukka, while Owens M. Wiwa, 
a medical doctor graduated from the University Calabar Nigeria and subsequently acquired a 
Masters of Public Health (M.P.H.) degree in International Health and Development from Johns 
Hopkins University USA. Alubabari Desmond Nbete, Peter Nlorle Medee, Barrister Tom 
Jackson Orage and Legborsi Saro Pyagbara were also educated in Nigeria. Even though the 
Ogoni have been presented as a minority within a minority, this small group were able to 
acquire a diverse variety of educational advancement that served the development and 
positioning of the Ogoni agenda. This can be seen from Birabi’s expertise in mathematics, 
English by Saro-Wiwa in addition to economic history Naanen (Naanen cv and interview: 10 
February 2017); law Mitee (CV and Interview: 10 February 2017) and Orage (CV and 
Interview: 15 February 2017); social and political philosophy Nbete (Interview: 10 February 
2017); medicine Owens Wiwa (CV and Interview: 24 February 2017); and economics Medee 
(CV and Interview: 10 February 2017).  
 
These indicate the wide ranging educational capacity possessed by some of the Ogoni leaders 
which provided the enabling platform for critically assessing and articulating their specific 
problems. This relates to the ‘universalistic cultural capital’ which is the knowledge of the 
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ideals, empathies, cultural principles and political trends within the wider publics they aim to 
connect with (Nepstad and Bob, 2006:4). This means that they were conversant with new 
developments in international thinking which facilitated the understanding and acceptance of 
the norm of nonviolence preached by Saro-Wiwa, especially in the establishment of MOSOP 
and the development of the Ogoni Bill of Rights.  
 
Also, almost all the Ogoni leaders have professional jobs or have had high-ranking positions 
as civil servants. For example, Birabi was part of the Ogoni Native Authority as well as the 
Ogoni State Representation Assembly (Okonta, 2008:71). Saro-Wiwa had at various times 
served the Nigerian state both at the federal and local levels including as a director and head of 
research in MAMSER, the administrator for Bonny and was a Commissioner in the Rivers state 
cabinet in 1968. Furthermore, Naanen, is a member of the governing Council of the 
Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP) established by the Federal 
Government to clean up Ogoniland and other oil-impacted areas of Nigeria (CV and interview: 
10 February 2017). Mitee had at various times held positions in the government: he  was the 
chairman of the 2008 Niger Delta Technical Committee, chairman, Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and was a member of the National Political Reform 
Conference 2005, and the 2014 National Conference (CV and Interview: 10 February 201. 
Mitee is currently a member of the HYPREP Board of Trustees for the UNEP clean-up of 
Ogoniland while Orage has engaged with the government at various times as a Commissioner 
for health,  education, agriculture, housing and for special duties in Rivers State, and has been 
in practice as a barrister of law (CV and Interview: 15 February 2017). The argument here is 
not to insinuate that having leaderships with professional jobs or held certain high positions 
with the government makes a movement nonviolent. The intention is to demonstrate how these 
experiences and relationships facilitated engagements with the state. This indicates the Ogoni 
leaders such as Saro-Wiwa, Naanen and Mitee had links or at least access to state institutions 
and agencies and could conceive of engaging in a dialogue with them at various levels. 
 
The intellectual capacity of the Ogoni leadership becomes important as many have been 
academics and writers, starting from Saro-Wiwa who was especially noted for being a writer 
and publisher, has several publications to his credit, especially as they affect the Ogoni 
situation. His notable publications such as ‘The Ogoni Nationality Today and Tomorrow; 
Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy; A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary; and On a 
Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War serve as examples. Moreover, Naanen 
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who has been recognised as one of the intellectual vocal leaders of the Ogoni and a disciple of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, is a Professor of Economic History at the University of Port Harcourt, with 
an academic career that spans across Nigeria and Canada (Naanen CV and interview: 10 
February 2017). Nbete is a senior lecturer and scholar at the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers 
state Nigeria, and has engaged in research and consultancy in politics and governance, conflict 
management and development (Interview: 10 February 2017), Medee is also a senior lecturer 
at the same university. Even Orage was at various times a lecturer at the University of Nigeria 
Nsukka, College of Science and Technology, Rivers State and the Rivers State University of 
Science and Technology, Nigeria (CV and Interview: 15 February 2017). These individuals 
have great experience of both academic and non-academic publications as well as engagements 
with the larger community, which are central because they both clearly indicate that they had 
excellent communicative and media skills. Persuasive rhetorical abilities, media skills and 
strategic knowledge to recognise opportunities and overcome barriers in the political grounds 
where they operate are essential for movement leaders (Nepstad and Bob, 2006:4). 
 
Furthermore, many leaders held posts in international organisations, an opportunity that 
allowed them to establish international networks of communication and exchange. Saro-Wiwa, 
Naanen, Mitee, and Pyagbara, for instance had strong ties to the UN. Records show that from 
1993 to 1995, Saro-Wiwa was the vice chair of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) General Assembly, and was once the president of the Ethnic Minority 
Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF) (Okonta, 2008; Osha, 2007; Comfort, 2002). 
Likewise, Naanen, over the years, has engaged in consultancies with international 
organisations and institutions such as the Department for International Development (DFID), 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), International Institute 
of Social History, The Netherlands. Of particular significance is his participation in the UNPO 
working groups on Ethnicity, Racism and Indigenous People, World Council of Churches, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 1995-1996, which led to his becoming the Vice-President of UNPO 
1995-1997. He also was a delegate to the annual Sessions, UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, Geneva, and Switzerland 1994-1996 (CV and interview: 10 February 2017).  
 
Additionally, Ledum Mitee served also as a member of the United Nations International 
Campaign to mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998, 
and was President of the UNPO 2005-2010 (CV and Interview: 10 February 2017). Legborsi 
Pyagbara is also a representative of the Ogoni at UNPO under the umbrella of MOSOP, 
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member of the Board of trustees of the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous 
Populations and the African coordinator of the International Indigenous Peoples’ Movement 
for Self-Determination and Liberation (IPMSDL) (Interview with a Confidential source: 24 
February 2017). Owens Wiwa became the vice-Chairman Eastern Canada Chapter of Sierra 
Club and a member of the International Committee of Sierra Club, USA. Specifically, he 
internationally advocated for the Ogoni cause and in particular the release of Saro-Wiwa and 
eight others that were detained and later executed (CV and Interview: 24 February 2017).  
However, in terms of the class status of the Ogoni leaders, it is a mixture of low, middle and 
upper class. Both Ken, Owens and Orage are from a middle class family backgrounds. Naanen 
is from an educated family while Pyagbara, Nbete and Medee are all from low income families. 
A common characteristic within their social status is that they are all property owners, owing 
to the traditional African land ownership system linked to family backgrounds and inheritance. 
 
Having briefly presented the social status of some of the Ogoni leaders, what emerges is that 
the quality and level of exposure of these leaders enabled them with an international outlook 
in terms of addressing the Ogoni cause. It displayed a high degree of leadership capital within 
the Ogoni and shows that the leaders have been more aware of what is going on, in terms of 
the human rights and internal colonial discourses. They understood that they could tap into 
such international resources by refusing to merely be constrained by the local situation. Their 
backgrounds allowed them to build social networks both at local and international levels, in 
terms of the contacts they made in particular with the United Nations Agencies. The next 
section will present how the Ijaw leaders preached violence in comparison to the Ogoni 
leadership. 
 
4.4 Timing of the Ijaw Struggle  
 
An interesting characteristic of the Ijaw movement is its fluidity between violence and 
nonviolence. From the 1960s, it was a violent rebellion which was short lived under Boro, then 
from the l990s it manifested in a nonviolent manner similar to that of the Ogoni, additionally, 
in 2003-2004 the Ijaw struggle took a turn towards violence as will be seen in the emergence 
of more radical armed leaders such as Asari Dokubo. From 2009, an amnesty was granted to 
the armed groups, hence a period of relative peace up to 2016 which then saw the re-emergence 
of violence again in the region while the Ogoni movement has been clearly identified with an 
engaged leadership specifically in the person of Ken Saro-Wiwa and later on Ledum Mitee. 
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This suggests that getting an accurate analysis of the nature of leadership that exists within the 
Ijaw movement would be almost impossible in view of the fact that these perceived leaders 
were not as unified in the construction of the struggle. However, an attempt shall be made. This 
section will discuss the Ijaw first national struggle for self-determination, spearheaded in the 
1960s by the late Ijaw patriot Issac Jasper Adaka Boro. It will then present the fragmented 
nature of the Ijaw leadership and how the Ijaw movement has witnessed the swaying from 
violence to nonviolence and back to violence seen in the emergence of several leaders. It will 
highlight the lack of unity in the construction of the Ijaw agenda in comparison to the Ogoni, 
by showing that the youth leaders who constructed the Ijaw Kaiama Declaration are different 
from those that actually took up arms against the state.  
 
The Niger Delta region from 1999 to date has been described as a hot bed of violent militant, 
terrorist and insurgent activities (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009) where a number of protest 
movements and militia groups surfaced in reaction to the perceived nature of state violence on 
the inhabitants of the region. Like in the case of the Ogoni nonviolent struggle, much has been 
written about the violent aspects of the Niger Delta struggles. The Niger Delta according to 
Akinwale (2009:192), has gradually become famed due to massive oil deposits and recurring 
episodes of violence. Ukiwo (2007:597), argues that insurgency is the outcome of established 
experiences of the political and socio-cultural relegation of youths in the Niger Delta, as a result 
of which militant groups emerged in the region. The start of pan-ethnic political identity, 
however, was gradually introduced in the early 1930s and 1940s in the course of an increasing 
struggle for influence and resources within the colonial administrative centre of Port Harcourt. 
Consequently, Ijaw, Igbo and other Delta migrants engaged in competition for jobs, political 
influence and land (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009:52).  
 
4.4.1 Ijaw Leadership Early 1960s (Isaac Adaka Boro) 
 
The Ijaw struggle, similarly to the Ogoni movement was initiated as far back as the 1960s. The 
Ijaw national struggle for self-determination was one of the early notable violent rebellions in 
the Niger Delta against the state, this was a struggle spearheaded in the 1960s by the late Ijaw 
patriots, Issac Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru and Nottingham Dick (Osha, 2006;  Watts, 2003) 
from the Kaiama community in Rivers state, under the group known as Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF), in what has been called a 12-day revolution. Adaka Boro’s ascension to Ijaw 
leadership was based on the premise that a fairer share of the oil revenues were the rights of 
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the Ijaw ethnic group. This idea came from the conviction that a majority of the Ijaw youths, 
frustrated with the general neglect, were ready for any action that would liberate the Ijaw from 
the central Nigerian state (May30, 2016:33). Boro’s primary intention was to create an 
independent state of the Niger Delta that aimed at solving the human and infrastructural 
developmental and infrastructural challenges faced by the Ijaw (Omotola, 2006). The Boro 
rebellion represented the peak of the injustice, political frustration and suffocation that the Ijaw 
suffered in an independent Nigeria (ibid). Darah (1995), points out that it was provoked by 
noticeable state of neglect, environmental degradation, poverty and the loss of the source 
livelihood.  Boro expressed his frustration over these by stating that: 
 
My sharp sensibility to injustice in my fellow creatures made matters worse and 
only aggravated my resolve to right all wrongs that lie within my reach (Boro, 
1982:31). 
 
To secede from the Nigerian state he declared the Niger Delta Republic on 23 February 1966  
(Darah, 1995; Mukoro, 2010). This historical incident took place a few weeks after young 
Nigerian army officers overthrew in a bloody coup the first post-independence government in 
1966. Boro was noted to have made several complaints before the uprising that marked the 
start of an epoch of insurgency and militia activities in the Niger Delta. Boro demonstrated to 
the world exactly how the region felt about their perceived oppression by the state by 
proclaiming that: 
 
Today is a great day not only in your lives but in the history of the Niger Delta. 
Perhaps, it will be the greatest day for a very long time. This is not because we are 
going to bring the heavens down, but because we are going to demonstrate to the 
world what and how we feel about oppression…. Remember your 70 year old 
grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty stricken 
people; remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your 
veins; and then fight for your freedom  (Agbo, 2007). 
 
With these brave words, the NDVF sailed into the creeks and took over several facilities 
belonging to Shell (Darah, 1995). Boro’s actions clearly demonstrate violence, the open call to 
arms as the best way to challenge the state has been evidenced in all his statements. This stands 
in clear opposition to the Ogoni movement under Birabi in that the Ogoni leadership were more 
concerned with educating and sensitising their people as against a call to arms recorded during 
the time of Boro. Under Boro, the preaching was clearly violent; he did not shy away from 
what he specifically intended to do, which was to secede from the state through the use of force.  
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However, the rebellion was crushed by the state on 7 March 1966 after 12 days of fighting, and 
Boro and his counterparts were subsequently captured, tried for treason and sentenced to death. 
The death sentences were not carried out on the trio who were later granted amnesty by the 
military government led by General Yakubu Gowon, after they opted to join the army and fight 
on the side of the state against the Igbo18. This came as a result of the urgent support the state 
needed from the Niger Delta region in order to fight the Biafran war. Additionally, Boro 
claimed that the killing of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa19, whom he described as the 
‘protector’ of all Ijaws, and the installation of Major General Aguyi-Ironsi20, an Igbo officer, 
convinced him that: 
 
The day had dawned on the Niger Delta, revolution is the only way out for the Ijaw 
otherwise we would throw ourselves into perpetual slavery (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 
2009:57; Boro, 1982:94).   
 
This fits in with Darah's (1995:1) assertion that, notwithstanding Boro’s early death in 1968, 
his revolutionary initiative became a model for struggles on national resistance against 
perceived oppression and exploitation by the state and multinational oil companies. 
Subsequently, all the militia groups that were formed by the Ijaw paid allegiance to the Boro 
rebellion. Even though the strategies may have changed noticeably, the demands have 
remained basically the same in the last 40 years in terms of the recognition of the ecological 
devastation by oil exploitation and the inadequate compensation and development of the oil-
bearing communities (Watts, 2003). The ill-fated Delta Peoples Republic was the front runner 
of what is today a prairie fire of ethnic mobilisation by the historically excluded indigenous 
minorities (ibid). Adaka Boro emerged as a political figure determined to lead the region out 
of the terrible situation of neglect they found themselves in. This suggests that calling the 
attention of the world to the uncomfortable situation of the Ijaw through violence, meant 
success in the perspective of Boro. After Boro’s death, no significant struggle was recorded 
within Ijawland until the Kaiama Declaration was issued in 1999. The next section will discuss 
the Ijaw struggle from the 1990s in order to assess if the Ijaw leaders preached violence in 
comparison to the nonviolent preaching of the Ogoni leaders.  
 
 
                                                          
18 One of the largest ethnic groups located in the south-eastern region of the Nigerian state. 
19 Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first Prime Minister of Nigeria 1 October 1960-15 January 1996. 
20 Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguyi-Ironsi, second Nigerian Head of State 16 January-29 July 
1966. 
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4.4.2 Ijaw leadership since the 1990s 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, Boro’s ‘ground-breaking credentials, soldierly dexterity 
and standpoint’ (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009:56) made him a strategic point of reference as well as 
a gallant figure for present-day Ijaw nationalists who claim to be defenders of resource control.  
Years of oil stimulated community rebellion in the region encouraged and enhanced the 
development of an extensive pan-Ijaw ethno-nationalist consciousness amid a group of people, 
communicating in some variations of six interconnected languages (Ibid:51). The late 1990s 
Ijaw movement witnessed the emergence of some moderate youth leaders in the persons of 
Oronto Douglas, Felix Tuodolo, Isaac Osuoka, Patterson Ogon, and T.K. Ogoriba, and the list 
is inconclusive, who were more concerned with the development of the region. This group of 
leaders is made up of those who are genuinely concerned with the goal of a truly developed 
Niger Delta, who are neither militants nor insurgents, but predominantly enlightened citizens 
and members of the intelligentsia which includes enlightened traditional institutions (Afinotan 
and Ojakorotu, 2009). These are the youth leaders who constructed the Kaiama Declaration as 
a form of demands to the state, and they did not take up arms. Discussing the rise of youth 
leadership in the Niger Delta would be incomplete without first understanding what constitutes 
youth in the Niger Delta. Generally in Africa, youth is a grouping of early adulthood, interested 
in and connected to the social order (Durham, 2000). Young people are at the heart of struggles 
and agitations in Africa (Ugor, 2013). According to Ikelegbe, the specific classification of 
youth in the Niger Delta is situational and culture specific, a good percentage of the population 
is within the ages of 15-35 (Osaghae et al., 2007:3), which, Osuoka linked to:  
 
The influence of traditional society in having gerontocracy as the system of rule. 
The elders in villages are believed to have knowledge, they are the ones who are in 
charge, and so power became conflated with age. If you are a youth, it means that 
you are not allowed to participate at that level of decision making, but over time 
those who became influential and were in power with government, and with the 
introduction of the state are not necessarily old people (Interview: 31 July 2015).  
 
As a social category, the youth develop certain awareness, behaviour patterns and value 
systems (Osaghae et al., 2007), but within the Niger Delta context in particular, this 
development is quite problematic. According to Osuoka,  
 
People that are 60 now call themselves youth. From the 90s those who tended to 
define themselves as youth were people who have the perception of being 
marginalized in society, and youth became the appellation for those who do not 
have access to power, at the same time looking for a space for expression and 
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participation. There was opposition to military dictatorship, different organisations 
emerged that defined themselves as youth. (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
In the Ogoni context as clarified by Saro-Wiwa, the term youth is used to define people below 
the age of 40 (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a:71). As Ikelegbe observes, these youths fight for existence, 
collective identity and inclusion, in view of the challenges which determine how the youths as 
a social group correlate to the environment within which they exist (Ikelegbe, 2006:3). In a 
research project on the Niger Delta, Olofinmoyin (1998) argues that the agitations in the region 
were typified with an increase in the development of militant youth groups such as the Ijaw 
Youth Congress, Itsekiri Youth Wing and Egbesu Militant Youths. This upsurge is the result 
of the awareness and defiance of the oil resource producing communities, specifically the Ijaw, 
to the environmental damage which sometimes occasioned physical resistance (ibid). In 
addition, Ijaw youths formed several armed militia groups with different leaderships that 
unleashed severe terror both on the Nigerian state and people of the region.  
 
In almost all the agitations and protests, Ijaw youths are at the frontline of the activities which 
ranged from nonviolence to violence perpetrated by some of the leaders. Some engaged in other 
activities that include lawlessness, piracy and blackmail which have been perceived as threats 
to the Nigerian national security. Alabi (2014:21), opines, however, that these militia groups 
concentrated on perceived dissatisfactions and resentments of a particular ethnic group as a 
cover for their pan-Niger Delta demands. On the other hand, Mukoro (2010:82), described 
them not as militants but as civil movements, with membership mainly from the Ijaw 
nationality, which heralded the development of the Kaiama Declaration, and the formation of 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (see Chapter Five). Which 
serves as the military arm of the Ijaw National Congress (INC) (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 
2009:192). 
 
As mentioned earlier, 2003 and 2004 saw the emergence of some of the notable radical militant 
leaders including Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo)21, Asari Dokubo22, Ateke Tom23, Farah 
Dagogo24, Oboko Bello25, Boyloaf26 and several others. The organisation of these groups will 
                                                          
21 Ex-militant, and a hero of the struggle for the emancipation and development of the Niger Delta. 
22 A prominent ex-militant and leader of FNDIC 
23 Leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante.  
24 One time MEND Commander in Rivers state 
25 President of the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) 
26 His real name is Ebikabowei Victor Ben, an ex-militant leader. 
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be discussed in the next chapter. By contrast, in the Ogoni struggle there is no record of armed 
militant leaders like those seen in the Ijaw movement, which further reaffirms the justification 
on the choice of nonviolence for the Ogoni. This second dimension of leadership links to the 
several groups of criminal cult gangs created and financed by political godfathers for the 
purpose of threatening and intimidating political opponents, kidnapping for ransom, and crude 
oil theft (ibid). In a similar attestation to the differing groups of leaders in the region, Benaebi 
Benatari, a member of the Ijaw nation27 classified the militant leaders into three groups:  
 
We have genuine leaders concerned with the freedom of the Ijaw in the Niger Delta, 
some are armed while others are intellectual. Some were into oil bunkering to fund 
the armed struggle. We have leader by day and political thug by night, those who 
are into armed struggle but rent out their services to politicians to achieve power. 
Then we have leader by day and criminal by night, those who are in the armed 
struggle, but commit the odd crime on the side to strike it rich and maybe fund the 
armed struggle (Benatari, 2010). 
 
This indicates that not all the leaders in the region are fighting an Ijaw cause or have the genuine 
interest of the Niger Delta in their activities, which suggests that some of the leaders, especially 
those that became active in the 2000s in the region, acted because of financial benefits; 
particularly those armed by local politicians to rig elections in their favour, scare and intimidate 
voters. Furthermore, Alabi (2014:8-10), classified the Ijaw leaders into two groups, (i) 
individuals and (ii) organizations such as MEND, FNDIC, NDV that have reasons for taking 
up arms against the state. According to Omotola (2009:137), taking up arms in a violent 
confrontation may not have been the actual intention of the militia leaders’ but for the 
inattentiveness to their agitations, the violent option may not have happened. This dimension 
was attested to in a newspaper statement by the then Governor Uduaghan of Delta State, who 
disclosed that 
  
The genuine and true struggle for economic and social emancipation of the Niger 
Delta is yet to take a direction with the importance of fighting the cause of the region 
on the basis of ethnic nationality, where all would be included and not on tribal 
differences. Including the absence of a leadership with a representative profile, 
collectively put together by the nationalities in the region (Uduaghan, 2008:193). 
 
This suggests that the representative profile discussed by Uduaghan relates to a militant group 
that will fight the cause of the region as one Niger Delta, not an Ogoni or Ijaw struggle, but 
                                                          
 
27 An Ijaw intellectual group in the Niger Delta. 
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one that will have the other ethnic groups in the region represented. The classification of leaders 
into different categories brings to question the actual motive behind the Ijaw armed struggle, 
which fits into Demirel-Pegg and Pegg's (2015:660), assertion that using greed and the desire 
for personal enrichment as the major reason for the escalation of the Niger Delta conflict is too 
simplistic. They presented a more compelling perspective in terms of the perceived failure of 
the nonviolent methods of collective actions, such as that employed by the Ogoni, as the key 
factors responsible for the violence. Collier et al., (2001:1), point out that uprisings are mainly 
caused by severe injustices such as extreme inequity, lack of political space and discriminations 
in society. What led to Asari Dokubo reiterating that, 
 
The struggle is unstoppable, we must avoid falling into the throes of what Adaka 
Boro foresaw forty years ago. Let them call us terrorists….bandits. It is important 
and critical that we remain as resolute in the pursuit of the ideals of our fallen heroes 
like Isaac Adaka Boro and Ken Saro-Wiwa (Dokubo, 2009). 
 
Ukiwo (2007) counters the inclusion of greed as part of the causal factors of the militancy in 
the region, arguing that if greed is the key cause of violent conflicts, then leaders of all the 
ethnic groups in the oil-bearing region would have taken up arms against the state and the 
multinational companies. It would be recalled that the Ogoni based on their own experiences, 
channelled their grievances using nonviolent direct action, but the simple fact that it is the Ijaw 
in the region that have taken up violent group mobilization alludes that violent disputes arise 
from the particular group experiences of ‘state power and inter-group relations’, rather than 
simply opportunities to loot resources (Ibid). This indicates the unpredictable nature of the 
Niger Delta conflicts because, if the Ogoni being faced with similar oil related predicaments 
did not employ violence against the state, why then did the Ijaw take up arms?   
 
4.5 Outlook of the Leaders: From Nonviolence to Violence (1999-Present) 
 
This section will show that although the Ijaw struggle from the 1960s started off with violence 
and then changed to nonviolence in an attempt to mirror the Ogoni outlook, the fragmented 
and fluid nature of the Ijaw leadership led to the transformation of the conflict in the region 
from a nonviolent community protest to a full blown violent insurgency. According to Wills,  
 
A dialogue ensued among those who were leading this movement that we’ve made 
nonviolent efforts, and you see the response. How can we continue to follow this 
nonviolent method? Some sections of the group decided that the more effective way 
to deal with these issues is to go violent, but there were some who decided to stay 
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the course of nonviolence. December 1998 into January 1999, was really the turning 
point from nonviolent intellectual political agitation to partly violent struggle 
(Interview: 29 July 2015). 
 
This seems to show some thoughtful considerations made within the Ijaw intellectual 
leadership in terms of how to best address the situation they found themselves in, in relation to 
the state’s actions. This indicates the juxtaposing of nonviolence versus violence before the 
violent option was adopted. These suggest the classical situation of those who make peaceful 
change impossible make violent change inevitable, as exemplified in the history of South 
Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) became involved in the struggle against 
apartheid through peaceful methods until the 1961 Sharpeville massacre that led to the 
establishment of the armed wing of the ANC Umkhonto we Sizwe28. The transformation of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta from the Ogoni nonviolent community protest to violent insurgency 
is a strategic factor to consider in order to fully understand the fluid nature and dynamics of 
the issues. According to Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015), while moderates spearhead the 
struggle toward more established forms of collective action such as strikes and demonstrations, 
smaller and newer groups become uncompromising because they engage in fierce strategies in 
a bid to make a clear distinction between themselves and the moderates. In support of this, 
Ogon highlights in an interview that: 
 
The preaching’s were on fundamental issues, because there were internal divisions, 
communities were in court, it was more or less to  resolve internal disputes and to 
say that you don’t have any need to fight amongst yourselves while people are 
drilling your oil and taking your resources away. Why don’t you come together and 
fight the common enemy (Interview: 30 July 2015). 
 
These indicate clearly that the moderate leaders were concerned with ways in which their 
internal and external issues and problems could be resolved through nonviolence while, the 
radical Ijaw leaders show openly that the adoption of violence is the only solution to solving 
the Ijaw problems. Media interviews with some of the militant leaders such as Boyloaf revealed 
that,  
 
We had to change our way since our rights are not given to us. Violence is the only 
way we can use to tackle the Nigerian state because they understand it better than 
us. We blow up stations because that is the source of government money. The best 
way to tackle government is to destroy these instalments before we go one on one 
(Vanguard News Paper, 2008). 
                                                          
28 Zulu word for Spear of the Nation. 
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Supporting this confrontational stance taken, Azazi revealed that,    
 
We were angry and tired, we didn’t look back, let them give us what belongs to us 
(Interview: 10 August 2015) 
 
These quotes underscore the assertion that violent confrontations have actually been the last 
resort of the civil groups, embarked upon because of the perceived failure of peaceful methods 
(Ikelegbe, 2001:459). This supports one of the arguments raised by this study that the nature 
of state response to the conflicts in the Niger Delta exacerbates rather than solves the conflicts.  
In a media interview, Tompolo revealed that,  
 
If the joint military task force had not woken up the sleeping lion the violence would 
have been avoided. But they attack us and i have promise them that i must revenge 
since they attacked my boys and people. We will succeed, kill them and burn down 
the place (The Punch, 2008). 
 
In the same vein, Ateke Tom adds that: 
  
We have already crossed our minds long time ago, we are ready to face anything 
that comes our way because we have the Egbesu God of war behind us. He is not 
afraid of anybody. The oil companies are on our land and it is our business to get 
rid of them, what we want is our land (The Guardian News Paper, 2008). 
 
According to Omotola (2009:137), the IYC, through its militant section known as the Egbesu 
Boys of Africa, became violent. At the forefront of the Ijaw confrontational activities was the 
Supreme Egbesu Boys that gained public attention during the military onslaught that followed 
the Kaiama Declaration. In this, there grew a perception that its members were purportedly 
protected by the Ijaw Egbesu deity and were invisible to bullets (Ukiwo, 2007:602). In support 
of this assertion, Alamieyeseigha recounts that, 
There was one type of movement, a deity that became so prominent, they call it 
Egbesu, ordinarily if you see them, you may not regard them as anything, but just 
a white cloth they tie as arm band. They became more or less invisible to bullets in 
reality, when the army will engage them and they will be moving towards them, the 
army will drop their guns and run. They could enter a place chained with big 
padlocks, by pointing at that particular padlock, the padlock and the big chains will 
just cut, the place will open, so that emboldened them, they became so fearless in 
their operations (Interview: 5 August 2015).   
He adds that,  
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Bayelsa state was near ungovernable, by 4 pm in the evening you can’t walk on the 
streets of Yenagoa the state capital for fear of Egbesu, rascality, kidnapping,  
miming of people, rape, all types of acts were going on (Ibid). 
 
The military onslaught referred to by Ukiwo (2007), occurred in the town of Odi after the 
Kaiama Declaration, which Elaigwu points to as the killing of policemen in Odi (Elaigwu, 
2014). In almost all the disturbances, youths formed the vanguard of the violence perpetrated. 
It is important to bring in the Odi incident that happened in November 1999, which some of 
the interviewees make reference to. The News (1999), reported of an attack on a team of seven 
policemen including a deputy commissioner, dispatched to Odi on a fact-finding mission, in an 
effort to re-open the police office that was previously burnt by the militants as a result of a 
violent clash with the police. The militants, who later requested a ransom in exchange for the 
policemen, abducted the team upon their arrival at Odi (Ojo, 2009; The News, 1999). The 
demand was initially turned down by the state but was eventually accepted after three days of 
negotiations. Unbeknownst to the negotiators, however, the policemen had been killed a few 
hours after they were abducted. Three soldiers traveling from Warri to Port Harcourt were also 
abducted and killed in Odi by the militants (ibid). According to Ojo (2009), a two-week 
ultimatum was given by the Nigerian state to the then governor to either bring out the killers 
and restore peace to the area or face the imposition of a state of emergency. This ultimatum 
generated a lot of controversy in the state as it became too difficult to be carried out (The News, 
1999).   
Shortly after these incidents, during the biggest internal military operation ever witnessed in 
the region, armed soldiers destroyed the entire village of Odi in the restive Niger Delta, igniting 
local and international condemnation for the then President Olusegun Obasanjo. More than 50 
army trucks and over 3,000 soldiers pushed through paths and forests into the heart of 
Kolokuma/Opokuma29. This deployment of soldiers within the Ijaw quarters was seen as the 
execution of the threat by the Nigerian state during which over 95% of the Odi population were 
displaced by the invasion (OMCT and CLEEN, 2002). Forty-eight hours after the attack, the 
rural town of Odi was completely levelled; only a church and a First Bank30 building survived 
the operation. Of the estimated 60,000 inhabitants, only 13 frail looking old women and eight 
children were seen, looking empty and dejected, with neither good meals nor medical attention 
                                                          
29 A local government area located in Kaiama, Bayelsa state. 
30 Literally the first bank established in 1894 in Nigeria. 
 159 
(The Punch Newspaper, 1999). The armed forces spent fourteen days in Odi, leaving behind 
raped women and a death toll of over 2,000 people including women and children of varying 
ages ranging from four to eighty-six (HRW, 1999; OMCT and CLEEN, 2002; Omotola, 2009; 
The News, 1999). Violations of right to life and associated civil and political rights were 
displayed openly (OMCT and CLEEN, 2002).  The Human Rights Watch Report stresses that 
these operations indicated a disturbing willingness by the new civilian government to use the 
same methods as the military governments of the past (1999).  
These seem to suggest that the Odi massacre in 1999 marked the most alarming state excesses 
recorded. It is possible to argue that these excesses could perhaps be noted as the actual trigger 
to the Ijaw violence. Such repressive and coercive actions by the state targeted at the militants 
(Omotola, 2009) pushed for the ensuing violence in the Niger Delta. 
 
To Ukiwo, the Egbesu were recognized for the possession of power and protection within the 
Ijaw and specifically targeted at the interests and instruments of the state. Even Asari Dokubo, 
one of the notable Ijaw militant leader of the NDPVF, stated openly that:  
 
We are talking about blood oil. Ken Saro-Wiwa and others were murdered for our 
oil. Anybody who takes our oil is an enemy. The only way they can contribute is to 
leave. As long as they continue to back the occupation by the Nigerian government, 
these multinational oil companies are enemy combatants and if they are caught in the 
line of fire, they will be killed. They will not be speared (Alabrah, 2010:1).  
 
Accordingly, this corresponds with Omotola's (2009:137), observation that the escalation of 
ethnic militias is simultaneous with the rise and snowballing radicalisation of ethnically 
founded leadership groups in the Niger Delta, whose fundamentals appear mainly violent. For 
instance, Dokubo preached open violence and even outlined that,  
 
 The views of the NDPVF are very clear. We are going back to armed struggle and 
anybody who is caught in the line of fire will be treated as an enemy combatant, 
whether an American or Dutch. Nobody can enslave and cause me pain in my land, 
destroy my land and continue to ask me to accept peace with my hands behind my 
back, with a gun pointed at my head. I will never accept that peace. I will fight until 
I get victory and place freedom on the palms of my people or I die (Alabrah, 
2010:10).  
 
Asari Dokubo’s leadership style, for example, becomes more of direct confrontation after him 
having left the IYC where he was the president in 2003 to set up his NDPVF. In an attempt to 
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justify the leadership status of Asari, the 2004 NDPVF handbill came up with the aims and 
objectives of ‘the fundamentals of justice and equality, truth, conscience, logic and facts, love 
for humanity as well as sanctity of life’ (Etemike, 2009:159) as key to being an Ijaw leader. 
Asari came up gallantly, and protested against what he perceived as the Nigerian government’s 
lack of concern about the area in spite of the fact that more than 80% of the state’s revenues 
derived from there, and the concomitant adverse effects on the livelihood of the people due to 
the large scale petroleum production activities (ibid). Asari concluded that if the people of the 
Niger Delta do not take up arms and fight the federal government, they would remain poor and 
become poorer in future. As a founding member of the Ijaw Youth Council in 1998, Asari 
started off as a vice president, but his committed stamina and leadership abilities facilitated his 
assumption of leadership as president in 2001. During his term, he engaged in the quest for 
resource control and self-determination (Clark, 2009). He challenged the central Nigerian state, 
determined to emancipate the Ijaw from state oppression by taking control of their destiny. 
Taking advantage of the poverty and prolonged oil exploitation grievances, Asari found a 
willing group of youth ready to engage in a realm of violence, bombs and bullets and thus 
became a significant influence within his community.   
He adopted a strong propaganda war that appealed to the opinions and backing of many in the 
region, in particular, his declared political ideology was one of advancing Ijaw rights through 
commanding control over the god given resources (Hazen, 2010:89). Dokubo’s ability to depict 
himself as a victim and the NDPVF as the solution to the Ijaw’s problems fitted strategically 
into the prevalent local grievance (Ibid: 90), indicating that the formation of the NDPVF 
exhibited an obvious refutation of nonviolent political movements in the Delta. The same 
stance is reiterated in an interview with confidential source 4, who points out that  
 
We know when it is time to change our tactics, why should we remain peaceful, when 
government has forgotten about Ijaw suffering? Whose mandate is it to tell the Ijaw 
people to remain calm when all they can see is suffering? We have to reclaim what 
is rightfully ours with our strength not with words but with our military style 
(Interview: 3 August 2015).  
 
These quotes seem to suggest that with the coming up of various militant leaderships within 
the Ijaw axis, the preaching’s were clearly confrontational and the quotes show that the voices 
and actions of the radical leaders such as Asari Dokubo and Tompolo were louder than the 
moderate leaders, because their groups were formed with a defined intention of violence. These 
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have further demonstrated the two-fold nature of leaders that exist within the Ijaw group and 
show how they turn to violence as the preferred method of engagement. They correspond with 
Idemudia’s (2009:319), observation that the concentration on violence witnessed in the area is 
the consequence of the opportunistic atmosphere for violence that emerged out of the 
multifaceted interface of need, creed and greed. The escalation of violence in Ijawland attracted 
several criticisms and much condemnation from some of the moderate leaders, who displayed 
their opposition to the violence perpetrated in the region. For instance, Sobomabo Jackrich, the 
leader of the Kalabari Unity Forum who was at one time part of the agitators, and Alabo Charles 
Harry, the president of the Ijaw National Congress explained that the negative and violent 
approach utilised by the latest crop of violence in the region not only inflicts severe aftereffects 
on the socieconomic lives of the people but also creates indescribable environmental risks that 
would result in destructive effects on the peoples’ well-being and health (Hart, 2016). Jackrich 
emphasised that,  
 
I am against agitation centred on violence and destruction, I believe in the 
nonviolent approach. I have continued to preach against violent agitation, even after 
accepting amnesty I have been deeply committed to advocacy for nonviolence and 
have taken my campaign to the youths (ibid). 
 
In the same vein, the new President of the INC reiterated that: 
 
The time is rife for us to jointly and responsibly take our destiny in our own hands, 
and to however, embrace nonviolence agitation. We know Niger Deltans are 
aggrieved and are justified to agitate against injustice and marginalization but we 
must do it in the most nonviolent manner to attract global attention and intervention, 
this is the path INC has chosen (ibid). 
 
This shows that nonviolent leaders argue that violence aggravated the problems faced by the 
people in the region because, as argued by Jackrich, the greatest resources of the Ijaw’s have 
been wasted, which are the Ijaw youth this becomes more of a disadvantage for us (ibid). The 
next section will present the social status of the intellectual and the militant Ijaw leaders. 
 
4.6 Social Status of the Leaders 
 
This section will discuss the similarities and differences between the social status of the Ijaw 
leaders and that of the Ogoni. It will specifically focus on how the function of group agency 
stands out within the dual nature of Ijaw leadership, suggesting the presence of two distinct 
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group of leaders. The point of interest here is that within the Ijaw leadership, we have an early 
leadership preaching violence, then we have a kind of leadership in the 1990s that were trying 
to follow the Ogoni style because they could see that the Ogoni seemed to be obtaining so much 
international support and therefore considered this a strategy that seemed to be working. But 
Ken Saro-Wiwa’s execution coupled with a change of leaders gave them a reason to go towards 
violence, linking up to the very early violent leadership of Adaka Boro. 
 
Therefore, on the one hand is a leadership that attempted to explore the benefits of these 
conditions and on the other, one that was unable to make the best out of the conditions (Nepstad 
and Bob, 2006:4) due to differences in social status. These distinctions will show what degree 
of leadership capital the Ijaw provide in comparison to the Ogoni, and how the leadership were 
similar to the Ogoni in terms of the engagement with nonviolence based on the education and 
work experience that influenced leaders’ social an international networks and, that had put 
them in contact with policy makers within Nigeria and internationally. The section will then 
focus on the social status of the new, more radical Ijaw youth leaders which emerged much 
later, from the 2000s, who were relatively uneducated, and even drop outs, to indicate that 
nonviolence was not what interested them, rather, that they were perhaps much more linked to 
the local people. These leaders will be approached in two parts, the first being of the intellectual 
youth leaders and the second in terms of the armed militant Ijaw leaders, with a view to better 
understand the adoption of a moderate stance on the part of the former as opposed to the violent 
stance adopted by the latter. The intention here is not to present the educated as essentially 
nonviolent, rather, it is to show how the less educated are much more tied to the local situation 
and probably more likely to express their feelings of rage, frustration and strong discontent 
through a much more radical representation of the local demands. It will thus be highlighted 
that as a result of the less external contacts, they had very limited social networks, to be able 
to tap into international movements and discourses like the Ogoni.  
 
Similarly to the Ogoni movement, the 1990s Ijaw agitation started on a very intellectual note 
organised by Ijaw personalities who were also graduates of local and international universities. 
Patterson Ogon for example, graduated at the postgraduate level from the University of Port 
Harcourt in Nigeria with a Noose Foundation Fellowship of the University of California 
Berkley. Isaac Asume Osuoka graduated from the University of Calabar and obtained 
postgraduate education from Nigeria and Canada, while Timi Keiser-Wilhelm Ogoriba had all 
his education in Nigeria. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha popularly referred to as the 
 163 
‘Governor General of Ijaw Nation’ graduated from the Nigerian Defence Academy, also, Iniruo 
Wills graduated from the Rivers State University of Science & Technology, Nigeria.  
 
The wide ranging educational capacity of the Ijaw leaders is similar to that of the Ogoni in the 
areas of political science studied by Ogon (Interview: 28 January 2017), social and political 
philosophy as well as environmental studies by Osuoka (CV and Interview 16 February 2017); 
chemistry by Ogoriba; law by Wills (interview and cv, 11 February, 2017); and also defence 
and logistics by Alamieyeseigha (Interview with Ben Tantua, February 9 2017). Just as in the 
Ogoni case, possession of such varieties of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991) enabled them to 
identify and put together the major issues affecting the Ijaw, indicating the awareness of 
strategic international trends within which they could situate their issues along a nonviolent 
disposition demonstrated in the establishment of the Ijaw Youth Council and the presentation 
of the Kaiama Declaration. Therefore, up to this point there is no major difference within the 
Ogoni and Ijaw leaderships in terms of possessing the knowledge and understanding of issues 
affecting their region. It is important, however, to restate that the inclusion of education is not 
about them being more educated; education is indicative of the wider social networks bearing 
in mind the fact that they themselves have got the hard side of the issues, having shared similar 
lived experiences. 
 
As seen in the Ogoni leadership, some of the Ijaw leaders are professionals in their own rights 
and have important positions although not mainly in the civil service. Ogoriba for instance, has 
been a teacher and was part of the Federal Government - Ijaw Representatives Joint Committee 
in 2007 which negotiated the truce and amnesty deal granted to the Ijaw militants (Interview: 
13 February 2017). Wills has worked within the public sector and has served at various times 
as a Commissioner for environment; information and culture, as a Special Adviser to the 
Governor on environment for the Bayelsa State government. He was also the Special Assistant 
to the Managing Director in the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (Interview 
and CV, 11 February, 2017). Osuoka has been mainly involved in environmental and civil 
society issues in nongovernmental organisations with Oilwatch Africa and Oilwatch 
International, a program manager, energy, mining and climate change in Environmental Rights 
Action (ERA) and Friends of the Earth in Nigeria, and currently with the Social Development 
Integrated Centre (Social Action) Nigeria where he currently is the Executive Director (CV 
and Interview 16 February 2017). Alamieyeseigha was a retired Squadron Leader of the 
Nigerian Airforce and onetime governor of Bayelsa state, while Ogon also engages in the civil 
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society and activism for the Niger Delta cause (Interview 28 January 2017). It goes without 
saying that the Ijaw leadership in the 1990s comprised of specialists that had the capacity and 
that also attempted to address their grievances through dialogue and who aimed at peacefully 
resolving some of these issues.  
 
In addition to the related educational and professional capacity, the intellectual ability of the 
Ijaw leadership, although not comprised of several academics as seen in the Ogoni case, serves 
as another interesting angle within which to examine the social standing of the group and its 
impact on central and common concerns. Osuoka, Ogoriba and Ogon, while in the university, 
have been active members of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), in fact 
Osuoka, was part of the National Executive Council of NANS (CV and Interview 16 February 
2017), who later decided to mobilise the local Ijaw youth that were more impoverished than 
themselves (Nwajiaku, 2005:9). An important characteristic of the Ijaw youth leaders is their 
engagement in student union activism while at university. Ukiwo maintains that some of these 
former Ijaw student union activists embarked upon the formation of various pan-ethnic youth 
organizations, notably the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), 
the Movement for the Reparations to Ogbia (MORETO), and the IYC which was conceived as 
the umbrella organization of Ijaw youth associations at the grassroots level. The IYC is similar 
to the Ogoni MOSOP, but the latter significantly did not stop at the Ogoni youth association, 
rather it encompassed women, professionals, traditional councils as well as church groups 
which also included elders. Moreover, just as MOSOP spoke for the Ogoni, the IYC was also 
advocating for the Ijaw youth associations in the region (Ukiwo, 2007:601).  
 
In terms of communication and connections to international networks, while the Ogoni are able 
to demonstrate strong ties to international organizations such as the UN, the same cannot be 
said in terms of the interaction from the intellectual moderate Ijaw leaders, even though they 
were able to link up with some institutions. Ogon, for instance, has been in contact on oil related 
issues with several international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International on behalf of the Ijaw, and with notable international personalities such as former 
President Jimmy Carter as discussed in the previous chapter. These interactions paved the way 
for the founding of the Ijaw Council for Human Rights, which championed the campaign and 
defence of violations of human rights of individuals and communities especially within the 
Ijaw areas of the Delta (Interview 28 January 2017). Osuoka has also been the co-Coordinator 
and Chair of the Steering Committee of the Gulf of Guinea Citizens Network, which is an 
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international advocacy initiative by civil society actors for effective enforcement of standards 
of legal, political, and social responsibility in natural resources exploitation, management, and 
accounting in the countries along the West African Gulf of Guinea (CV and Interview 16 
February 2017). Oronto Douglas has also been noted to have engaged actively with some 
institutions in Canada as well as with the European Union officials that even saw a visit to the 
region by some members of the Italian parliament to the Niger Delta (Ogon Interview: 31 
January 2017).  
 
Iniruo Wills’s commitment with the World Legal Systems and Contracts for Oil and Gas 
Associated London, United Kingdom also served as channels within which the Ijaw interacted 
and built networks and contacts internationally. These indicate that the Ijaw youth leadership 
were also equipped with the necessary skills with which they could easily express and 
communicate with the wider international community both orally and in writing. Here the 
similarity between the leaders is clear in terms of the understanding that the contacts you can 
make relates to the kind of discourse you can promote to engage with and gain international 
recognition, and goes further to highlight the differences in terms of leadership capital with 
that of the Ogoni being evidently higher. Meanwhile, in terms of family background and class 
status, Iniruo Wills and D.S.P Alamieyeseigha come from a middle income background, while 
Osuoka, Ogon and Ogoriba can be said to be from low income families (Interview with Ben 
Tantua, February 9 2017).  
 
As argued earlier in the chapter, the second group of Ijaw leadership is such that was highly 
deficient in leadership capital and was therefore incapable of making effective use of their 
conditions (Nepstad and Bob, 2006:4) due to differences in social status. Comparing the radical 
leaders to the moderate Ijaw and even the Ogoni will be very difficult because of the huge 
variances in education and intellectual abilities. Going back to the Isaac Adaka Boro rebellion 
of the 1960s, Boro was a chemistry university drop out from the University of Nigeria Nsukka, 
who left to champion an armed rebellion against the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the 
region. While at university, he was also active in student union activities, and was at one time 
president of the student union (Boro, 1982), which is a trend observed by some of the moderate 
Ijaw leaders such as Osuoka and Ogon.  
 
Another leader that stands out within the radical Ijaw group is Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo 
who was originally known as Melford Dokubo Goodhead Jr., who in a similar gesture dropped 
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out of higher education after making two attempts at studying law from the Rivers state 
University of Science and Technology as well as the University of Calabar (Interview with Ben 
Tantua, February 9 2017). The other leaders, such as Government Ekpemupolo, popularly 
known as Tompolo; Ateke Tom and Ebikabowei Victor-Ben popularly known as Boyloaf, are 
all primary school drop outs with the exception of Tompolo who dropped out of secondary 
school (Interview with Belema Papamie: 30 July 2015).  
  
On the grounds of intellectual capacities and professionalism, Boro was once a teacher, 
policeman and served as an officer in the Nigerian Army (Boro, 1982), while Dokubo was one 
of the founding members of the IYC, hence his activism, which propelled him to be the third 
president of the council. From there, he set up the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force and 
became very well-known because he pioneered the armed struggle in the region. His role in the 
IYC handed him the prefect opportunity to implement what he had been suggesting, in terms 
of taking up arms against the state (Interview with Ben Tantua, February 9 2017). He was also 
an executive member of the earlier Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and 
Ethnic Nationalities, which enabled him the opportunity to unleash his violent tendencies in 
the region (Ibid). On the other hand, all the others have no record of either working for the 
government or relating with any local or international organisation, but Tompolo has been 
referred to as a true born Ijaw original fighter and a ‘general’, who fought not because of the 
oil, but because the Ijaw’s would not die in the hands of their neighbours and the hired 
mercenaries of their neighbours namely the Nigerian military. He joined those forces as a boy 
and has been fighting for his village, where he had his camp, the famous camp 5, where the 
Ijaws of that area would assemble and go to unleash attacks on Itsekiri villages. He grew up in 
that struggle (Interview with Belema Papamie: 30 July 2015).  
 
Incidentally, Boro and Dokubo come from middle level family backgrounds, Boro’s father was 
the headmaster of a mission school while Dokubos’s father was a retired judge. Tompolo, 
Ateke and Boyloaf are all from very poor family set ups, their parents were fishermen and 
farmers. The poor family back ground of the more radical leaders could also be considered as 
another factor that shaped the line of thinking of some of them. For instance, Boyloaf, Tompolo 
and Ateke were not opportune with the exposure that Dokubo or Boro had, they had the 
experience of better life and educational lifestyles yet they chose to take up arms, whereas the 
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other three, were raised at the local grassroots level without experiencing various options in 
terms of choices of actions related to expressing their grievances.  
 
Further interviews reveal that the transformation to violence from an intellectual angle was due 
to the level and quality of the militant leaders’ education. It was their education that determined 
the strategy they adopted. Kukah stated that:  
 
Looking at the militant leaders in the Niger Delta, the first thing was the quality of 
education or lack of it, they did not have the articulation of Saro-Wiwa. The best 
they could do was to take up their struggle through violence because the struggle 
came from the bottom rather than the top. Compare them against the Ogoni people 
and you will see that the context was different, had that struggle been started by 
some of their elites let’s say President Jonathan himself then perhaps the outcome 
would have been structured in a slightly different way (Interview: 1 August 2015) 
 
These therefore clearly indicate the lack of leadership capital within the radical Ijaw leaders 
because there is no question of understanding or of establishing social networks within which 
they could channel their grievances effectively through civil activities and dialogue. Rather, 
their close links to the grassroots prepared them with one line of thinking and action and were 
more concerned with ways to stand up and defend their people from the state forces.  The social 
status of the militant leaders presented seems to indicate that they are from a more limited 
social background and while they are more likely to interpret and represent the local discontent 
and the grassroots feelings, they are more constrained in terms of which direction they are 
going to lead their followers. For them, violence was the only way and there was nothing else 




This chapter built on the foundation set by Chapter Three on the narratives centred on the 
dynamics of choice between nonviolence and violence set out by the Ogoni and Ijaw. It has 
been shown that although the two groups share similar origins and lived experiences, the two 
movements are distinct from one another specifically expressed in the inclination to the choice 
of nonviolence as against violence. In this chapter, we have seen how distinct the timing and 
nature of leadership that exists between the movements are, while the Ogoni can show a more 
disciplined and intellectual leadership in the person of Saro-Wiwa, the Ijaw on the other hand 
includes several fragmented leadership styles ranging from the nonviolent intellectuals such as 
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Osuoka and Ogon to the more radical and violent prone militants in the persons of Asari 
Dokubo, Tompolo and others.   
 
Evidence has shown that from the start, the Ogoni leaders preached nonviolence, a notion that 
was introduced to the group by Saro-Wiwa due to his informed knowledge and observation of 
the prevailing conditions of America and Western European countries, and interactions with 
the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. An organisation, he stressed, that did not 
tolerate any form of violence, which shaped his preaching of the importance of nonviolence to 
his people at different stages. These collectively provided him with universally valid 
generalisations regarding governing political actions based on historical facts and processes. In 
the course of his preaching, the Ogoni were sensitised on the significance of ethnic autonomy, 
resource and environmental control, (ERECTISM) which became the key themes of the Ogoni 
movement. These have been seen in the Ogoni agenda preached by Saro-Wiwa, so much so 
that even after his execution by the state, nonviolence is still the guiding principle of the group, 
and in spite of all the internal divisions being experienced, the group still maintains their 
nonviolence stance. In the concept of ethnic autonomy, Saro-Wiwa puts forward the right of 
preservation of the cultural heritage of different people, especially the Ogoni, and in terms of 
resource control, he contends that the allocation and distribution of oil accrued revenues should 
be the prerogative of the producers of the resources not centrally to the state. The social status 
of the Ogoni leaders showed an informed group of intellectuals who appreciated what their 
problems were and charted a nonviolent course of actions with linkage to internationally 
accepted norms.   
 
While for the Ijaw on the other hand, evidence suggests that the movement in the 1990s started 
on an intellectual note which continued through to the establishment of the Kaiama 
Declaration, but as a result of the excesses of the state typified by the Odi massacre, the 
movement escalated into full violence and the emergence of several armed leaderships. Unlike 
in the Ogoni case, the fragmentation and lack of a unified leadership changed the character and 
nature of the movement into an armed struggle. The execution of Saro-Wiwa in addition to the 
nature of state responses have also been linked to the factors responsible for the transformation 
of the Ijaw conflict from nonviolence to violence, as Watts notes, what followed was a period 
of silence in the region up until 1999 when a democratic government came into power and it 
transformed into a violent confrontation against the state. He explains that after Saro-Wiwa 
and the Ogoni eight were executed, the region became an area of intense conflict with more oil 
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producing communities such as the Andoni, Itsekiri and the Ijaw clamouring for reparation and 
resource control (Watts, 1999, 2003:16).  
 
The outlook of the Ijaw leaders was fluid, ranging between nonviolence and contentious, 
evidence has shown how the fragmentation among the Ijaw leadership prepared the grounds 
for the adoption of violence while, the Ogoni, despite their issues, were still preaching 
nonviolence. The significance of the strategic level of acceptable knowledge of the engagement 
that would attract international and local support was clearly not part of the views held by the 
militant leaders. Rather, theirs was mainly anger and loss of faith against the state which 
generated the need for violence in the region. Moreover, this chapter has analysed how the 
leaderships of the two groups responded differently to the actions and inactions of the Nigerian 
state, with the Ogoni maintaining their stance of nonviolence and the Ijaw going for a more 
confrontational strategy. While the social status of the Ogoni showed an internationally aware 
set of leaders, that of the Ijaw was fragmented, and showed a group coming from middle to 
low income families that had the benefit of both the local and international levels of education 
and exposure, and another composed mainly of the less educated from very low and poor 
backgrounds. These were more concerned with taking up arms to clamour for the change they 
want for their communities. These put together further address the gap in the literature on the 
region by supporting the argument raised in the chapter that the two movements are distinct 
from each other. Therefore, if the conflicts within the Ogoni movement did not lead to violence, 
why then did the Ijaw movement turn to violence? This will be further addressed in the next 
chapter which will discuss the organisational structure of the Ogoni and the Ijaw movements 
















This chapter builds on the nature of the Ogoni and Ijaw leadership presented in Chapter Four, 
which highlighted how the Ogoni leadership preached nonviolence even when faced with 
internal divisions and challenges after Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Ijaw leadership demonstrated a 
dual, fluid and fragmented system of leadership, consisting of one group that tended to adopt 
the Ogoni system and later saw the emergence of more radical leaderships that felt violence 
was the best way to solve the Ijaw problems. As we saw in the narrative chapter, certain leaders 
within the Ijaw used state repression and the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa as strong arguments to 
promote an alternative strategy, however, on the Ogoni side, the state repression, including the 
execution of Saro-Wiwa who was their leader, did not propel them to violence. Therefore, in 
this chapter I argue that the differences in terms of the organizational structure of the Ogoni 
and the Ijaw movements demonstrate the commitment to nonviolence versus violence. The 
chapter will analyse the development and presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 
comparison to the Kaiama Declaration, as well as the establishment of MOSOP in comparison 
to the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and later MEND, to further highlight the dynamics of choice 
between nonviolence and violence between the two movements.  
 
The articulated set of demands presented in the form of an Ogoni Bill of Rights targeted at 
getting the support of the international community (Okonta, 2008; Watts, 2003; Osha, 2006) 
will be analysed in comparison to the Kaiama Declaration, which is a set of demands that 
actually mirrors the organisation of the Ogoni movement. It would be fair to suggest that the 
Kaiama Declaration was the closest the Ijaw movement ever came to the Ogoni peaceful 
resistance but, as this chapter will show, it was short lived (Ukiwo, 2007; Isumonah, 2004, 
2015; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009; Nwajiaku, 2005) due to an ultimatum issued to the Oil 
companies by the youth leaders. Furthermore, the organisation and establishment of MOSOP 
as the voice of the Ogoni will also be highlighted to indicate the contrasts in the development 
of the IYC to champion the Ijaw agenda which saw the emergence of the radical armed MEND 
which was rather concerned with a move towards physical violence in order to attain the Ijaw 
self-determination. The chapter will show the discipline, structure and organisation employed 
by the Ogoni in their struggle in comparison to that of the Ijaw. The internationalisation of the 
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Ogoni struggle in relation to networking with some foreign associations and civil societies and 
their support for the Ogoni cause will also be analysed in comparison to the Ijaw movement.  
The chapter will also present the latest developments within the Ogoni movement in respect to 
the implementation of the recommendations of the UNEP Report which was at the instance of 
the Nigerian state. It will detail the temporary peace and pause in violence within the Ijaw 
group, in terms of the amnesty granted to the militants in the region. The UNEP 
recommendations become significant as they will be used to show that MOSOP did not reject 
the offer of a potential clean-up of Ogoniland, and that they took on the offer and engaged in a 
dialogue with the state. At the same time, the inclusion of the amnesty which is sometimes 
referred to as a reward for criminality becomes vital in order to demonstrate that although some 
of the Ijaw militant leaders were not prosecuted and even paid in exchange for peace, still not 
all the groups gave up arms. Yet many of those who gave up arms were left idle and without a 
role in the society, which, because they did not have many alternatives, made it easier to go 
back to the armed struggle. Thus, organisationally, much of the Ijaw struggle is still around 
armed groups with these events helping and leading them to shape their struggle, to organise it 
the way they are, towards violence. Meanwhile, the social status and outlook of the two groups 
of leaders will be used as justification for the inclination and adoption of nonviolence and 
violence respectively. 
 
The interviews for this chapter were accomplished through Ogoni leaders that include Peter 
Medee, Legborsi Pyagbara, Owens Wiwa, Ledum Mitee, Alubabari Nbete, Ben Naanen, Tom 
Orage and a confidential source; as well as Ijaw youth leaders; Patterson Ogon, Isaac Osuoka, 
Iniruo Wills, Lancelot, T.K. Ogoriba, Andrew Azazi and Ramsey Mukoro. Likewise, former 
President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Inemo Samiama, Bishop Kukah, Ukoha Ukiwo, 
Frederick Ikwang and Ken Henshaw were included based on their knowledge and roles they 
played in the Organisation of the two movements (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of all group 
leaders, activists, and key informants engaged with for this study). 
 
Accordingly, the first half of the chapter will be on the organization of the Ogoni struggle and 
the second half will focus on the organization of the Ijaw movement. This chapter will be 
presented in three sections which will comprise the organization of the struggle, the 
internationalization and the current dimensions of the struggles (see Table 5.1 below). 
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1. Organisation of the Ogoni Struggle 
1.2 The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) 
1.3 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) – Peaceful Resistance 
4. Organisation of the Ijaw Movement  
4.1 Kaiama Declaration – Peaceful Resistance 
 Ijaw Youth Council - Towards Militancy 
2. Strategies of Engagement  
- Internationalization 
5.  Strategies of Engagement 
5.1 MEND (Towards the armed struggle) 
3. Current Dimensions of the Ogoni Struggle: 
The Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland 
by UNEP (still maintaining nonviolence) 
6.  Current Dimensions of the Ijaw Movement: 
The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme and  
Resurgence to Violence 
 
5.1. Organisation of the Ogoni Struggle 
 
Okonta observes that Ken Saro-Wiwa’s aim of completing his thirty-year dream of politically 
steering the Ogoni people started at a time when the Nigerian state was going through a crisis of 
legitimacy, during which citizens were made to draw back from their ‘Nigerian’ identity into 
ethnic, collective, and other forms of identities. This was the period when he decided to question 
through the understanding of economic and political self-determination the state which, he 
believed could no longer provide for the essential needs of its citizens (Okonta, 2008:169-170). 
In the process of constructing the Ogoni as an oppressed people in the early part of 1989, Saro-
Wiwa thought of and presented his ideas for a political movement. He claimed that:  
 
I began the process of mobilising the Ogoni people by organising a seminar under 
the auspices of the newly formed Ogoni Central Union, of which I had been 
elected president. The best Ogoni brains presented papers on aspects of Ogoni life, 
culture and education, the disorganisation of the Ogoni, their traumatic existence, 
[…]. The seminar conclusions pointed to the need for the Ogoni people to organise 
themselves better and to take responsibility for their political existence (1995:46). 
 
He adds that: 
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I canvassed the idea of forming a mass organisation with Kagote and the Ogoni 
Klub, another club for young Ogoni professionals. I attended meeting after 




The above reconstruction by Saro-Wiwa on attending meetings in order to press his views on 
the Ogoni people was similar to that adopted by Martin Luther King JR, who was an inspiration 
and model to Saro-Wiwa. In the words of Martin Luther King JR: 
 
From the beginning there was a philosophy undergirding the Montgomery 
boycott, the philosophy of nonviolent resistance. There was always the problem 
of getting this method over because it didn’t make sense to most of the people in 
the beginning. We had to use our mass meetings to explain nonviolence to a 
community of people who had never heard of the philosophy and in many 
instances were not sympathetic to it (Martin Luther King Jr., 1991). 
 
Saro-Wiwa started a systematic campaign of persuasion to show the Ogoni the path and 
strategy that had to be adopted. He organised the campaigns in a structured way that 
institutionalised the Ogoni into different groups for the purpose of communication. The Kagote 
platform mentioned by Saro-Wiwa refers to an Ogoni elite group. Historically, the Ogoni was 
a gerontocratic and traditional group where leadership was logically exercised by the elders 
and wiser individuals (Tam-George, 2010:303). Given all the predicaments that the Ogoni 
faced, there was an understanding among the group of a need for some kind of renewed 
unification, because, as discussed in the chapter on narratives, the leaders claimed that the 
Ogoni had a common predicament which reinforced their sense of nationhood. This 
reinforcement led to the formation of Kagote31 in the 1970s as a supreme cultural organisation 
(Watts, 2003:22, 1999). The main objective of Kagote was to provide a platform for seeking 
solutions to the cultural, social and economic problems of the entire Ogoni nation, through the 
promotion of the welfare of its citizens both at home and in diaspora and defending them 
against discrimination and injustice. Kagote was also expected to provide effective leadership 
at all times so as to justify the existence of an enlightened citizenry within the Ogoni (Kagote 
Constitution, u.d.). Peter Medee the President of Kagote explains that, 
 
                                                          
31 KAGOTE is an acronym of Khana, Gokana, Tai and Eleme which arte the constituent units of Ogoni ethnic 
nationality. 
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It acted as a socio-cultural and political platform, in the days when we did not have 
political parties, to agitate and negotiate with government for the well-being of the 
area. (Interview: 27 July 2015).  
 
It was a major platform used for agitations, negotiations and for the struggles in Ogoniland and 
although it was also an umbrella organisation of the people, it was largely for the elites. Saro-
Wiwa in particular felt the need for a more formidable organisation in which every sector of 
the community would be involved. The idea of forming an inclusive organisation corresponds 
to Hutchinson and Smith’s observation that movements in Eastern Europe also started with an 
elite of intellectuals, which subsequently included the professional classes as well as masses of 
clerks, artisans, workers and even peasants (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:5). The Ogoni 
struggle, similarly, started with an elite group, the Kagote and then moved to include the 
ordinary Ogoni people through the creation of MOSOP in 1990.  
 
Going back to Saro-Wiwa’s political philosophy, he claimed that he had a ready response from 
the Ogoni people. Saro-Wiwa wrote in his civil war pamphlet32: 
 
We must remember that no matter the system of government, unless a people take 
their destiny into their own hands, no improvement will come to them. We cannot 
afford to be complacent. We must begin immediately to organize ourselves 
enthusiastically for the difficult and turbulent days ahead (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a:53). 
 
To woo the Ogoni, and inculcate confidence in them, the elite laid emphasis on what Smith 
termed as myths of ‘auto-emancipation’ and ‘ethnic authenticity’ (Smith, 1976:8) in mobilising 
the communities. Saro-Wiwa made a deliberate effort in attending several meetings of Kagote 
and recurrently stressed the traditional significance of the land (Isumonah, 2004:443) as well 
as the need to form a mass organization. His proposal to develop an Ogoni Bill of Rights was 
willingly accepted, and he concerned himself with drafting the bill (Hunt, 2005:63).   
 
5.1.1. The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) 
 
The strategy of nonviolence is further demonstrated by the elaboration and presentation of the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights on 26 August 1990. Saro-Wiwa presented to the Ogoni an articulated set 
of requests which summarised Ogoni issues and demands. Specifically, he called a meeting in 
Bori, inviting influential Ogoni people from all six kingdoms to sign the OBR, and they offered 
                                                          
32 A 1967 civil war pamphlet produced by Ken Saro-Wiwa titled: The Ogoni Nationality, Today and Tomorrow. 
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to put their signatures on the historic document (Ibid: 63). However, it should be noted here 
that the traditional ruler of Eleme initially refused to sign the OBR along with the other rulers 
of the clans, but he did so later. As earlier discussed in the chapter on narratives, the Eleme 
expressed their reservations of being subsumed under the Ogoni group. Pyagbara explained 
that: 
We had some people who articulated the problems and bounded the people 
together, using the commonality of the problems and a clear vision of why we 
shouldn’t be having the problems. We had this leadership who worked together to 
get a Bill of Rights, before then there were pamphlets that Ken had written, ‘Letter 
to the Ogoni Youths’. The pamphlets were very well circulated and almost every 
Ogoni person who could read had access them, which made mobilisation easy 
(Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
  
The OBR adopted by the Ogoni with general acclaim, demanded political control of Ogoni 
affairs. Importantly for the argument of this dissertation, the Ogoni as a group were not fighting 
the cause of the Niger Delta as one, they were fighting a cause for the six clans that make up 
Ogoniland and the OBR is a confirmation of this battle. Detailing a historical narration of 
neglect and local misery of the Ogoni, the Bill addressed the question of Nigerian federalism 
and minority rights and it called for active involvement in the affairs of the state (Watts, 1999, 
2003:22). The Bill started off with the following statement: 
 
We, the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai) 
numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Government and 
people of Nigeria (Saro-Wiwa, 1992:93). 
 
 
It highlighted the historical grievances of the Ogoni against the state, such as socio-economic, 
political, and environmental ones. It became very attractive to the chiefs and leaders who felt 
marginalised within the political arena at that time. Accordingly, Senewo (2015:665) points to 
the strategic importance of the presentation of the OBR as the most important tool in the region, 
which was used to push forward the struggle for the survival of the Ogoni, as well as a 
framework employed by other groups agitating for their rights (Okonta and Douglas, 2001; 
Human Rights Watch, 1999).  The Bill focused on the justification of the rights of minorities 
as the proper entity to which accrued oil revenues should be apportioned to (Watts, 1999, 2003; 
Okonta, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 1999). The Ogoni, according to Saro-Wiwa, wanted 
political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the state as a distinct and separate unit, which 
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included the right to control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni 
development (Saro-Wiwa, 1992:95). The question of political autonomy included in the OBR 
according to Senewo (2015:666), was a bold demand for self-determination; the capacity to 
use a rational portion of the resources produced from their land to develop Ogoniland. Senewo 
argues that the political autonomy the Ogoni were asking for is in the form of a medium which 
delegates power to the people, thereby galvanizing them to take responsibility for their 
destinies through participating in the development of their region with a clear form of freedom 
(ibid:668).  
 
Moreover, the 20-point Bill was signed by leaders of the six Ogoni clans on behalf of the people 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1992:93). The Babangida administration ignored the presented Bill, and instead 
proceeded with the creation of additional local states without any created for the Ogoni as 
requested in the OBR, making the Ogoni feel further marginalized. The lack of response by the 
state and Shell to the presented OBR consequently led the Ogoni leaders to meet again in 1991 
to request attention and support from the international community, through an Addendum to 
the OBR (ibid: 97). The addendum expressed dissatisfaction that a year after receiving the OBR 
the state refused to grant to the Ogoni people an audience, where the listed demands could be 
discussed (Ibid). This granted permission to MOSOP to make a representation to the United 
Nations and the international community (ibid: 98) on behalf of the Ogoni. The OBR was an 
attempt to return to pre-colonial Ogoni, where all citizens regarded power and authority as 
legitimized by good conduct (Okonta, 2008:174). According to Ako (2015:625), the OBR was 
much more than a human rights articulation of their grievances and requirements. It served as 
the logical foundation of their struggle for establishing their rights and the crusade to 
accomplish these rights (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The inclusion of the Addendum 
according to Senewo, attracted instantaneous interest and prompted non-governmental 
organizations and human and environmental rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International, Sierra Club, Green Peace, Friends of the Earth, and Human Rights Watch to 
support the plight of the Ogoni people as propelled by MOSOP (Senewo, 2015:666). This, he 
maintains, provided the precise medium and fertile ground to the organizations to engage in 
their various institutional agenda as well as to further internationalize their plight.  
 
Saro-Wiwa maintained that the Ogoni leaders decided to approach the Nigerian state using a 
nonviolence strategy, and sent an OBR to the then President, General Ibrahim Babangida and 
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to the Shell multinational oil company on the 26th August, 1990 at Bori Rivers State (Saro-
Wiwa, 1992:93). Owens Wiwa recounts that:  
 
The OBR was actually first drafted by Ken Saro-Wiwa himself, but his approach 
to leadership was a bottom-up approach, so he summoned the entire Ogoni people 
to a congress from all the local government areas and presented it to them. He 
provided a background on why he thought those demands should be made to the 
government and became convinced that the people accepted the demands, they 
became the views and demands of the Ogoni (Interview: 3 August 2015).  
 
The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) declared that, starting from 
December 1992, the people of Ogoni handed out a thirty-day demand ultimatum to Shell, which 
raised fears around a developing fight with the Ogoni people. The ultimatum was accompanied 
by several organised nonviolent actions by the Ogoni including the protest of January 4th 1993, 
also referred to as the Ogoni Day in commemoration of the International Year of the world’s 
Indigenous People. This singular, massive, non-violent protest in which an estimated three 
hundred thousand Ogoni people participated was indeed a novel event with striking impacts. It 
undeniably showed that the Ogoni people had come of age and imbued the struggle with a 
greater level of seriousness and intensity on both sides. This event and other subsequent non-
violent passive resistance activities, such as the holding of successful vigil nights across 
Ogoniland and the launch of a survival fund, sent panic signals to the Nigerian authorities and 
to Shell (UNPO, 2008). As Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015:658) explain, ‘most self-
determination movements’ channel their claims solely at sovereign states, but in the Ogoni 
case, such claims were continuously directed to the government and at the oil companies’. In 
1993, the Ogoni staged a massive protest against the actions of Shell, requesting environmental 
justice and reparations for the damages done to Ogoniland (Nwulu, 2015). Saro-Wiwa 
recounted that: 
  
When it was my turn to speak, I mounted the rostrum and seized up the crowd. 
From a vantage point above everyone, I saw a new profile of the Ogoni people, a 
profile I had not identified. I saw eagerness, determination and joy on the young 
faces that looked up to the men on the rostrum. And I knew that a new seed had 
germinated and everything would have to be done to water, nurture, grow and 
harvest it. Ogoni would surely not be the same again. And I also felt that I must 
not let them down ever, or they would be right to lynch me (Saro-Wiwa, 
1995a:129).  
 
Language was a vital strategy of Saro-Wiwa’s in organising the struggle that he used to connect 
to the Ogoni masses, he addressed them in their local languages and dialects (Demirel-Pegg 
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and Pegg, 2015:659). It was noted by Boele, that Saro-Wiwa learnt to speak the different Ogoni 
dialects, which apparently was a rare quality for Ogoniland leaders, and it captivated several 
people (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a:11). Although in the OBR, the Ogoni leaders deny asking for 
secession from the Nigerian state, one question that comes to mind is why the Ogoni had a flag 
and a national anthem. Isumonah (2004:444), clarifies that there was a proposal to concurrently 
fly the Ogoni flag alongside the Nigerian flag and simultaneously demand an Ogoni state as 
the ‘minimum for staying within the Nigerian Federation’ (Saro-Wiwa, 1994:17). This 
separatist attitude implied in the decision to introduce an Ogoni flag and anthem may have 
necessitated the violent suppression by the state operatives who viewed it as a pursuit for 
sovereign independence (Isumonah, 2004:444).  Again, Saro-Wiwa referred to the Ogoni 
anthem as: 
 
The Ogoni liberation song, it is not the anthem yet… self-determination does not 
mean secession. Self-determination means that you choose (Saro-Wiwa, 1993b). 
 
Contrary to the general belief that the OBR was the work of Saro-Wiwa alone, Mitee points 
out that, 
  
The OBR was something that we all sat down and looked at, it took over a year for 
all the Ogoni leaders to articulate ideas. It was signed by a cross section of people 
from all the six kingdoms of Ogoni. Ken hardly comes to a meeting without 
bringing a paper, so you find out that the conversation will be mainly how to amend 
what he thought, because he had given it a more considered thought (Interview: 2 
August 2016). 
 
This suggests that although Ken was the personification of the struggle and most of the 
literature credit it to Saro-Wiwa alone, other Ogoni leaders also participated in developing the 
OBR. It is important to note at this point that there was no opposition to Saro-Wiwa’s stance 
on nonviolence in all the meetings and gatherings he attended during the campaigns. That he 
persuaded leaders of most of the subethnic kingdoms within Ogoniland to become part of 
MOSOP suggests that Saro-Wiwa was the central generational link between his age group, 
Ogoni leaders, elders and the youth (Osaghae, 1995; Bob and Nepstad, 2007). Nbete concludes 
that: 
 
It was environmental, economic and a struggle for political representation, the 
OBR stated it clearly that the struggle was not a kind of secessionist struggle, they 
maintained their allegiance to the Nigerian state. They needed political autonomy 
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as one would expect within a democratic presidential system, that would bring 
about fiscal federalism in which case the regions were supposed to have control 
over their resources (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
The OBR heralded the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), which together with the fact that it emphasised a nonviolent manifesto of human 
and minority rights might indicate that the OBR clearly was aimed at the international audience 
and international organisations, especially the UN. An interesting question that came up when 
trying to understand the Ogoni Bill of Rights was why such emphasis was placed on rights, and 
this question, as we have seen has been discussed in the chapter on narratives.  
 
5.1.2. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)  
 
Prior to the formation of MOSOP, the Ogoni were a linguistically obscure people (Jones, 
1963:10) and politically salient mainly within Rivers state (Isumonah, 2004:439). Senewo 
(2015:664), underscores the claim that MOSOP through the leadership of Saro-Wiwa, 
confronted the state and oil multinational businesses such as Shell on environmental and human 
rights awareness, which made them realize that the major interest of the Ogoni struggle was 
more ecological rather than a purely political struggle (Saro-Wiwa, 1995:xi). Naanen recounts 
that, 
 
The turning point in that struggle was the formation of MOSOP in 1990. It took 
on a distinctive Ogoni character within the Niger Delta struggle.  The struggle 
focused mainly on the Ogoni situation, the issue of oil, empowerment and 
inclusion (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
 
This validates one of the main arguments of this thesis, namely that the Ogoni were fighting a 
distinct cause not representative of the region. The MOSOP was founded in 1990 as a mass 
movement, an umbrella organisation of other organizations. It comprises 10 affiliated bodies, 
the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), Ogoni Council of Churches (OCC), 
Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COTRA), Ogoni Students Unions (for those in secondary 
schools and below), National Union of Ogoni Students (for those in tertiary institutions); Ogoni 
Teachers Union; Federation of Ogoni Women Association (FOWA), Ogoni Central Union; 
Committee of the Leaders of thought (which is for the elders) and the Council of Ogoni 
Professionals (COP) (Interview with Pyagbara: 31 July 2015). The encompassing membership 
of MOSOP, according to Isumonah (2004:442), possibly explains why the Nigerian state under 
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the administrations of Generals Babangida and Abacha could not ban it. The interview with 
Pyagbara shows that, 
  
It is organised vertically and horizontally, every community in Ogoni has chapters 
of MOSOP, from the chapter level you move to the kingdom level. The electoral 
process starts at the chapter level in the villages, after which the chapter leadership 
will elect the kingdom leadership.  Three persons from each of these affiliates and 
kingdoms elect the national leadership of MOSOP (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
The MOSOP structure consists of the General Assembly of the Ogoni people, the Steering 
Committee (Haynes, 1999:237), which is made up of three representatives of each of the 
affiliates and then three representative of each of the Kingdoms. Below the Steering Committee 
is the National Executive Council, after which is the Kingdom leaderships and then the chapters 
(Interview with Pyagbara: 31 July 2015). There are about 16 national executives, made up of 
8 kingdom coordinators, from the 6 kingdoms and 2 special units, which includes Bori. There 
are coordinators for each of those kingdoms, who automatically become vice presidents of the 
organisation, accordingly MOSOP has 1 president, 1 deputy president, 8 vice presidents, 
general secretary, assistant general secretary, public relations officer, finance secretary and 
treasurer (Ibid). From the onset, MOSOP embarked upon massive sensitization campaigns to 
get all on board. This is confirmed by Medee who explains that, 
 
We did enlightenment, demonstration, media and we used a lot of approaches to 
engage with government, so where necessary we demonstrate, which was almost 
like the last resort (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
This indicates that MOSOP made strategic use of public speeches at rallies, press statements, 
and handbills, to address a variety of audiences both local and international with environmental 
degradation and genocide against the Ogoni as the key themes of their propaganda.   
Okonta (2008), in contrast, points to some major fault lines within MOSOP at that time. He 
contends that the movement concentrated on ideological and educated entrepreneurs like Saro-
Wiwa, without a working consensus with other influential political and economic elites. He 
countered the assumption that the Ogoni struggle was a unified movement that was accepted 
by all the Ogoni elites. Similarly, Watts (2003:23), observes that, notwithstanding the notable 
record of MOSOP, its ability of epitomise itself as an integrated pan-Ogoni movement remains 
an open question. This indicates that MOSOP was not that wide platform that carried along all 
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Ogoni’s, as Okonta (2008) explained. Within the group, stronger clans like the Eleme and 
Gokana influenced the decisions and only the voices of the old, wealthy and accomplished 
males were considered instead of the voice of all. Orage supports these arguments put forward 
by Okonta and Watts by adding that, 
MOSOP did a lot of sensitization and mobilisation which gave them an 
opportunity to be able to misdirect, misconstrue and mismanage the whole idea of 
the struggle. In Ken Saro-Wiwa’s characteristic nature, there were a few things 
they disagreed on with Dr Gary Leton33, one was on the question of methodology 
in the constitution of the struggle, while the leaders believed in constructive 
engagement, Ken, was preaching total isolation, an isolation strategy of attack 
which was tending towards the issue of conflict. Ken felt that the other leaders 
were a sell out because he had been mirrored as the image of the organisation 
(Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
This indicates that there was severe rivalry among Ogoni political elites to control MOSOP, 
which also aimed at channelling the organisation as a bargaining tool for personal, clan and 
national advantage (Okonta, 2008:216). Countering the argument put forward by Watts, 
Okonta and Orage, Owens Wiwa explains the division in line with the decision taken by 
MOSOP during the time of Saro-Wiwa: 
  
MOSOP had taken a stance, that the leadership are not going to participate in 
partisan politics but when politics came some set of the leaders attended the 
convention. When the movement found out, we had an emergency meeting and 
took a decision that we were not going to vote. That divided those that have been 
promised positions by the political parties (Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
These divisions emerged in June 1993, when the Nigerian state under the leadership of General 
Babangida called for presidential elections, which, under MOSOP directives, the Ogoni 
decided to boycott. The Ogoni refused to vote for a government which, they claimed, would 
rule under a constitution which ignored minority rights (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a). Tam-George 
(2010:302) argues that for the Ogoni as a group, to partake in an electoral process is to 
participate in a process that would take full control of their lives and resources and to further 
agree to be submissive to that authority. This, according to the Ogoni means that to boycott an 
electoral process is to negate that procedure and all its basic conventions (ibid). The decision, 
however, to boycott the election was not accepted by some of the Ogoni elites, which caused 
further divisions within MOSOP and the Ogoni. Mitee recounts that:  
 
                                                          
33 One of the leaders of the Ogoni struggle. 
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In the meeting which we held in Dr Leton’s house, Ken made that proposal, that 
whether we vote or not, Ogoni votes will have nothing to do with the presidential 
elections, but if we do that, it will attract attention to our cause. Most of us the 
younger folks bought that idea, we wanted something that was exciting which most 
of our leaders didn’t like. There were those who felt that we were with the 
government and those who felt if you were with the government you are not with 
us (Interview: 2 August 2015). 
 
This suggests that the decision to boycott the elections developed into an ‘us versus them’ 
problem. Explaining the election boycott, Nbete stated that, 
 
Ken wanted us to boycott and some people wanted us to participate in the election. 
There were actually some internal divisions within MOSOP during his time but it 
was managed and did not quite become as glaring as it became after him 
(Interview: 27 July 2015). 
 
In the same vein, Medee includes the conflict surrounding the Ogoni representation in the 
Constitutional Conference as an additional factor to the divisions. He pointed out that, 
  
Government and the oil companies sponsored the divisions, they used a strategy 
of divide and rule. They will come into the place they look at one or two persons, 
give them money and brainwash them and those people will begin to fight the 
other people. When Ogoni’s wanted Saro-Wiwa to represent Ogoni for the 
constitutional conference, government wanted Eddy Kobani (Interview: 27 July 
2015). 
 
These indicate that the decision to boycott the elections and the constitutional conference 
conflicted with what the mainstream Ogoni political leaders wanted. They also highlight the 
interference made at some point by the state. The interview with Ukiwo explains that, 
 
The mainstream Ogoni leaders saw the constitutional conference and the elections 
as opportunities for participation, and here was Ken and his team saying they should 
not participate (Interview: 14 June 2016).   
 
The MOSOP leaders, according to Watts, 1999, 2003:23), were clearly opposed by sections of 
the traditional clan leadership (Haynes, 1999:237), prominent leaders as well as public 
servants. In the same vein, Osaghae (1995:334), posits that Saro-Wiwa and the other leaders 
of MOSOP did not have the support of the entire Ogoni people, explaining that there was strong 
opposition specifically from other Ogoni elites. Particularly, the clan heads, known in Ogoni 
as Gbenemene of Babbe, Ken-Khana, and Nyo Khana as well as other Ogoni elites such as 
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Chief Giniwa and I.S. Kogbara disagreed with MOSOP’s tactics and were labelled as state 
agents by MOSOP. These divisions saw the resignation of some Ogoni elites from MOSOP, 
who, according to Okonta (2008), felt challenged by a younger generation of Gokana and 
Ogoni activists that introduced new initiatives in MOSOP. The other leaders felt that especially 
the youth wing was controlled by Saro-Wiwa, and thus it was unacceptable to them (Watts, 
1999, 2003:23; Haynes, 1999:237). The youth wing (NYCOP) has been accused of using force 
in order to ensure strict compliance to the MOSOP directive, to boycott the June 12, 1993 
presidential elections through the mounting of roadblocks to compel the decision taken in 
Finimale-Nwika Hall, Bori Rivers state (Isumonah, 2004:444).   
 
Desmond Orage attributed the problems within MOSOP to several factors that led to the 
resignation of some of the MOSOP leaders in 1993. These include the boycott of the 
presidential elections, the formation of the youth wing of MOSOP advocating for an Ogoni 
nation, the production of an Ogoni flag and a national anthem. These, he argued, were against 
the objectives of MOSOP, which brought about serious disagreements with the leaders and 
Saro-Wiwa (Orage, 1998:47). In 1994, some Gokana chiefs made a public call to the people of 
Gokana to ‘forsake MOSOP and return to the age-old culture of respect for the elders’ 
(Isumonah, 2004:446). Furthermore, Saro-Wiwa was strongly accused of exploiting the 
travails of the Ogoni to achieve his egotistic wishes and desires by Dr Garrick Leton in his 
witnessing against Saro-Wiwa during the trial of the murder of the Ogoni four (Maier, 2000). 
These show that individual and group interests played a significant role within the group. The 
tension caused between these interests against the Ogoni political mobilisation is a particularly 
clear indicator of this (Ibid).   
 
Similarly, Watts (1999, 2003:23), clarified that Saro-Wiwa seized the opportunity to make use 
of the over 50 years of Ogoni unification and built upon the decades of anger against 
multinational oil companies to provide a critical mass foundation and a youth driven ardour 
within an indigenous subject, in a space that was highly debateable and challenging. 
Furthermore, he challenged the claim made by Saro-Wiwa of having the support of ninety-
eight percent of Ogonis, citing that there was ‘no Ogoni-ness, no unproblematic unity, and no 
singular form of political subject’, and that MOSOP exemplified a fractured and increasingly 
divided ‘we’ as clear differences and divergences between Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni 
elites were visible. Ethnicity to Watts was a major issue in postcolonial Nigeria not only to the 
Ogoni as claimed by Saro-Wiwa, it incorporates the corruption of ethnic minorities. He pointed 
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out another contradiction by Saro-Wiwa, that to ‘implore the history of exclusion and the need 
not solely for ethnic minority inclusion as the foundation for federalism, steered Saro-Wiwa to 
overlook the histories and geographies of conflict and struggle within and between ethnic 
minorities’ (ibid).  Additionally, Bob and Nepstad (2007:1387), contend that Saro-Wiwa failed 
to exemplify a collective Ogoni identity and did not personify a resilient group identity 
(ibid:1388), stressing that he tried to depict the Ogoni movement generally as a struggle for 
environmental justice and human rights instead of the ‘complex, regional ethnic minority 
rights’ (ibid). Even the framing of the entire Ogoni cause within environmentalism and human 
rights was criticised as a ‘weaker’ foundation for unified engagement (ibid: 1389). However, 
despite the divisions within the Ogoni group, the leaders remained committed to nonviolence 
owing to the preaching’s of Ken Saro-Wiwa and also the shared similar statuses and 
backgrounds presented in Chapter Four. 
 
According to a Social Action report, as the Nigerian state ignored the Ogoni demands, MOSOP, 
in 1992 demanded US$10billion, with a breakdown of US$ 6 billion as royalties for past oil 
production and US$4billion as damages for environmental degradation. In addition, MOSOP 
issued a 30-day ultimatum to Shell within which to meet the demand or leave Ogoniland. The 
Ogoni people were informed of the collective decision to send Shell out of Ogoniland during 
the first Ogoni Day meeting in 1993 (Osha, 2007), highlighting the impact of the activities of 
MOSOP under the leadership of Saro-Wiwa. By 1995, the organization pushed the Ogoni 
agenda to the visible levels of engagement based on human rights and environmental issues 
(Bob, 2005).  
 
Regarding the question of why the OBR was not attended by the Nigerian state at that time, 
former president Ibrahim Babangida points out that although the Ogoni were asking for what 
they thought rightly belonged to them, as a government,  
 
We looked at the OBR from the point of this is a country, where we wouldn’t like 
a situation that will make us repeat what we went through before. Nigeria went 
through a civil war in 1967 and for another area to carve itself separately, and then 




This decision by the Babangida administration was conveyed to the MOSOP leadership, 
according to Okonta, in a meeting where the administration acknowledged the plight of the 
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Ogoni people and reassured them of the administration’s determination to do what was required 
to address their problems, short of granting them the Ogoni state they have been clamouring 
for. He stressed that the Babangida administration had resolved not to create any more states 
in the country as that would spark new requests for states creation in areas that felt 
disadvantaged or marginalised. Instead, the administrated offered to create eight new local 
governments for the Ogoni (Okonta, 2008:217-218).  
 
5.2. Strategies of Engagement: Internationalisation of the Ogoni Struggle  
 
The deliberate choice of nonviolence by the Ogoni is likewise visibly exemplified in the 
authorisation of MOSOP to make representations to the Unite Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, the Common Wealth Secretariat, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the European Community and all international bodies that have a role to play in the 
preservation of the Ogoni nationality (Saro-Wiwa, 1992:98). Mitee recounts that:  
 
We clearly looked at all the options, the question of armed struggle, the Nigerian 
system is so violent that the only thing that they listen to is violence. After hours of 
arguments we rejected all that based on two main considerations, first is that of our 
terrain, ours is just a flat land, so where do you run to? Secondly is the philosophical 
angle, if the Nigerian system is this violent, then what do you do? We decided to 
take an option that would bring out the contrast between us and at the same time 
get public sympathy locally and internationally (Interview: 2 August 2016).  
 
According to Kukah, 
 
The Ogoni realized the correlation between the pain and destruction of their 
environment with the irresponsibility of the oil companies, they also understood 
the fact that the state was negligent. They discovered that in other parts of the 
world, communities where oil was being drilled were entitled to certain economic 
incentives and they decided to engage the Babangida administration. The high 
point of their struggle was the convergence in their struggle with Green Peace, 
which fed their struggle as an environmental struggle (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
Saro-Wiwa made very good efforts in soliciting attention from the international community. In 
fact, Amnesty International adopted Saro-Wiwa, Dube34 and Nwinee35 as prisoners of 
conscience (Okonta, 2008:278; Hunt, 2005:274).  Support came for them through international 
                                                          
34 One of the Ogoni nine, executed along with Ken Saro-Wiwa. 
35 Ibid. 
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organisations such as Greenpeace; The Body Shop; Amnesty International; PEN 
International’s Committee for Writers in Prison; UNPO; the UN Working Group for 
Indigenous People; the Association of Nigerian Authors; the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
and William Boyd (Saro-Wiwa, 1995:236). The support from the listed organisations confirms 
the impact and appeal the Ogoni struggles had on the international community. This is 
demonstrated in the speech delivered during the Ogoni Day rally, where Saro-Wiwa reiterated 
to the Ogoni people that:  
The UN recognises the rights of all the world’s indigenous people, the indigenous 
people have been cheated through laws such as are present in Nigeria today. 
Through political marginalization, they have driven certain people to death. That 
happened in America and Australia. They are trying to repeat it in Nigeria and we 
don’t want it. In recovering the money that has been stolen from us, I do not want 
any blood spilled, not of an Ogoni man, not of any strangers amongst us. We are 
going to demand our rights peacefully, non-violently, and we shall win (Saro-
Wiwa, 1995a). 
 
This shows how Saro-Wiwa deliberately linked their local struggle to the international 
discourse on rights. According to Ako (2015:625), the reconceptualization of the Ogoni 
problems in terms of environmental human rights by MOSOP was not only intelligently 
comprehensive but similarly to preceding social movements, it served as the foundation upon 
which the trust in nonviolence as its method of approach was constructed.  Although Saro-
Wiwa pitched the Ogoni struggle at a much higher level as a result if the internationalization, 
Ukiwo confirms that, 
 
Ken was not isolated from other movements that were ongoing that were 
contemporaneous with the Ogoni struggle at that time (Interview: 14 June 2016). 
 
In addition, Naanen argues that, 
 
If Ogoni employed violence it would not have gotten the support of the 
international community, which was a critical part of the struggle. Without that 
we would have gone nowhere, there is no way a small group such as Ogoni would 
have been able to challenge the power of the military, although we paid for it 
(Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
According to some informants, women in Ogoniland played a key role in ensuring that 
nonviolence became the norm in the struggle, they played a very significant role in forming the 
massive Ogoni protest (Barikor-Wiwa, 1997:1). Barikor-Wiwa explained that women 
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supported Saro-Wiwa because the movement was constructed on the accounts that he had 
accumulated over the years about what women objected to and complained about (Turner, 
1997;75). According to Isumonah (2004), Ogoni women had been meeting to discuss 
community affairs, and, incidentally, Jessica Wiwa36 had been leading women groups for 
decades. Noting Saro-Wiwa’s interests, she introduced him to some of the informal groups’ 
leaders, which led to the creation of the Federation of Ogoni Women’s Association (FOWA) 
in 1993 (Hunt, 2005:65). This shows that in the course of organising the Ogoni struggle, Saro-
Wiwa made use of his mother’s position and influence on the women groups, which gave him 
an opportunity to directly address the women and mothers to get their support in Ogoniland. 
The interview evidence from Wiwa confirmed that,  
 
The movement was more than 50 percent women, they were at the forefront of most 
of the marches and town hall meetings. They have been more impacted upon by the 
pollution. Some of MOSOP positions were influenced by core elections and if you 
don’t have the backing of the most numerous group you are gone. That was Ken’s 
power, he was a feminist, and the women gravitated towards him a lot (Interview: 
3 August 2015). 
 
According to Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, women frequently led MOSOP demonstrations, visibly 
parading in the front to indicate nonviolence and also included campaigners carrying twigs or 
leaves in order to display that they were without arms (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015;658). 
This depiction of nonviolence by MOSOP relates to the postulation by Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011), that the nonviolent character of the struggle amplified its recognition as ordinary people 
are more probable to partake and pledge to nonviolent struggles as opposed to violent ones, 
which entails a greater form of liability. 
 
These show the importance of using nonviolence by the Ogoni, and highlight the common 
opposition to the use of violence in bringing about the desired change through the 
internationalisation, discipline, organisation as well as the role played by women groups during 
the struggle. These fit in perfectly with Saro-Wiwa's (1995), argument of nonviolence being a 
formidable psychological weapon and a moral advantage which gives strength necessary for 
victory locally and internationally. Although the Ogoni claim to have demonstrated and 
protested peacefully, their actions were perceived as violent because they hindered the state’s 
access to the vital petroleum and oil resources. The Ogoni did not bomb or destroy any pipeline 
                                                          
36 Ken Saro-Wiwa’s mother. 
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but they were successful in disrupting oil related activities in that area. This is why, although 
the Ogoni would argue that they were nonviolent the state would counter argue that the peaceful 
protests included the application of force in terms of loss of man hours, disruption of oil 
production and revenue on which the state depends on.  
 
According to Haynes (1999:238), ‘the Ogoni movement recorded some achievements in the 
short-term, particularly the national and international awareness raised to the Ogoni cause’. 
The internationalisation of the Ogoni struggle had succeeded to the extent that, we can see that 
from the international reaction to his death. Saro-Wiwa and eight others were arrested, detained 
and charged for the murder of four37 prominent Ogoni chiefs. Subsequently, on 9th November 
1995 Saro-Wiwa along with eight38 others, were hanged by the Abacha administration for the 
murder. The execution of Saro-Wiwa and the others attracted international condemnation 
against the actions of the Nigerian state. The United States, Canada, South Africa, and all 
fifteen members of the European Union withdrew their ambassadors from Nigeria (Hunt, 
2005:285). At the request of the South African president Nelson Mandela, two days after the 
execution, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group suspended Nigeria from the 
Commonwealth. The suspension excluded Nigeria from receiving any new Commonwealth 
technical assistance, such as the agricultural training which took place in 1993 and also 
prevented government representatives from participating in inter-governmental meetings and 
events (Velde, 2013). This suspension also acted as a public condemnation from the 
Commonwealth to the Nigerian government and the international community; it denounced the 
undemocratic and human rights abuses which reverberated across the world (ibid). Even the 
FIFA game that Nigeria was to host was stopped (Interview with Nbete: 27 July 2015).   
 
It should be recalled that during the height of the Ogoni struggle, the state was faced with a 
confluence of factors that led to its isolation by the international community. In reality, the 
mobilizations within Ogoniland at that time were very troubling because whether Saro-Wiwa 
and his team appreciated it or not, the approach they adopted threatened the regime’s survival, 
and within the context of any threat to a regimes survival, different states react differently. 
According to Ukiwo, 
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The reactions of the Abacha administration could be interpreted in two ways, on 
the one hand, to defy both the Ogoni and the international community that isolated 
it, and on the other hand, to send a signal to the other groups in the Niger Delta of 
what would be fall them if they took the path of the Ogoni (Interview: 14 June 
2016). 
 
This corresponds to Mitee's (1999:435) assertion that a grass roots mass movement using the 
basic tools of civil disobedience, attracting national and international attention was not the 
challenge the military administration had anticipated. The aftermath of the killing of the Ogoni 
nine was marked by harsh army repression which significantly subdued major response within 
Nigeria, coupled with the fact that MOSOP was fragmented by factionalism (Bob and Nepstad, 
2007:1386). Marion Campbell described the execution of Saro-Wiwa as an effort by the state 
to quash an opinionated criticism of a corrupt national government and an unfair multinational 
oil corporation (Campbell, 2002:39). According to Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, the Ogoni struggle 
weakened quickly when the leader of the protest movement, Saro-Wiwa, was executed by 
Nigerian military regime (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015:654). They argue that protest 
movements as put forward by social movement scholars, disband as an after-effect of the 
division between radical and moderate protesters but in the Ogoni case, it demobilized as a 
result of the repression and might of the military regime. The events in Ogoni highlight the fact 
that states can successfully prevent the rebound consequence of suppression even if the protest 
continues non-violently (ibid: 656), which the military regime did by going after the members 
of MOSOP who went underground. In 1995, most of the surviving MOSOP leaders were 
compelled to escape to foreign countries where they scattered and eventually settled in 
countries that offered them asylum. These wide geographical distances intensified further the 
already prevailing generational and subethnic contentions (Bob and Nepstad, 2007:1388) 
which affected the immediate remobilization of the Ogoni struggle.  
 
The fractioning of MOSOP into factions has been credited to the leadership gap created after 
the death of Saro-Wiwa, who was the unifying and organizational voice in the struggle. The 
Ogoni, were faced with a clear deficiency of a united voice in the quest of the attainment of the 
OBR (Senewo, 2015:669). The international and local credibility and recognition that Saro-
Wiwa had had been lost by MOSOP, especially considering the fact that he was highly 
knowledgeable in the Nigerian geo-political, economic, social and environmental systems 
(ibid). These visible divisions led organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Sierra Club, 
Green Peace and Amnesty International to pull out their backing from MOSOP (Bob, 2005; 
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Human Rights Watch, 1999). This affected MOSOP to such an extent that it had diminished 
its ability to vigorously chase the attainment and implementation of the OBR (Senewo, 
2015:669). Nevertheless, the internationalisation strategy and the organisation of the struggle 
at the international level had had a very substantial impact.  
 
5.3. Current Dimensions of the Ogoni Struggle: The Environmental Assessment of 
Ogoniland by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)    
 
Although the chapter has established the fractioning that exists within MOSOP, current 
developments within the organisation relate to the clean-up recommended after the 
environmental assessment carried out by UNEP at the instance of the Nigerian state. Bringing 
this section into the chapter is strategic in that it argues that even when the state attempted to 
engage UNEP in assessing the environmental impact of oil exploration activities and 
implementing a clean-up in Ogoniland, the response of MOSOP was that of dialogue and the 
acceptance of the offer by the state and Shell. This section is aimed at showing that in spite of 
all the conflict that exists within the group, the organisation does not change its strategy, it is 
still active and has maintained the nonviolence stance preached by Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni 
leaders. In response to the continuous request for environmental accountability in Ogoniland, 
in 2006, the Nigerian state and Shell sought the assistance of the UNEP ‘to undertake a 
comprehensive environmental assessment of impacted sites in Ogoniland’ (UNPO 2009:6; 
Senewo, 2015:667) 
 
In May 2005, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally launched an initiative to resolve 
the long standing conflict between Shell and the Ogoni people, which was facilitated by 
Reverend Father Mathew Hassan Kukah, as part of attempts aimed at enhancing relationships 
and facilitating the resumption of oil exploration activities in Ogoniland (Social Action, 
2014:1).  This followed the meeting the president had with some Ogoni leaders, where the issue 
was broached, and subsequently, MOSOP leadership held two special congresses in Eleme, 
and resolved to mandate and approve that the Ogoni should participate in a dialogue, provided 
it was genuine and transparent (MOSOP, 2006:2). In a press statement, MOSOP stressed that, 
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We have consistently said that we are willing to talk and we want to hear what the 
state and Shell have to say about redressing the damage which has been done to our 
land and our people’ (Ibid:5).  
 
This marked a new development in the history of the struggle which has drawn a lot of interests 
within the entire Niger Delta. As anticipated by MOSOP, the study confirmed the nature and 
extent of oil contamination in Ogoniland across areas that include contaminated land, ground 
and surface water (UNEP, 2011:8). It revealed the extent and harshness of oil contamination 
in the area, even though oil production activities are no longer taking place there, as oil spills 
continue to occur with disturbing regularity, causing soil pollution by petroleum hydrocarbons 
becoming more extensive. It concluded with a summary of recommendations that once 
implemented, would have an immediate and positive impact on Ogoniland. These 
recommendations, according to Senewo (2015:668), highlight the blatant environmental 
disrespect of Shell and the Nigerian state, which could be regarded as an environmental triumph 
for the Ogoni struggle, that has vindicated the allegations of the Ogoni contained in the OBR 
regarding the devastating effects of oil on their land.   
 
According to Social Action, SPDC welcomed the UNEP report and the Chief Executive 
Officer39 agreed that the company’s counterpart funding to the US$1billion Ogoni Restoration 
Fund for the clean-up has been set-aside in a verifiable account, in a London Bank. However, 
the clean-up is yet to commence because the state is yet to provide the framework and the 
technical work plan needed for the clean-up exercise (Social Action, 2014:24). In the words of 
Naanen,  
 
The Ogoni fought a hard battle and they seem to have won considerably especially 
on the environmental issue, Ogoniland will now be cleaned up hopefully. Shell 
never absolved themselves from that responsibility, all they wanted was a 
framework. We hope that the president will act very soon and give his approval 
for that process to commence (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
Although MOSOP welcomed the findings, it argues that the involvement of UNEP was 
announced at a meeting held in the Rivers state government house in October 2006, under the 
auspices of a dialogue process in which they were not represented. The process, as highlighted 
above, was surrounded by several issues and complaints by MOSOP, so much so that the 
organisation expressed their concern to the UNEP Executive Director in a letter dated 22 
                                                          
39 Mr. Ben Van Beurden. 
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October 2006, over the announced involvement of UNEP in a proposed clean-up in Ogoniland 
without due consultation. MOSOP reiterated its concerns about the increasing gap between the 
reconciliation process in Ogoni and frustration at the lack of actual dialogue (MOSOP, 2006b). 
They claim to have received a late invitation to the crucial Saturday 21 October meeting, where 
the announcement of the clean-up was made. They also mention the dramatic wavering of the 
state and Shell’s positions regarding their operations in Ogoniland which has contributed to 
deeper crisis in the area. Mitee recounts that: 
  
We were to have conversations with Shell, but all of a sudden they came up to say 
they are going to clean up, both Father Kukah and them arranged to say they that 
and UNEP has been contacted. We said is this not something we should talk about, 
we had an agenda for these talks, and we’ve not started some of the things which 
are important (Interview: 2 August 2016). 
 
In spite of the talks on cleaning up Ogoniland, it is the implementation of the UNEP Report 
that is the current issue within the organisation. The Goodluck Jonathan Administration 
inaugurated a Presidential Implementation Committee to study and advice on the way forward 
(Social Action, 2014:15). But the silence from the state again led the Ogoni to start preparing 
for mass protests against the state a year after the report was officially released. The setting up 
of the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) was the response from the state, 
with the mandate of implementing the recommendations of the UNEP report, and tasked with 
investigating, evaluating, establishing other hydrocarbon impacted sites and making 
appropriate recommendations (UNEP, 2012). Accordingly, the MOSOP president Pyagbara, 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the activities of HYPREP by pointing out that, 
 
 I cannot tell you that HYPREP has started and completed any water project 
anywhere in Ogoniland. I have not heard of any community that has water provided 
by HYPREP (Interview: 31 July 2015).  
 
The Ogoni leaders argue that the creation of HYPREP was not backed by an enabling 
legislation, and the state failed to allocate budgetary allocations for its operations (Social 
Action, 2014:15). This seems to suggest that the actual clean-up is not regarded as a solution 
to the Ogoni issues, rather, the organisation is still agitating for the fulfilment of its requested 
demands articulated in the OBR. Still on the implementation issue, Mitee reiterated that, 
  
UNEP was not part of our agitation as Ogoni. It is wrong to put the whole Ogoni 
thing in a match box called UNEP report which came just yesterday. I think it is 
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most unfair to Ken and all others to say that all we were fighting for was just that. 
UNEP the clean-up is good but it should not be taken that that was what the Ogoni 
were fighting for (ogoninews.com, 2016). 
 
Agitations towards the implementation of the UNEP report increased in 2014 when protests 
and letter writing campaigns started gaining momentum within Ogoniland, which led to the 
state sending a delegation to Ogoni on the 8 of August 2014. MOSOP issued a 30-day 
ultimatum to the state to implement the report during the 23rd celebration of Ogoni Day. 
Pyagbara reaffirmed the determination of the Ogoni in embarking on protest marches and other 
forms of nonviolent actions such as international advocacy, letter writing campaigns should 
the state fail to implement the recommendations (Godwin, 2016; Enviro News Nigeria, 2016). 
Although the state was praised for restoring attention to the urgency and importance of the 
UNEP report, Pyagbara reiterated that the deliberate slow action was an ‘act of genocide’ 
against the Ogoni (Godwin, 2016). It would be recalled that Saro-Wiwa used the word genocide 
to describe what had happened to the Ogoni people. He explained that the UN defines genocide 
as the commission of acts with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1992:9). Naanen renewed the call on the people of the area to form a united front 
in order to achieve the implementation of the clean-up, vowing that: 
 
The struggle for the actualization of the freedom of the Ogoni would not stop until 
our demands are met (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
MOSOP reports that the Ogoni people will fully cooperate with all agencies, including 
‘security personnel’ to see that the programme is successful, urging the youths to abstain from 
all types of behavior that could sabotage the struggle of the ancestors of the land (Godwin, 
2016; Enviro News Nigeria, 2016). This serves as another corroboration that the Ogoni 
movement still adheres to the principles of nonviolence, even after the slow actions of the state 
in implementing a clean-up which Shell has provided funds for.  
 
Although MOSOP has been shown to be the voice of the Ogoni, the fieldwork revealed that 
there are still tensions between Kagote and MOSOP in terms of representation on the 
committees and working groups set up towards the implementation of the UNEP 
recommendations. A confidential source informs us that, 
 
MOSOP and Kagote are fighting for positions to represent Ogoni on the federal 
government committees. We are still not together in this struggle, we still bring in 
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personal interests. I have complained to Ben Naanen that the current MOSOP 
president is side lining us, he doesn’t want KAGOTE to be part of the discussions 
of the UNEP report (Interview: 28 July 2015). 
 
The researcher was present during one of the heated discussions on who best to represent the 
Ogoni on the committees. Some leaders are complaining of being sidelined in the ongoing 
discussions on the implementation of the clean-up.  
 
This section indicates a positive change in the attitude of the state towards the plight of the 
Ogoni. The change in the political climate in Nigeria started after the death of General Sani 
Abacha in 1998. Nothing significant was achieved during this period when General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar took over as Head of State (1998 to 1999), until power was transferred 
to a democratically elected government. In 1999, General Olusegun Obasanjo (Rtd) became 
president, and under his leadership the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was 
created to help in the positive development of the Niger Delta, and the revenue allocation 
formula was increased to 15 percent in favour of the region and later Umaru Yar’adua. As a 
matter of fact, the UNEP report on the environmental assessment of Ogoniland was presented 
to the government of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011, but nothing was done to favour the Ogoni 
plight. The current Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari took over in 2015, and the clean-
up of Ogoniland has made some very slow progress under his leadership, as discussed in the 
chapter.  
 
Therefore, there appears to have been a clear dynamic shift from the stance originally taken by 
MOSOP not to collaborate with the enemy, because the state was perceived as being out to 
destroy the Ogoni nation. Currently, the MOSOP leadership under Legborsi Pyagbara are 
interacting and collaborating with the Nigerian state towards the implementation of the clean-
up of Ogoniland. This serves as an indication of the achievement of the Ogoni struggle, 
showing the possibility of collaboration between the Ogoni leaders, the state and Shell oil 
conglomerate towards a common goal while maintaining a nonviolent posture. This renewed 
relationship heralds discussions on the possibility of resumption of oil extraction in Ogoniland. 
The interview with Nbete revealed that, 
 
Currently some Ogoni people are seriously asking for replacement of Shell with 
another company. A few Ogoni people think that the problem is not with the name 
Shell but with their policies and that if any company comes that can do what the 
people want them to do, it will be good. But still 99 percent of the Ogoni people 
don’t want to hear the name Shell (Interview: 27 July 2015). 
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This further indicates a shift from the original MOSOP ideology of forbidding all Ogoni from 
interacting, or having anything to do with the oil companies, especially Shell, which was black 
listed as the major enemy after the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, internal conflicts within the 
MOSOP organisation continue to form a major obstacle to the resumption of oil exploration in 
the area. It has been reported that oil exploration was stopped in Ogoniland in 1993 as a result 
of the massive demonstrations by Ogoni people (Sotunde, 2013; MOSOP, 2015).  
 
This section has shown that although the organisation is challenged with divisions and 
conflicts, the Ogoni struggle has maintained the tenets of nonviolence. These tenets have been 
evidenced in the reiteration of nonviolence during sensitisations and speeches made at different 
levels of the mobilisation process. The next section will present the organisation of the Ijaw 
movement and examine in comparison to the Ogoni the ways in which it relates to violence.  
 
5.4. Organisation of the Ijaw Movement 
 
Having presented the organisation of the Ogoni struggle and how it relates to nonviolence, this 
section will analyse the Ijaw struggle in relation to its engagement with violence. This section 
is concerned with how the Ijaw organised their movement and will focus on the issuance of the 
Kaiama Declaration as a similar action taken by the Ogoni. The argument here is to show that 
the closest the Ijaw movement ever came to the nonviolent strategy of the Ogoni struggle was 
in the declaration as an imitation of the OBR, and secondly, that it was short lived unlike the 
former which the Ogoni are still clamouring for. It will be argued that the Kaiama Declaration 
was a temporary nonviolent posture precisely because it was followed by an ultimatum by the 
IYC to the oil companies operating in the area. This results from the simple fact that although 
both these groups are confronted with the same repression by the state, one has gone towards 
violence, and the other towards nonviolence.   
 
5.4.1. The Kaiama Declaration and the Ijaw Youth Council 
 
Frustrated by economic and political marginalisation, environmental pollution and in order to 
capture the attention of the state, the youth in Ijawland decided to come together in an ‘All Ijaw 
Youth Conference’ on 11 December 1999, and issued a communique termed as the Kaiama 
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Declaration in Kaiama community of Bayelsa state. The conference themed ‘Regaining 
Control of Our Destiny’ recorded attendance of more than 5000 Ijaw youths pulled from over 
500 communities of about 40 clans within the Ijaw nation (Ijaw Youth Council, 1999b). The 
gathering was to consider the way forward in order to safeguard the uninterrupted existence of 
the indigenous peoples of the Ijaw ethnic nationality. This Kaiama Declaration was meant to 
answer the question raised in 1998 on how to determine the best way to interact with the state 
with regards to the peculiar Ijaw problems (Ibid:5). Simulating the Ogoni, they also confirmed 
their unceasing membership of the Nigerian state (MOSOP, 2008:42), but on the other hand 
demanded to work for self-government and resource control for the Ijaw people (Ijaw Youth 
Council, 1999b:10).  
 
The Kaiama Declaration was constructed in such a manner that declared all the land and natural 
resources within the Ijaw territory to belong to the communities, being the basis of their 
survival. They expressed the non-recognition of all undemocratic decrees that robbed the Ijaw 
communities of the right to ownership and the control of their lives and resources, all of which 
were enacted without their agreement (Ibid). Unlike the OBR, the Kaiama Declaration was 
addressed as an ultimatum to all the multinational oil companies operating in Ijawland at that 
time in a letter40 which conveyed that: 
 
We demand that all transnational companies and their contractors involved in the 
exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the Ijaw areas of the 
Niger Delta cease operations and withdraw by 30 December, 1998 [….] We know 
that transnational companies like yours have continued to support military 
dictatorships in the Nigerian state in their project of repression of the minority Ijaw 
nation; even as your reckless activities result in the devastation of our natural 
environment and the impoverishment of our peoples[….] (Ibid:11). 
 
 
This letter was followed by a press statement issued by the IYC on 28 December, 1998, which 
appealed to all Ijaw communities to take demonstrative steps to protect the environment 
beginning from 1 to 10 January 1999. Oronto Douglas reiterated that, 
  
We have just taken a decision to extinguish the fierce flames of hell called gas flares 
on our land. We have done so because of its negative impact on our people, on our 
                                                          
40 Letter from Ijaw Youth Council to all Managing Directors and Chief Executives of Transnational oil 
companies operating in Ijawland (Shell, Agip, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco and Statoil BP), dated 18 December, 
1998 signed by Felix Tuodolo, T.K. Ogoriba, Oronto. Douglas, I. Osuoka, Abule Benard, Rowland Oweinanabo 
and Valentine Kuku. 
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environment, the noise and the heat, the permanent daylight and the deaths of 
animals and plants (Ibid: 12). 
 
Wills explains the emergence of the various Ijaw platforms for agitation as, 
  
Platforms emerged, like the IYC, and the Ijaw National Council (INC) in 1998, as 
major platforms for conducting the agitations of the Ijaw people. In principle all 
Ijaw people belong to it. There are also other platforms over the past 10 years 
progressively with dilutions and contradictions attending the struggle, affecting the 
cohesion, coherence and effectiveness of even these structures (Interview: 29 July 
2015).  
 
The IYC was set up to coordinate the struggle of Ijaw people for self-determination and justice 
(Ijaw Youth Council, 1999a), which is similar to the Ogoni MOSOP. Between 29 and 30 
December 1998, the states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers in the Niger Delta witnessed 
demonstrations and protest marches which, as Nwajiaku (2005:457), asserts, were met with the 
full might of the Nigerian state security apparatus. Watts (2003:24), opined that the 
presentation of the Kaiama Declaration suggests that within the Ijaw, there is a construction of 
a pan-ethnic solidarity movement. According to Wills,  
 
They set a target that by 31 December 1998 all oil producing activities must be 
stopped., During this time the general political agitation was continuing, in the form 
of position papers in the constitutional assembly under Abacha, these positions 
were articulately presented which led to the regime acceding to grant 13% 
derivation (Interview: 29 July 2015). 
 
These indicate the similarities between the construction of the Ijaw and the Ogoni struggles in 
terms of the articulation of their grievances as a document, but the Ogoni go a step further to 
include the international community. The formation of MOSOP and IYC and the rejection of 
the perceived actions of the elders in the two groups is another similarity, where the youths 
decided to take over the struggles. However, unlike the Ogoni struggle, there is no indication 
of a particular leader heading the process of the struggle as done by Ken Saro-Wiwa, but rather, 
of a group of Ijaw youth. Also, there is no indication of the intense mobilisation campaign as 
reflected in the Ogoni struggle, instead it was an invitation to a meeting termed conference 
where the decision was taken to engage the state. Furthermore, the formation of two principle 
umbrella organisations, INC and IYC is a direct contrast to the formation of MOSOP in that 
the Ogoni relied on one umbrella organisation not two. Nwajiaku (2005:470), explains that 
IYC and INC have separate social standings, INC is mainly tasked with the mobilization of 
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past, present and would be political personalities, while IYC stood for those youth who contest 
the way in which members of the Ijaw political class have acted in the past.   
 
The Kaiama Declaration, just as in the case of the OBR, is also yet to be recognised by the 
state. In the wake of the Kaiama Declaration, Ayuba (2010:133), observed a shift in the nature 
of demands by the militants, with more importance being placed on resource control as against 
development of the region. On the question of the implementation of the requests made in the 
Kaiama Declaration, Ogon, clarifies that to date, the demands are yet to be considered by the 
state.  
 
Between 1998 and now, our demands have not been addressed, governments have 
come and gone. The issues will continue to remain and we hope it will not form the 
nucleus of another militancy in post amnesty Niger Delta (Interview: 30 July 2015). 
 
 
In the same vein, Lancelot adds that, 
 
Some persons in government will interpret items contained in the charters of 
demand to mean secession. Successive regimes have not given the right response, 
which will be a cocktail of legal and administrative measures and legislations by 
way of changing certain laws to give communities a greater stake holding and 
participation (Interview: 3 August 2015). 
 
The Ijaw nationalist movement, which came after the Ogoni struggle, witnessed the creation 
of several ethnic nationality associations within the region41; each with their own charters of 
demand and bill of rights, often acknowledged to have developed from the similar experiences 
of historical and political contexts as that of the Ogoni (Nwajiaku, 2005:469). Lancelot 
reiterates that, 
  
Although the Ogoni and Ijaw struggles happened at different time periods, they 
speak to the clamour for greater inclusiveness (Interview: 3 August 2015).  
 
While the Ogoni maintained a nonviolent attitude to the actions and inactions of the state, the 
Ijaw movement, which also started off in a similar manner of nonviolence, transformed into a 
violent course of action in order to stress the importance of their demands. The violent 
                                                          
41 See Appendix 5. 
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aftermath of the Kaiama Declaration indicated the defining moment in Ijaw political history 
and a key moment in the youth restiveness in the Niger Delta (Nwajiaku, 2005:458).  
 
Having suggested that the Kaiama Declaration attempted to copy the OBR, the next section 
will analyse some of the Ijaw militant groups that came after the declaration. The Kaiama 
Declaration and the struggle for self-determination heightened tensions in the region, and 
transformed them into a full-blown militant action against the state. Ayuba (2010:134) explains 
that youth groups who were capable of safeguarding their communities gradually became 
dominant. He argues that the proliferation of youth mobilisation and association with violence 
has also accounted for the encouraging environment for violence to prosper. According to 
Osuoka,  
 
I was one of the founders of the Kaiama Declaration and the IYC. But things have 
changed so much that it is difficult to understand how to explain the vision in a way 
that will make meaning, considering what the organisation has become (Interview: 
31 July 2015). 
 
 This further shows that the decision to take up arms was not collective, and indicates the 
fragmentation of the Ijaw movement into several militant groups, a process which the next 
section will address.  
 
 5.5. Strategies of Engagement: Violence as a Strategy for Expressing Ijaw Grievances  
 
This section will argue that, although the Kaiama Declaration was also met with repression by 
the state as in the Ogoni case, it allowed certain Ijaw leaders to put forward this as a 
legitimation, with strong arguments, to turn to violence. Therefore, this section will show that 
unlike in the Ogoni case, there was no direct linkage to an international strategy in terms of 
nonviolence, rather, the Ijaw militant leaders armed with a feeling of hopelessness and 
desperation decided to take up arms. There was no international support received by the Ijaw 
on this stance. The previous chapter demonstrated the initial influence and inspiration that some 
of the youth leaders had with revolutionary movements like those led by Che Guevara, and 
Hugo Chavez as well as some of the international support they had attracted from Human 
Rights Watch, Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International. The emphasis here will be on 
the organisation of the MEND militia activities, these will further highlight the differences 
between the strategies adopted by the Ogoni and the Ijaw. 
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5.5.1. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and Some Militant Groups in 
the Niger Delta.  
 
Okonta (2006:24), described MEND as the violent outcome of decades of intentional limitation 
of the social space in the Niger Delta, where the people have been denied their public and 
political rights in their lawful quest of material and social welfare. He argues that the militant 
leaders that make up MEND are political subjects compelled to take up arms with the sole aim 
of reestablish their rights as citizens. In an interview with one of the MEND leaders, Okonta, 
reports that the members do not refer to themselves as MEND, rather as, 
 
Armed youth in the creeks who say they have had enough of the oil companies’ 
double standards, and are determined to put an end to an exploitation of their people 
by Shell, Chevron and the federal Government (Ibid). 
 
He explained that the group emerged in 2004 in order to call international attention to the plight 
of the Ijaw people (ibid: 4) under the leadership of Henry Okah42, Asari Dokubo, Ebikabowei 
Victor Ben, John Togo, Godswill Tamuno, Ateke Tom, Government Ekpemupolo, Soboma 
George, Brutus Ebipadei, Solomon Ndigbara and Tubotamuno Angolia. The foundation of 
MEND’s activities was the kidnap of four foreign oil workers in 2006, while at the same time 
issuing demands for improved involvement in political affairs, larger share of profits derived 
from resource extraction, increased development, and outright rejecting the transition to civil 
rule put in place by the General Abdulsalami Abubakar43 (ibid: 14). According to Ukiwo 
(2007:605), MEND became visible sometime after the arrest and detention of Asari Dokubo 
and Chief Ebitimi Banigo44, after the impeachment and detention of D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, 
together these three episodes were perceived as attempts to break and humiliate the Ijaw. A 
key strategy deployed by the group in drawing attention to their activities include sending out 
pictures of armed youth in masks displaying heavy armoury, and helpless oil workers at their 
mercy (Okonta, 2006:4). Jomo Gbomo45 goes as far as describing the group as a non-tribalistic 
merging of various groups without any political inclination, with the single purpose of 
managing the oil resources of the region (Ibid).  
 
                                                          
42 Leader of MEND currently jailed for 24 years in South Africa for the Independence Day attacks in Nigeria in 
2010. 
43 Military Head of State 9th June (1998-29th May 2009). 
44 A prominent Ijaw business man who has provided employment for several Ijaw youth. 
45 Militant war lord and part of the leadership of MEND. 
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While adopting the Kaiama Declaration as its focal terms of reference, MEND was involved 
in several kidnappings which, as Turner (1998), argues were done for four reasons: financial 
reasons, kidnapping without any governmental or financial reason, kidnapping for financial 
and governmental affairs, and kidnapping for politics but without any financial interest. 
Kidnapping foreigners was especially profitable, hence they became preferred targets, for the 
ransom paid for their freedom (Ibid). Kidnapping was also done for financial motives, which 
became essential for maintaining the struggle. For instance, in April 2003, four Niger Delta oil 
rigs were seized and two hundred and seventy people held hostage; in 2004, seven Chevron 
Texaco workers were kidnapped and in January 2006, four foreign oil workers were kidnapped 
and a pipeline blown up (Alabi, 2014:5). Even pipeline vandalism escalated in the region: from 
seven cases in 1993; thirty three in 1996; fifty seven in 1998 to four hundred and ninety seven  
in 1999 and over six hundred cases in 2000 (Okecha, 2003:9). The NNPC further verified this 
by reporting that in 2010 there were five thousand cases of pipeline vandalisation in the region 
(Alabi, 2014).  
 
MEND gradually transformed into a grouping of diverse militant youth groups with perpetually 
fluid associations and allegiances. According to Alabi (2014), the group had the Federated 
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) among a list of 
others operating under the MEND umbrella, which made it challenging for the state to identify 
the group. Unlike some of the groups in the region MEND, according to Ukiwo (2007:607), 
did not exchange kidnapped hostages for ransom, rather, the hostages were used to negotiate 
and portray the political objectives of the region.  
 
The Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) often referred to as Western MEND 
was founded on a more rigid ethnic stance in Delta state. It emerged out of the interethnic wars 
from 1997 through 2003, and was specifically concerned with the physical safeguarding of the 
Ijaw communities within Warri and its surroundings (Berman and Florquin, 2005:334) and 
with the action of hostilities towards those mainly opposed to ethnic groups that endangered 
Ijaw interests (International Crisis Group, 2006:1). Politically, the group was led by Oboko 
Bello and militarily by Government Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo), with a key objective of Ijaw 
self-determination. The Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF) also referred to as the eastern MEND 
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operated in Rivers state led by Farah Dagogo46, a onetime commander of a separate militant 
organization. General Boyloaf and his group, often referred to as central MEND, operated 
mainly in Bayelsa and are believed to have greatly benefitted from the state government and 
were an ally of Henry Okah.  
 
The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) earlier known as Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force is the militant group led by Alhaji Mujahid Abubakar Dokubo-Asari, a breakaway 
faction from the IYC that operated in Rivers state. It came into being in 2001 after Dokubo was 
forced to step down as president of IYC (Ukiwo, 2007:602), and has been described as the 
most organized and armed (Marquardt, 2007).  It was also involved in both covert and overt 
violent conflicts with Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) (Ibid). Dokubo has acted as an 
intermediary between Delta’s underground political movement and the state (ibid). 
International Crisis Group (2006), reported that NDPVF received its funding from the Rivers 
state government and through oil bunkering.  According to Ukiwo (2007:603), the FNDIC 
gained prominence in 1997 when it organized youths to engage thirteen Itsekiri villages after 
the contested moving of the local government headquarters from Ogbe-Ijoh to Ogidigbeh. 
Similarly, on 17 March 2003, the FNDIC militants were suspected to have attacked and killed 
several unarmed Itsekiri civilians in three villages, which the group argued to have attacked as 
a consequence of it being a ground from which soldiers had attacked its members (ibid). This 
shows that tribal clashes occurred within most of the militia groups because tribes in the region 
were regarded as distinct from the other even after the declaration of support by MEND to the 
other groups. This further indicates the entrenchment of violence in showing displeasure or 
anger both within and outside the militant groups. 
 
The militia leaders were organised in various camps with camp 5 being the recgonised one 
under the control of Tompolo. The militant leaders operated throughout the length and breadth 
of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, and Ondo states. These military style camps were separated 
from the main communities and other areas, they were a bit isolated and located mainly in the 
creeks.  The actual number of the camps is not yet known but in the interview, with Ogoriba 
he revealed that,  
 
There were about 140 camps in the different states, the most famous camp was 
camp 5, where a lot of discussions took place, it was the camp vice president 
                                                          
46 One time MEND Commander in Rivers state. 
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The setting up of these camps further indicate that the perception within the militia groups was 
that of the violent option, suggesting there was no space to even propose alternatives. This also 
suggest that having the camps was more about organising the violence, which therefore makes 
the militia actions an organised type of guerrilla violence, it was not indiscriminate violence. 
Therefore, a pattern observed in the formation of the militia groups is the link to MEND and 
allegiance to the 1960s Boro revolution. All the groups started off as members of MEND, but 
later broke away to form new groups with a variety of aims and objectives, signifying the 
increase in violence which created wide spread anxiety in the country. This compelled the 
deployment of a joint military task force which included the police to conduct an operation 
nicknamed Operation Hakuri47 for the continuance of peace in the region.  
 
Hanson (2007), rightly observed that the first response of the Nigerian government to the rising 
insurrection in the region was a long period of military involvement in order to maintain peace 
and stability. This military involvement ranged from engaging the militants in the creeks’ and 
guarding the waterways to securing oil installations in the region. These measures put in place 
by the state exacerbated violence between the militants and the joint task force, with casualties 
recorded on both sides. The militia activities at times forced the shutdowns of oil production 
of up to 800,000 barrels per day, which had a negative effect on the national economy, leading 
to an annual loss of 4.4 billion dollars (Agbo, 2009). In 2006, the average daily oil production 
of Shell at 1 million barrels per day was significantly reduced to about 500,000 barrels per day, 
so also in 2008, about 24-40 percent of oil production was shut in and by early 2009, both 
Chevron-Texaco and Total oil multinationals had shut some of their capacity while Agip 
announced a force majeure (Umukoro, 2011:133). Similarly, Watts (2008:42-43), points out 
that the period between 1998 and 2003 recorded an average of about 400 attacks on oil facilities 
and about 581 incidents between January and September 2003.  
 
Meanwhile, the state suffered a shortfall of about $6.8 billion in oil revenues as a result of the 
militia actions and public disturbances between 1999 and 2005, and the deficits amounted to 
$45.5 billion from 2006 and 2009 (ibid:43). International Crisis Group (2009:5) also reported 
                                                          
47 Hakuri is a Hausa language word for patience. 
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that in 1998, militants in the Niger Delta carried out 92 strikes on the oil industry, and in 2007 
also, in the form of  abductions of about 167 foreigners, and kidnappings of about 128 persons 
both Nigerian and foreigners in 2008. Therefore, in 2009, revenues accruing to the Nigerian 
state were greatly affected by serious deficits in oil production. This was evidenced in the 
decreased oil production activities and exploration which had a negative impact on public 
finance, which shrank the country’s production to less than 1.7 million barrels per day, from 
about 2.6 million barrels per day in 2005 (Social Action, 2010:7). The decline in oil revenue 
which was the main stay of the state pushed for the granting of amnesty to the Ijaw militant 
leaders and their groups. This shows that the state reconsidered the relationship between the 
violence employed in the region to the economic situation of the nation which would slow 
down or even shut oil production, with the possibility of new armed groups evolving from such 
an action. In the wake of the possibility of shutting down oil production, the state decided to 
grant an amnesty to the militants. This will be briefly examined in the next section to uncover 
why it was readily accepted by the Ijaw militants, and what factors led to the temporary pause 
in violence in the region. 
 
5.6. Current Dimensions of the Ijaw Movement: The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme 
and Resurgence to Violence 
 
Of all the strategies employed by the state against the insurgency in the Niger Delta, it is the 
amnesty program that heralded the relative peace and quiet experienced in the region up to 
2016, when the violence erupted again. This section aims to show that, the amnesty was 
introduced as an attempt to pacify the Ijaw militant leaders, but it however did not lead to 
reintegration into society; the armed groups were not given jobs and many were left idle. It will 
be shown that the amnesty was not followed by an effective systematic re-integration process 
of the armed men, rather, the armed groups continued to exist. This will show evidence that 
the organisation of the Ijaw struggle is still to a large extent constructed and reacting to these 
developments, towards violence. Despite the amnesty, some armed groups have not disarmed 
and others are simply paid a daily rate and are not re-employed into civil society. Hence, from 
an organisational point of view, the military structures are still in place with new crops of 
militant groups emerging in the region. 
   
The amnesty was an initiative of the President Umaru Musa Yar’adua administration aimed at 
ending insecurity and underdevelopment in the region. In 2009, a proclamation of 
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unconditional amnesty was made by the president, in order to steady, unite and maintain 
security conditions in the area (Kuku, 2012:23). The amnesty was predicated on the condition 
that the militants renounced militancy within a stipulated period (Umukoro, 2011:136). 
President Yar’adua declared that: 
  
The offer of amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants 
to give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely renounce militancy in all 
its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect. The 
offer of amnesty is open to all militants for a period of sixty days (Federal 
Government of Nigeria, 2009). 
 
This proclamation was made with the expectation of bringing about lasting peace in the region 
and granting unconditional pardon to all militants who had taken up arms as a way of attracting 
attention to their predicaments (Vanguard, 2009). Explaining the amnesty, Ikwang48 stated that: 
  
The programme was supposed to create an enabling environment for peace to be 
achieved in the Niger Delta. There were several negotiations with the militant 
leaders and community leaders, we went into several areas of the creeks, and also 
negotiated with the military officers who were involved to allow the amnesty 
programme to thrive (Interview: 9 August 2015). 
 
The commitment of the state to the amnesty is its commitment to institute programmes to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-militants under a structured DDR49 programme (Ikwang, n.d.), 
with the vision of moving from militancy to gainful employment and from abject poverty to 
growth and development. These would be done through four key components which includes 
the implementation of the amnesty programme; oil asset redistribution; infrastructure 
development and environmental remediation (ibid). Incidentally, nonviolence transformation 
training is a key component of the amnesty programme aimed at changing the militants’ 
conviction from violence to nonviolence as an alternative, as well as promoting nonviolent 
methods in bringing about a better Niger Delta (ibid). This suggest that in terms of the amnesty 
deal, the employment of nonviolence as an avenue to be used in expressing issues in the region 
was considered as an important tool in conducting peaceful agitations. The interview evidence 
from fieldwork in the region suggest that several negotiations took place with the intervention 
of some of the key Ijaw leaders such as T.K. Ogoriba. Ferdinand Ikwang the lead consultant 
informs that,  
                                                          
48 Lead consultant of the amnesty programme. 
49 Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration 
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Entry point for us was through elder statesmen in the Niger Delta, we were able to 
bring them on the table and they called these militant leaders to a meeting 
(Interview: 9 August 2015). 
 
T.K. Ogoriba was one of such elders that participated actively in the negotiations, he recounts 
that: 
   
In July 2007, negotiations started between our Izon people called Federal 
Government /Ijaw Representatives Joint Committee, the federal government side 
was led by Babagana Kingibe50; Yayale Ahmed;51 General Godwin Abe52; Mike 
Ogiadhome53; Engr Numoipre Wills54; Mrs Deziani Allison Madueke55. On the 
Ijaw side, T.K. Ogoriba56; Patrick Akpobolokemi; Kime Engozu; Dan Ekpebide; 
Bello Oboko; Chris Ekiyor; Richard Akinaka; Opaks Harry; Isaac Osuoka; and 
Elfreda Olungwe (Interview:10 August 2015 ). 
  
He adds that, 
 
We said to them Goodluck is your son, an Ijaw. We discussed and gave the 
government seven conditions of engagement, to establish a developmental 
emergency in our area; rebuild the burnt down towns; release Alamieyeseigha and 
Asari; the President has to visit the Niger Delta to see things first hand to appreciate 
our issues; the United Nations and other foreigners should come as witnesses and 
observers, and an amnesty must be given to everybody (Interview: 10 August 
2015).  
 
He further informed me that, 
 
Yar’adua agreed to all the demands, but the only condition that government 
objected to was the one that involved the UN and foreign bodies. But he also 
charged us to go and release the hostages that were held, which we did (Interview: 
10 August 2015).  
 
The then vice President Goodluck Jonathan was noted to have visited the famous camp 5 and 
met with the militant leaders because the focus at that point was on the way forward for the 
region. According to Ogoriba,  
 
                                                          
50 ThenSecretary to the Federal Government of Nigeria.   
51 Minister of Defence. 
52 Minister of Internal Affairs. 
53 Chief of Staff to the President. 
54 Member representing the Vice President. 
55 Minister for Works and Housing. 
56 Leader of the Team. 
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Goodluck Jonathan was in camp 5 to plead with the agitators (Interview: 10 August 
2015).  
 
The disarmament programme recorded some success in terms of mopping up of arms and 
ammunitions, between 6 August and 4 October 3,124 weapons, 18 gun-boats, 3,693 magazines 
and 297,056 rounds of ammunitions were recovered from the ex-militants and between 2009 – 
2010, 707 weapons, 1,976 ammunitions, 684 magazines were also recovered (Ikwang, n.d.:4). 
Confirming the achievement of the programme, the interview with Ikwang revealed that a total 
of 2,192 militants were recorded and trained during the first phase, 6,166 during the second 
phase and 3,642 registered for the third phase, which is still on going. The third phase consists 
of militants whose leaders refused to capitulate initially, they have been registered but they are 
yet to be demobilised and sent for training. The disarmament process was organised in about 
seven areas. Ikwang explains that, 
  
We set up collection points in Bayelsa, Rivers, Edo, Delta, Ondo and Imo states, 
with headquarters in Enugu and appointed state coordinators. Serving army Majors 
trained them and we registered the various groups that came in to disarm. We now 
had a list of the persons and we called them up for demobilization in Obubra camp 
(Interview: 9 August 2015). 
It is important to note that not all the militants accepted the amnesty, but although some of the 
militants capitulated, it leaves a lot to be desired in the region. For instance Ogon, is of the 
opinion that,  
 
Capacities have been built but limited to only 30,000 persons. The number is 
probably minute when it comes to the number of youths in the Niger Delta. There 
should have been ways for accommodating wider audience so that you don’t seem 
to demonstrate the fact that your interest is not only for those who can be violent 
(Interview: 30 July 2015). 
 
Some of the ex-agitators interviewed were concerned with the slow pace of the demobilisation 
and training of the third phase. Additional interviews reveal that not all the militants 
surrendered. According to Ramsey, 
 
We looked at it from a distant, before we surrender our arms, to see if they are going 
to do what they promised. Some of us do not believe in the amnesty up till now, 
because in the process of how the amnesty came, there was no sensitization. 
Continuity of the amnesty is paramount, if government fail to continue there will 




This suggests that, there were indeed some militant leaders who felt the state was not sincere 
enough and who refused to accept the amnesty, but when they realised that the programme had 
recorded some success, they had a change of mind on the deal because they felt that they had 
genuine cases. According to Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015), the scheme of paying off militants 
$410 monthly under the amnesty programme, which they argue has earned the support of some 
of the moderate Ijaw militants is a point of concern. The interview with Azazi revealed that: 
 
Something called a stipend of 65,000 naira per person is paid. Today the Niger 
Delta struggle can come up at any time, for the struggle is still at the war front. The 
government promised to do a lot and yet nothing has been done, they promised to 
develop our communities (Interview: 10 August 2015). 
 
Initially the agreement was for the sum of 1500 naira to be paid daily for feeding and the sum 
of 25,000 naira monthly during the demobilization period (Umukoro, 2011:146), but, 
according to Ikelegbe (2010), the amount was changed to 65000, naira as claimed by Azazi.  
This suggests that peace is bought rather than attained, and the above quotes indicate a general 
dis-satisfaction with the amnesty deal. Another major flaw observed in the organisation of the 
amnesty programme has to do with the reintegration of the reformed militants into society.  
Most of those trained are left without jobs bearing in mind that some did not accept the amnesty 
deal at all. As a result of which, new crops of militant groups have come up, and even the 
victims are yet to be addressed. According to Ikwang, 
 
They have gone for their reintegration training, they are now skilled, some of them 
have gotten jobs, and others are yet to get jobs. That is not what was supposed to 
happen, before you train somebody you should have a place for the person to come 
in and reintegrate, but that is not happening in the amnesty as we speak (Interview: 
9 August 2015).   
 
An important factor to address is the prediction of a relapse to militant violence in the region 
if the amnesty is not handled well. The general feeling among the other groups in the region is 
that you can do bad and be rewarded with an amnesty, the Ogoni view the amnesty as payment 
for trouble making. Worthy of note here is that the Ogoni were not part of the amnesty because, 
according to the group, it was a payment for violence and they were not a violent group. In the 
words of Naanen: 
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The amnesty was for trouble makers, the Ogoni trouble was a different kind of 
trouble, it was an intellectual problem. And Government as usual didn’t value 
intellectual struggles (Interview: 31 July 2015). 
 
In line with the above assertion, Pyagbara observed that,  
 
The amnesty has not addressed the core justice issues that are involved in this whole 
campaign. There are two types of militants in the Niger Delta, there are those who 
are the intellectual militants like the Ogoni and  those who carry guns, so when you 
talk about militants everybody in the Niger Delta has been a militant (Interview: 31 
July 2015). 
 
The response from some of the civil society organisations regarding the amnesty was not 
different from those expressed by some of the Ijaw, Ogoni and ex-militants. Samiama points 
out that, 
 
We thought they should follow examples of successful amnesty programmes, 
particularly the Northern Ireland amnesty, the IRA engagement to us was well done. 
But the government decided to do it their way and somehow it actually worked, at 
least it contributed to the ongoing peace, however, the situation is changing now 
(Interview: 29 July 2015).  
 
Henshaw concludes that, 
 
 
Till today, the government has not addressed any of the root causes of militancy 
which are getting worse, and that runs to only one conclusion, that this region will 
return to militancy, it’s just a matter of time (Interview: 28 July 2015). 
 
These suggest that the peace recorded in the Niger Delta is temporary the prediction of a 
relapse into violence by some of the interviewees has proven to be true with the latest 
resumption of militant attacks on strategic oil installations. Although the amnesty programme 
is on-going, the so called peaceful atmosphere once again faces new violent episodes from 
new militant groups that include the Niger Delta Avengers, Red Egbesu Water Lions, Joint 
Niger Delta Liberation Force, Niger Delta Volunteers, Concerned Militant Leaders and 
several others. The fluidity of the Ijaw movement is further demonstrated in these attacks that 
resumed in 2016, but this is beyond the scope of this study and because it is on-going, will not 
be adequately analysed, it is subject for future research. The amnesty raises the question as to 
whether the problems in the region have been addressed and what will happen post amnesty? 




This chapter built on the conclusions drawn from the previous two chapters on narratives and 
leadership. In this chapter, we have analysed the organizational structure of the Ogoni and the 
Ijaw movements. The discussion has been put within the context of nonviolence and violence 
respectively, and shows the structure employed by the two groups in charting their distinctive 
courses. The first section presented the deliberate adoption of a nonviolent discipline by the 
Ogoni through the meetings and discussions held within the organisation and the final decision 
to fight a nonviolent action through the guidance of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The adoption of 
nonviolence as a strategy saw to the articulation of their grievances and demands into a 
document presented to the state during the Babangida administration as an Ogoni Bill of Rights 
(OBR). While the Ogoni pledged allegiance to the state, they requested for political autonomy 
to engage as a separate unit with the intention of controlling Ogoni affairs as well as using a 
fair amount of their resources for Ogoni development (Saro-Wiwa, 1992), among other 
requests. The OBR led to the establishment of MOSOP, an umbrella organization with a unique 
Ogoni appeal, to fight the Ogoni cause both locally and internationally, and gained the support 
of the UN, Body Shop, Green Peace, the international community and other organizations. 
Under MOSOP, the Ogoni witnessed several internal conflicts and divisions, especially after 
the boycott of the 1993 general elections which the organisation decided to do in spite of 
interests shown by some of the Ogoni elites.  
 
Interview evidence has been used to show that although MOSOP has and is still facing internal 
conflicts, the organisation of the movement has maintained nonviolence. Additional evidence 
has shown some changes from the early stance of MOSOP which involves no relationship with 
the state and the stoppage of oil exploration in the region. The divisions within the organisation 
have been posed as a threat to a unified agreement, and even, not all the Ogoni people are ready 
for oil activities to resume. The reactions of the state to the Ogoni issues have been discussed 
and the chapter also presented briefly some of the latest dimensions of activities happening 
within Ogoniland, specifically, its clean-up based on the recommendations of the 
environmental audit carried out by UNEP. Discussions with key Ogoni leaders suggest a 
possible inclination towards resumption of oil production activities, which MOSOP as an 
organisation is yet to take a definite stand on. But as it stands, the clean-up as well as the 
resumption are greatly challenged by the slow attitude of the state and the existing internal 
divisions within the group. In-spite of all the challenges facing the Ogoni movement, however, 
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evidence has shown that the group is still able to maintain the principle and discipline of 
nonviolence. 
 
On the other hand, just as in the Ogoni case, the chapter portrayed the organisation of the Ijaw 
movement which started nonviolently and saw the development and presentation of the Kaiama 
Declaration but later fractured into several fluid armed groups. The OBR and the Kaiama 
Declaration, although specific to each group’s demands, have further demonstrated the 
distinctiveness of the two movements as well as the different characters of the two groups. 
While to date, the Ogoni still refer to the OBR, the Kaiama Declaration seems to have been 
lost to the multiple fragmentation of the Ijaw movement into armed militant groups such as 
MEND and NDPVF. With the Kaiama Declaration came the IYC which was meant to chart all 
Ijaw issues as in the case of MOSOP, but their movement was fluid and fractured. The Ijaw 
movement witnessed the break-up of militia leaders into almost one hundred and forty military 
style camps that were located within the almost inaccessible creeks in the Niger Delta and 
separate from the Ijaw communities. The famous of these was that led by Tompolo’s camp 5. 
This fragmentation has further verified the earlier assertion of the Ijaw movement lacking the 
discipline and coordination that has existed within the Ogoni group and through which they 
have been able to maintain nonviolence. Rather, the fragmentation of the Ijaw movement 
engages with armed violence.  
 
While on the Ogoni side, the chapter briefly examined a positive side to the reactions of the 
state to their nonviolent actions such as the implementation of the clean-up recommended by 
UNEP, the violence demonstrated by the Ijaw attracted an amnesty deal from the state. The 
analysis of the on-going amnesty deal indicated the achievement of temporary peace in the 
region, which has witnessed the resumption of full oil production activities, but the fluid nature 
of the Niger Delta conflicts has also shown the resurgence of armed militancy activities in 
2016. Here, it has been indicated that the Ijaw violence was not solved. Rather, it was a situation 
of freezing the conflict and ignoring the organisational structure of the violent struggle which 
made remobilisation in the area easy. The lack of an adequate reintegration strategy in the 
amnesty deal specifically facilitated remobilisation. This has proven that predictions made 
during the field work by the Ogoni, Ijaw, and civil society have indeed come true within a very 
short period of time; that if the amnesty deal was not carefully handled, the militants would 
take up arms again. This has once again demonstrated the Ijaw commitment to violence. As 
the amnesty is on-going, a thorough analysis will be the topic of another research.   
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The perception of the Niger Delta conflicts brings forth questions about why a conflict is 
nonviolent or violent while acknowledging that they evolve out of certain historic 
circumstances which are constructed by unique and precise occurrences (Unesco, 1994:2). 
Generally, scholarship on the region has tended to focus on debates from the lenses of resource 
exploitation, marginalisation and neglect. While significant, these discourses tend to present 
the Niger Delta conflict as representative of the region, but neglecting the essential 
understanding of the dynamics of narratives, choice and trajectories used in constructing the 
issues surrounding the resource conflicts. This final chapter offers a summary of the thesis as 
well as the conclusions arrived at during the analysis of the dynamics of choice between the 
Ogoni and the Ijaw movements in the Niger Delta. It will also offer essential policy 
recommendations and suggestions for future research studies. This thesis attempted to 
determine the dynamics of choice between the Ogoni nonviolent struggle and the Ijaw violent 
movement based on the comparative experiences of the two groups and the various strategies 
used in expressing their grievances to the state against oil production activities.  
 
This thesis has argued that in order to better understand the dynamics of the Niger Delta 
conflicts, it is imperative to analyse the dynamics of choice in terms of the distinct courses of 
action taken by the two groups. This was approached through the social construction of reality 
within the perspectives of the Ogoni and the Ijaw, particularly because the method of 
investigation was to analyse the structure of the facts (Searle, 1995:2) that determine the 
direction the different narratives chart in relation to nonviolence or violence. This was 
advanced through the main question of (1) why the Ogoni adopted nonviolence as a means of 
expressing their grievances while the Ijaw opted for a violent course of action. Additionally, 
three sub-questions discussed (2) what role did the leaders of the two groups play in 
determining the strategy adopted in relation to the profile, nature and character of the rebellion. 
(3) How important were the collective narratives developed by the two groups in accounting 
for the trajectories in fighting the Nigerian state; and (4) did the two groups organise themselves 
in ways which reinforced their strategic choices in relation to violence and nonviolence.  
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The research project approached the Ogoni and Ijaw conflicts from the perspective of why 
nonviolence and violence, and these perspectives revolved around the questions of how the 
collective narratives were developed by the leaders of different ethnic groups in the Niger 
Delta, particularly the Ijaw and the Ogoni; the process of interactions and negotiations within 
the two groups that justified the different courses of actions taken to express their grievances 
and frustrations against the Nigerian state, and finally the outcomes that led to the transition 
from a nonviolent to a violent situation. Having closely explored and analysed these trends, I 
argue that the Niger Delta conflicts comprises distinct strategies and ideologies particular to 
Ogoni and the Ijaw, thereby making the conflicts very clearly different.  The understanding 
that violence in the region is most of the time aggravated by the nature of state response to 
protests and expressions of dissatisfaction of oil related activities shows that within the Ogoni, 
the nonviolence has been continuous, while for the Ijaw nonviolence and violence have been 
fluid and recurring themes of the conflicts. 
 
6.1 Overview of Findings 
 
The major findings of this research relate to the research questions presented both in the second 
chapter as well as at the beginning of this chapter. Through the analysis of various discourses, 
historical and secondary as well as structured elite interviews, the foundational reasons which 
occasioned the adoption of nonviolence and violence by the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders were 
systematically examined in relation to the research questions. Having closely observed the two 
sets of narratives, this study has established that although the Ogoni and the Ijaw share similar 
lived experiences, they are not fighting a common cause. Rather, they are each fighting context 
specific battles that are constructed and framed for particular specific communities. The 
important discourses embedded in each community’s context specific battle were explained 
within the context of the strategic logic of different methods (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:6), 
of understanding the relationship between nonviolence and violence tactics and their 
expressions. The major delineations on the choice of strategies were based on three key 
elements; narratives on nonviolence versus violence, leadership and the organizational 






6.2 Narratives on Nonviolence versus Violence 
 
The two sets of narratives in the analysis on the historical narratives constructed on the lived 
experiences of the group leaders exposed that although they both put forward corresponding 
claims, the way in which these have been framed are specific to the group in question. 
Historical understanding of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements became central from the vantage 
point of trying to bring together several episodes that were inarticulate without being 
entrenched in leadership narratives. Through the use of narratives in the construction of both 
the Ogoni and Ijaw identities, the two groups of leaders had to situate the past history within 
factual frames of events relating to the identity of the groups in question; thus the historical 
aspects are directly linked with the construction and reconstruction of collective Ogoni and 
Ijaw meanings (Kratochwil, 2015:33) tied to the identities of the groups. The data collected 
during my interviews for the chapter on narratives established that, for instance, the Ogoni 
leaders narratives which were reviewed from the four sub-themes of (i) collective Ogoni 
narratives, (ii) nature of the Nigerian state, (iii) transnationalism and internationalism, and (iv) 
narratives on oil, constructed the ethnic group as distinct with an exceptional bond to the land. 
It was this bond that has, made unacceptable to the Ogoni anything that affects the environment 
negatively.  
 
But even more crucial in this regard is the positive engagement with the notion of nonviolence 
in the relationship between self-determination groups and the political strategies they adopt to 
determine whether or not they tend towards nonviolent commitment (Cunningham, 2013). In 
the commitment to nonviolence, they systematically pitched their struggle within 
internationally recognised narratives of minority issues situated within the contexts of internal 
colonialism and human rights issues. The notion of internal colonialism for the Ogoni relates 
to their perception of being a minority ethnic group within a minority in Rivers state, and the 
accusation refers to their domination by the Ijaw and the Igbo. This perception of being 
internally colonised steered the leaders towards positive collective agency through such 
discourses, international solidarity and peaceful encounter with the state.  
 
The discourses and political practices associated with the above issues championed by the late 
Ken Saro-Wiwa tended to humanise the enemy through civil protests, letter writing activities 
and campaigns. Being purposive, Saro-Wiwa organised and coordinated the Ogoni in an 
attempt to compel the state and transform the status quo through civil disruption and pressure 
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(Sharp, 1973, 2005) by the international community, particularly the United Nations, Body 
Shop and Green Peace. The findings of this thesis provide ample evidence that in spite of the 
obvious oil and gas related frustrations and discontentment advanced by the oil discovery and 
exploration activities, as well as the actions of the state, the Ogoni as a group do not suggest 
violence through its narratives.  
 
However, for the Ijaw group which were also reviewed along the same four sub-themes, 
establishes some similarities in the peaceful nature of their land before colonisation and oil 
production activities, but when the question shifts to their perception of the state, their 
narratives became more combative and confrontational. It was clear from the interviewees that 
the Ijaw perceived the state within the lenses of the three major groups of Hausa, Igbo and 
Yoruba, who they regard as unfairly dominating specifically the economic and political scene 
within the state. This depicted another major contrast between the minority statuses of the 
Ogoni and the Ijaw. Although the Ijaw failed to regard their relegation in the form of internal 
colonialism, what emerged from the interviews suggest some form of internal colonialism in 
terms of being excluded and controlled by the more powerful ethnic groups. The expressions 
of the forceful governance particularly in terms of oil production and revenue allocation were 
quite strong and aggressive in comparison to the Ogoni.  
 
The successful internationalisation of the Ogoni struggle was not equally achieved by the Ijaw. 
While the former ethnic group attracted significant international attention and recognition to 
their issues, the latter did not approach the international community as a collective group. 
Rather, the findings show that within the Ijaw movement, such international engagements were 
done on individual basis by youth leaders such as Patterson Ogon and Oronto Douglas. 
Although they received some attention by the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch, 
Friends of the Earth to mention but a few, the support was short lived when the protests and 
agitations transformed into a tsunami of armed militancy by Ijaw youth leaders such as Asari 
Dokubo. It established that while the interviewees ascertained the familiarity of the specific 
grievances between the Ogoni and the Ijaw, striking dissimilarities exist between them 
regarding the techniques of presentation, with the latter expressing more frustration and 
desperation. Worthy of mention was the direct impact of oil production activities that have 
resulted in these frustrations and desperations within Ijawland. Consequently, these narratives 
reflect clearly an introduction to the dynamics of choice between nonviolence and violence by 
the Ogoni and the Ijaw. 
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6.3 Nature of the Ogoni and Ijaw Leadership  
 
Closely related to the dynamics of choice between Ogoni nonviolence and Ijaw violence is the 
understanding of the types of leadership that steered the two groups towards their different 
courses of action. The leaderships of the Ogoni and the Ijaw were analysed under the sub-
themes of (i) timing of the struggle, (ii) outlook of the leaders, and (iii) social status of the 
leaders. The findings establishes another major distinction between the two groups. This 
section specifically examined some of the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders, and it stands out that the 
Ogoni have a more disciplined and intellectual leadership exemplified in individuals such as 
Paul Birabi, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ben Naanen and Ledum Mitee. It is hard to overstate that right 
from pre-independence Nigeria, the Ogoni leadership advocated nonviolence and the 
importance of the education and enlightenment of their people. Specifically exemplified in the 
engagements by Ken Saro-Wiwa with the international community and in particular with the 
United Nations, at this level, are Saro-Wiwa’s awareness and experience being a writer fully 
equipped with knowledge of internationally accepted issues on oil related matters. He preached 
and advocated for ethnic autonomy, resource and environmental control, (ERECTISM) to the 
Ogoni, to the extent that the outlook of the leaders became synonymous with maintaining 
nonviolence as a basis for the international support and ERECTISM became the key theme of 
the Ogoni agenda. The leaders demonstrated a collective sense of agency in relation to their 
grievances with the state. 
 
Although the Ogoni leadership became fractured at different levels, which brought about 
divisions within the group, the findings indicate that they were still able to stick together as one 
group. Another important factor observed during the research was that of the social status of 
the Ogoni leaders; most of the leaders have been from middle class educated family 
backgrounds and have been educated to university level in Nigeria. It is clear that their back 
grounds and experiences provided a well-informed platform within which they have been able 
to operate with a collective sense of agency. To date, the Ogoni nonviolence continues to be 
the principle within which the Ogoni engage with the state and oil companies, in spite of all 
the fragmentations and challenges they have faced.  
    
In a similar way, from analysing the data collected in my interviews in Chapter Five, it is 
demonstrated that, for the Ijaw, the nature of leadership was not as co-ordinated and unified as 
that of the Ogoni. For example, the Ijaw leadership could be grouped into two: one comprising 
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the nonviolent intellectual youth leaders such as Patterson Ogon, Isaac Osuoka and Timi 
Ogoriba. These were leaders that attempted to chart a nonviolent Ijaw movement similar to that 
of the Ogoni, which culminated in the production of the Kaiama Declaration. The second group 
were the less educated and more radical militants exemplified in the likes of Asari Dokubo, 
Ateke Tom, Tompolo and Boyloaf. By investigating the different leadership within the Ijaw, 
this thesis provided a clear insight into the often ignored fluid and fractured nature of their 
leadership, which had a major impact on the character and nature of the movement from a 
nonviolent to a violent armed struggle. The dissonance between the nonviolent and violent 
advocates of the Ijaw movement as well as the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa emerged as key 
factors in transforming the conflict from nonviolence to violence. 
 
While the outlook of the Ogoni leaders leaned on a nonviolence stance, that of the Ijaw claimed 
that the state denied agency to the Ijaw people, which provided them only with one option of 
response: to engage in violence against the state. Another important element that stands out 
between the Ogoni and the Ijaw leadership is their social status. For example, the nonviolent 
intellectual group mentioned earlier emerged also from middle class educated backgrounds 
with a variety of work experience, but most of the radical group are from very low income 
families, with the exception of Asari Dokubo whose father was a retired Justice of the Supreme 
Court. Almost all the other militants were school drop outs while some benefitted only from 
primary school education and some had no formal education.  
  
6.4 Organisational Structure of the Ogoni and Ijaw Movements 
 
Organisation of the movements were examined under the sub-themes of (i) organisation of the 
struggle, (ii) strategies of engagement, (iii) current dimension of the struggle. Concentrating 
on how the Ogoni structured their struggle revealed the impact that peaceful links, negotiations 
and advocacy had on their nonviolence posture. Additional distinctions manifested in the 
development of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) and the establishment of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) as an umbrella organisation for all Ogoni. In particular, 
the Ogoni agenda and the adoption of nonviolence by the Ogoni went through series of 
deliberations with a clear choice made between nonviolence and violence. Guided by the 
intellectual ability of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Ogoni leaders were brought together under MOSOP 
through meetings and discussions where the different available options were presented. This 
type of organisation led to the deliberate adoption of civil engagement with the state, in line 
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with the recognition and legitimacy of the struggle gained through the internationalisation of 
their agenda to the UN, Body Shop, Green Peace, and the international community (Chapter 
Five). 
 
The presentation of the articulated set of demands in the form of an OBR to the state paved the 
way for the establishment of MOSOP to push forward the Ogoni agenda, exemplified in the 
boycott of the 1993 general elections (Okonta, 2008; Osha, 2006). Interview evidence from the 
data analysed in Chapter Five showed that although MOSOP became fractured even under the 
leadership of Saro-Wiwa and after his death, nonviolence continues to be the norm. Another 
important observation is the shift in the attitude of MOSOP which at one time forbade 
interactions with the state and oil companies and the successful stoppage of oil related activities 
in the area. Currently, the differences were clear as evidence suggest regular interactions with 
the state and the possibility of the resumption of oil production in the area, bearing in mind that 
some of the Ogonis are still opposed to the idea.  
 
It is considered that the effectiveness and nonviolent standing of MOSOP is quite visible with 
the notable achievement of the anticipated clean-up of Ogoniland under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). Although the Ogoni leaders showed open 
dissatisfaction with the state with regards to the slow pace of activities regarding the clean-up, 
evidence revealed that the group are still able to maintain the principle and discipline of 
nonviolence. Interview evidence indicated a possible resumption of oil exploration in the area.  
A key element which distinguishes the Ijaw movement is their earlier organisation and the 
subsequent production of the Kaiama Declaration and the establishment of the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC). It has been ascertained that while the Ogoni have continued to press their 
demands in the OBR, the Kaiama Declaration remained relevant only for a few months as a 
result of the multiple, fluid and fractured style of the leadership of their movement. The 
declaration became lost with the transformation of the movement from nonviolence to violence, 
because it changed hands with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
and other such militant groups that sprang up.  
 
State responses to the two movements served as further elements that separates them in the 
sense that the Ogoni are currently talking about the UNEP clean up while the Ijaw are faced 
with two distinct actions. The escalation of the Ijaw conflict to violence which directly affected 
the oil economy of the state saw the pronouncement of an amnesty to the armed militants, 
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which evidence showed was received with mix feelings and uncertainty within both the Ijaw 
and the Ogoni. Within the intellectual Ijaw group, the perception is that of another clear failure 
by the state in addressing the root causes of the Ijaw problems, while the Ogoni, although 
sharing the same view, also regard it as a reward for violence with a prediction by both the Ijaw 
and the Ogoni of a resurgence of the violent militancy. However, the analysis of the on-going 
amnesty showed the achievement of temporary peace which could be regarded as negative 
peace (Galtung, 1969), and has seen the resumption of oil activities and a boost to the Nigerian 
economy that ninety percent relies on accrued oil revenues.  
  
The accuracy of the prediction of both the Ijaw and Ogoni manifested in 2016 in that the region 
is now engaged in another cycle of violent bombings of strategic oil facilities. Going back to 
the interview with Elder Orubebe (3 August 2015), a onetime Minister for Niger Delta Affairs, 
during which it was clear that under the amnesty deal several ex militants have been trained in 
under water marine wielding and oil drilling areas, and in the event of a relapse of the region 
into violence, it is demonstrated that the impact would be more than what was recorded in the 
past.  Therefore, it is a major finding of this study that the Ijaw conflicts are just a perpetual 
continuous recycling of recurring themes swinging between nonviolence and violence in stark 
contrast of the Ogoni who have remained fixed on nonviolence as a choice. 
 
6.5 Contribution of the Thesis 
 
The story of the Niger Delta conflict is incomplete without the critical understanding of the 
dynamics of choice between the different ethnic groups engaged in the region’s conflicts. As 
this thesis has argued, some scholars tend to discuss the Niger Delta conflict generally as one, 
with mentions of the Ogoni and Ijaw groups. This study has provided a detailed analysis of the 
differences between the Ogoni struggle and the Ijaw movement. Bearing in mind the 
similarities in their lived experiences, it has showed the convergence of experiences. This is 
strategic as it has brought into the discourses on the Niger Delta the voices of key contributors 
such as Ledum Mitee and Legborsi Pyagbara from the Ogoni angle as well as Patterson Ogon, 
D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha and T.K. Ogoriba. Of particular importance is that it fills the gap in the 
existing literature on the region by bringing to the fore the significance of including narratives, 
leadership and organisation of the different movements together in the Niger Delta analysis for 
the Nigerian state, this thesis provides some strategic perspectives from which to consider 
critically not only the Niger Delta conflict but even the wider national conflicts such as Boko 
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Haram, and help in the formulation of policies. This is crucial because, the militarised 
perception of one size fits all and the failure to take into consideration the historical specifics 
and dynamics of each form of protests and grievances tend to push nations into recurring cycles 
of conflicts some of which are becoming more violent than others. It is not enough merely to 
identify a conflict. The government’s ability to identify the reasons why in the same region one 
group takes up arms while the other remains nonviolent is key to peace within the Nigerian 
state. 
 
6.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This thesis created a framework of three key elements in terms of narratives, leadership and 
organisation to examine the dynamics of choice. Adopting this framework will enable 
researchers and policy makers to gain better understanding of the subject matter. It opens the 
door to applying my approach to other movements locally and internationally for future 
researchers. This framework suggests some opportunities for future research, for example, as 
the current thesis has focused only on two ethnic groups within the Niger Delta, additional 
research capturing other articulated sets of demands from groups such as the Chikoko 
Movement 1997, Oron Bill of Rights 1999, Aklaka Declaration 1999, the Urhobo Economic 
Summit 1998, the Charter of Demands of the Ogbia People 1992, The Warri Accord 1999, The 
Ikwerre Rescue Charter 1999, and The Niger Delta Peoples Compact 2008, will provide a 
wider and more detailed understanding of the differences and similarities of the Niger Delta 
conflicts. As the amnesty is on-going, a thorough analysis should be the topic of another 
research study in order to fully assess its impact and benefits (if any), and possibly a 
comparative analysis of the Nigerian, Northern Ireland, and the South African amnesties. 
Fieldwork in the Niger Delta revealed that even though the amnesty had at one point reduced 
active and sustained physical combat, with new militant groups emerging in the region, peace 
here remains elusive.  
 
 A mini research carried out by the researcher examined that the construction of amnesty as 
social harmony in the Niger Delta is a major challenge that side-lines the actual grievances 
(Mai-Bornu, 2016). Therefore, an exploration of the similarities and differences of the Niger 
Delta and Northern Ireland amnesties could be carried out to examine how the concept of peace 
is constructed and interpreted in terms of the two amnesties granted. The constructivist 
perspective might be used to explore the question of ‘What have been the main consequences 
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of the two amnesties, and how has it affected the peace and conflict dynamics’. For example, 
the goal of this would be to argue that if not efficiently handled, the Nigerian amnesty deal 
would give rise to potentially more radically armed militia organizations in the country, which 
will ultimately lead to regional instability. Researching this is important as it will better situate 




This thesis connected the three key elements of narratives, leadership and organisation as the 
basis for an informed understanding of the Niger Delta conflict. However, while 
acknowledging the similarities of the living experiences of the Ogoni and the Ijaw ethnic 
groups in the Niger Delta, clear distinctions emerged, showing that the two conflicts are not 
one and the same. Looking into the future and having gained a better and more informed 
understanding of the nonviolent and violent aspects of the Niger Delta conflicts, it is hoped that 
this knowledge would help in some ways to solve some of the problems out there. The Ogoni 
and the Ijaw movements are major milestones in the discourse of the Niger Delta conflicts 
basically targeted at addressing their perceived domination and marginalisation with the hope 
of achieving self-determination and resource control within the Nigerian state. The harsh and 
militarised responses of the state to the Niger Delta question continues to recur and has seen 
the emergence of nonviolent intellectual and violent militant postures from two ethnic groups 
in the region. These different positions have affected the quest for national security, unity, and 
stability within the state, which go back to historical minority issues that have been ignored 
since pre- and post-independence. The perceived injustices and grievances which have haunted 
most minorities are factors which have continuously aggravated nonviolent and violent 
minority agitations and contestations in the state. The fact that the state reacted with harsh 
repression against both the violent and nonviolent activism, exasperated attitudes whereas a 
more nuanced and articulated response would have helped strengthen nonviolence. Perhaps, 
the state’s recent behaviour towards and engagement with the Ogoni represents a possible way 
forward to the Niger Delta conflicts in Nigeria.  
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IJAW YOUTHS OF THE NIGER DELTA 
BEING COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF THE ALL IJAW YOUTHS 
CONFERENCE 
WHICH HELD IN THE TOWN OF KAIAMA THIS 11TH DAY OF DECEMBER 1998 
   
INTRODUCTION  
   
We, Ijaw youths drawn from over five hundred communities from over 40 clans that make up 
the Ijaw nation and representing 25 representative organisations met, today, in Kaiama to 
deliberate on the best way to ensure the continuous survival of the indigenous peoples of the 
Ijaw ethnic nationality of the Niger Delta within the Nigerian state.  
   
After exhaustive deliberations, the Conference observed:  
a. That it was through British colonisation that the IJAW NATION was forcibly put under the 
Nigerian State  
b. That but for the economic interests of the imperialists, the Ijaw ethnic nationality would have 
evolved as a distinct and separate sovereign nation, enjoying undiluted political, economic, 
social, and cultural AUTONOMY. 
c. That the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the British 
marked the beginning of the balkanisation of a hitherto territorially contiguous and culturally 
homogeneous Ijaw people into political and administrative units, much to our disadvantage. 
This trend is continuing in the balkanisation of the Ijaws into six states-Ondo, Edo, Delta, 
Bayelsa, Rivers and Akwa Ibom States, mostly as minorities who suffer socio-political, 
economic, cultural and psychological deprivations.  
d. That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, suppression 
and marginalisation visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the Nigerian state and transnational oil 
companies.  
e. That the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil mineral 
resources which account for over 80% of GDP, 95 %of national budget and 90% of foreign 
exchange earnings. From which, 65%, 75% and 70% respectively are derived from within the 
Ijaw nation. Despite these huge contributions, our reward from the Nigerian State remains 
avoidable deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military repression.  
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f. That the unabating damage done to our fragile natural environment and to the health of our 
people is due in the main to uncontrolled exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural 
gas which has led to numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening up of our 
forests to loggers, indiscriminate canalisation, flooding, land subsidence, coastal erosion, earth 
tremors etc. Oil and gas are exhaustible resources and the complete lack of concern for 
ecological rehabilitation, in the light of the Oloibiri experience, is a signal of impending doom 
for the peoples of Ijawland.  
g. That the degradation of the environment of Ijawland by transnational oil companies and the 
Nigerian State arise mainly because Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to 
ownership and control of their land and resources through the instrumentality of undemocratic 
Nigerian State legislations such as the Land Use Decree of 1978, the Petroleum Decrees of 
1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting etc.) Decree No. 52 of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree), 
the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997 etc.  
h. That the principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has been consciously and 
systematically obliterated by successive regimes of the Nigerian state. We note the drastic 
reduction of the Derivation Principle from 100% (1953), 50% (1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975) 
2% (1982), 1.5% (1984) to 3% (1992 to date), and a rumoured 13% in Abacha's 1995 
undemocratic and unimplemented Constitution.  
i. That the violence in Ijawland and other parts of the Niger Delta area, sometimes manifesting 
in intra and inter-ethnic conflicts are sponsored by the State and transnational oil companies to 
keep the communities of the Niger Delta area divided, weak and distracted from the causes of 
their problems.  
j. That the recent revelations of the looting of national treasury by the Abacha junta is only a 
reflection of an existing and continuing trend of stealing by public office holders in the Nigerian 
state. We remember the over 12 billion dollars Gulf war windfall, which was looted by 
Babangida and his cohorts We note that over 70% of the billions of dollars being looted by 
military rulers and their civilian collaborators is derived from our ecologically devastated 
Ijawland.  
Based on the foregoing, we, the youths of Ijawland, hereby make the following resolutions to 
be known as the Kaiama Declaration:  
1. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong 
to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.  
 
2. We cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the 
right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our 
participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum Decree etc. 
 
3. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of occupation 
and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed 
forces of the Nigerian State to "protect" its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw 
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people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should appeal to their 
people to leave the Ijaw area alone.  
 
4..Ijaw youths in all the communities in all Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to 
implement these resolutions beginning from the 30th of December, 1998, as a step towards 
reclaiming the control of our lives. We, therefore, demand that all oil companies stop all 
exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area. We are tired of gas flaring; oil spillages, 
blowouts and being labelled saboteurs and terrorists. It is a case of preparing the noose for our 
hanging. We reject this labelling. Hence, we advise all oil companies’ staff and contractors to 
withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th December, 1998 pending the resolution of the issue 
of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta  
 
5. Ijaw youths and Peoples will promote the principle of peaceful coexistence between all Ijaw 
communities and with our immediate neighbours, despite the provocative and divisive actions 
of the Nigerian State, transnational oil companies and their contractors. We offer a hand of 
friendship and comradeship to our neighbours: the Itsekiri, Ilaje, Urhobo, Isoko, Edo, Ibibio, 
Ogoni, Ekpeye, Ikwerre etc. We affirm our commitment to joint struggle with the other ethnic 
nationalities in the Niger delta area for self-determination. 
 
6. We express our solidarity with all people’s organisations and ethnic nationalities in Nigeria 
and elsewhere who are struggling for self-determination and justice. In particular we note the 
struggle of the Oodua people’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People (Mosop), Egi Women's Movement etc. 
 
7. We extend our hand of solidarity to the Nigerian oil workers (NUPENG and PENGASSAN) 
and expect that they will see this struggle for freedom as a struggle for humanity   
 
8. We reject the present transition to civil rule programme of the Abubakar regime, as it is not 
preceded by restructuring of the Nigerian federation. The way forward is a Sovereign National 
Conference of equally represented ethnic nationalities to discuss the nature of a democratic 
federation of Nigerian ethic nationalities. Conference noted the violence and killings that 
characterized the last local government elections in most parts of the Niger Delta. Conference 
pointed out that these electoral conflicts are a manifestation of the undemocratic and unjust 
nature of the military transition programme. Conference affirmed therefore, that the military 
are incapable of enthroning true democracy in Nigeria. 
9 We call on all Ijaws to remain true to their Ijawness and to work for the total liberation of 
our people. You have no other true home but that which is in Ijawland.  
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10 We agreed to remain within Nigeria but to demand and work for Self-Government and 
resource control for the Ijaw people. Conference approved that the best way for Nigeria is a 
federation of ethnic nationalities. The federation should be run on the basis equality and social 
justice.  
Finally, Ijaw youths resolve to set up the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the struggle 
of Ijaw peoples for self-determination and justice.  
Signed for the entire participants by:  
Felix Tuodolo   
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